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Introduction
Summer 2015. While the beaches of Greek islands received boat after boat 
of refugees, a large part of the space of the central station in Copenhagen 
was occupied by young Danish volunteers who distributed sandwiches, 
drinks, blankets, and second-hand clothes to crowds of people on the 
move, most fleeing wars in Syria and Afghanistan. Locals bought train 
and bus tickets so the travellers could continue their journey onwards to 
Sweden and beyond. Across the strait forming the Swedish–Danish border, 
the Sound (hereafter Öresund), in Malmö, Swedish volunteers were doing 
the same as their Danish counterparts. Only a few weeks later did Malmö 
municipality and the local branch of the Swedish Migration Agency send 
some of their employees to meet those who were on the move. The asylum 
seekers were slowly registered and accommodated by different authorities. 
After their encounters with police and border patrol agents, they met case-
workers from the Migration Agency, healthcare professionals for medical 
check-ups, employees and managers from refugee camps, schoolteachers 
for their children, and many more representatives of the welfare state. 
Those encounters were to shape and form their experiences from that point 
onwards.
From the news reports, it became evident that the situation was more or 
less the same at train stations and border crossings all over Europe. Within 
a few weeks, however, a refugee crisis had been declared by media outlets 
and politicians in many countries of Europe. The crowd at the Scandinavian 
stations was replaced by police officers after the Swedish government imple-
mented border controls. The Danes followed suit. From that point onwards, 
the trains between Copenhagen and Malmö were stopped twice on their 
40-minute journey; first, at the train station next to Copenhagen interna-
tional airport, and second, at the next train station across the Öresund in 
Sweden, Malmö Hyllie. Guards met all travellers, asking for passports and 
ID cards, severely delaying the trains. Fewer and fewer people in line 
waiting to have their papers checked were asylum seekers. The crowd soon 
consisted of local commuters and European travellers. Talk of the refugee 
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crisis almost vanished from public discourse a few months later. What 
remains, however, are debates about what institutional arrangements are 
best suited to ‘integrate’ the refugees and maximise their utility for the 
welfare state they encounter.
Despite the spotlight, whether during the ‘long summer of migration’ 
in 2015 (Hess et al., 2016; Odugbesan and Schwiertz, 2018), which led 
to the constructed notion of a refugee crisis, or in the many welfare state 
interventions that target refugees across Europe, little is known about the 
experiences of refugees in their countries of settlement. Even less is known 
about those daily experiences in the established bureaucracies of the North-
ern European countries where increasing numbers have settled.1 Through 
interrogating the phenomenon of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’, and its foreplay 
and aftermath in the context of Northern Europe, this edited volume 
analyses the tensions that emerge when strong welfare states are faced with 
large migration flows. With an eye to the daily strategies and experiences 
of newly settled populations, this book tackles the role played by different 
actors such as state agencies, street-level bureaucrats, media discourses, 
and welfare policies in shaping those experiences. As we argue later in this 
introduction, the receiving states encountered those groups of people on 
the move as largely embodying high levels of risk that had to be mitigated 
through various mechanisms. The assumption of risk triggered the desire 
to control the flows of people and control the individuals who embodied 
the perceived risks. When control and discipline were being challenged, 
the sense of crisis took over public discourses and policy environments, 
triggering exaggerated responses that were camouflaged under the term 
refugee crisis. Writing prior to 2015, Peter Gatrell (2013, p. 17) reminds 
us that ‘there is a tendency to regard refugee crises as temporary and 
unique rather than as “recurring phenomena”’. Gatrell’s statement draws 
attention to crises as recurring phenomena, ones that strengthen gover-
nance through risk. As recurring phenomena, governing crises also involves 
the enactment of violence, which is the argument we put forth in this 
volume.
Given the significant similarities and differences between the welfare 
states of Northern Europe and their reactions to the perceived refugee crisis 
of 2015, the book focuses primarily on the three main cases of Denmark, 
Sweden, and Germany. Placed in a wider Northern European context – and 
illustrated by those chapters that discuss refugee experiences also in Norway 
and the UK – the Danish, Swedish, and German cases are the largest case 
studies of this edited volume. To focus on these three national contexts is 
meaningful because they include 1) Denmark, a country with one of the 
most restrictive asylum policies in Europe; 2) Sweden, having one of the 
– formerly – most generous asylum systems in the Global North;2 and 3) 
Germany, which, since 2015 and of all EU member states, has received the 
largest number of asylum applications (UNHCR, 2017).
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The aim of the book: studying refugees and welfare  
state bureaucracies
It is difficult to approach the state methodologically and conceptually, to 
define its boundaries, and to disentangle the power structures within the 
context of state–society relations. Empirical research can, however, analyse 
some of the effects that the state’s institutions and its employees have on 
people’s everyday lives – and vice versa. With regards to the mechanisms 
that the state applies to govern its population, the analytical significance of 
studying bureaucratic practices has been highlighted: ‘The ongoing nature 
of governance requires maintenance and administration. This suggests that 
scholars interested in the workings and the effects of the state should look, 
at the very least, to the bureaucracies that keep it running’ (Bernstein and 
Mertz, 2011, p. 6). One example of such research is the study of refugee 
asylum and reception, which has been conducted in and across different 
national contexts (e.g. McKinnon, 2008; Canning, 2017; Maroufi, 2017; 
Sager and Öberg, 2017; Gateri, 2018).
This is also the subject of the book, which contributes to debates on the 
governance of non-citizens and the meaning of displacement, mobility, and 
seeking asylum by providing interdisciplinary analyses of a largely over-
looked region of the world, with two specific aims. First, we scrutinise the 
construction of the 2015 crisis as a response to the large influx of refugees, 
paying particular attention to the disciplinary discourses and bureaucratic 
structures that are associated with it. Second, we investigate refugees’ 
encounters with these bureaucratic structures and how these encounters 
shape hopes and possibilities for building a new life after displacement. This 
allows us to show that the mobility of specific segments of the world’s 
population continues to be seen as a threat and a risk that has to be gov-
erned and controlled. Focusing on the Northern European context, the 
volume interrogates emerging policies and discourses, as well as the lived 
experiences of bureaucratisation from the perspective of individuals who 
find themselves the very objects of bureaucracies.
In his classical conception, Max Weber (2009, p. 245) defined a bureau-
cracy as a ‘permanent structure with a system of rational rules … fashioned 
to meet calculable and recurrent needs by means of normal routine’. This 
definition, while offering an ideal type and not an empirical reality, is taken 
to reify a vision of a bureaucracy that is impersonal and merit-based, and 
founded on rational-legal administrative structures, which promises a 
variety of practical freedoms. While Weber saw the risk of bureaucracies 
as resulting in an ‘iron cage’ (stahlhartes Gehäuse in the German original, 
see Weber, 2009) governed by mundane, stagnant administrative structures, 
more contemporary studies highlight the ways these structures reproduce 
axes of discrimination and inequality. Bureaucracies involve power dynam-
ics that affect the everyday lives of citizens (Herzfeld, 1992; Bernstein and 
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Mertz, 2011), sometimes with violent outcomes (Graeber, 2015). We 
address such violent outcomes associated with bureaucracy later in this 
introductory chapter but, before we do that, we highlight the relevance of 
focusing on bureaucracies in understanding experiences with forced dis-
placement and important features of the Northern European context.
In his formative book, The Making of the Modern Refugee, Peter Gatrell 
(2013) draws attention to an international refugee regime that constructs 
refugee migration as a problem which is amenable to a solution, and argues 
that humanitarianism ‘fashion[s] the modern refugee as a passive and trau-
matised object of intervention’ (Gatrell, 2013, p. 13). As a legal category, 
the label refugee ‘seek[s] to “discipline” life and knowledge to realise domi-
nant interests in society’ (Chimni, 2009, p. 12). As Liisa Malkki (1992) 
convincingly argued, nation state projects include a naturalisation of the 
links between people and place as well as a sedentary bias. This implies 
that populations on the move (be they nomads or forced-displaced), both 
across national borders and within a state’s territory, are seen not only as 
abnormal but also as a politico-moral problem (Malkki, 1992). ‘Histori-
cally, refugees’ loss of bodily connection to their [national] homelands came 
to be treated as a loss of moral bearings. Rootless, they were no longer 
trustworthy as “honest citizens”’ (Malkki, 1992, p. 32). Regarding forced-
displaced people,3 the bureaucratic labelling of refugees creates stereotypes 
and generalisations in the process of registering and providing support to 
those who have sought international protection (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Zetter, 
1991). This process partly averts attempts by refugees to express individual 
or collective will, although at times it has also been resourcefully used as a 
basis for political mobilisation (Malkki, 1995; Gren, 2015; Joormann, 
2018; Odugbesan and Schwiertz, 2018).
Roger Zetter (1991) highlights explicitly ‘the extreme vulnerability of 
refugees to imposed labels’ as well as ‘the non-participatory nature and pow-
erlessness of refugees in these processes’ (p. 39; see also chapter 9 below). 
Yet, Zetter (1991) argues, labelling is not simply imposed but is a dynamic 
process, negotiated between the forced-displaced and those institutions that 
attempt to support them. As Lacroix (2004) has shown, the intersection 
between bureaucratisation and ‘refugeeness’ is not as simple as extend-
ing the denial of refugees’ agency, collective will, and, thus, democratic 
or political participation. There remain possibilities, although limited, for 
forced-displaced people to act collectively and engage in the politics of the 
receiving country and/or their countries of origin. Specifically, with regards 
to the effects of bureaucratisation on refugees’ agency, it is important to 
note that bureaucratisation is not unique to refugees but marks the lives of 
most people around the world, not least citizens in Northern Europe. Few 
people who seek asylum, however, are prepared to handle those bureaucratic 
interventions which asylum processes and integration programmes demand 
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(Jackson, 2008; Whyte, 2011). People are subjected to multiple layers of 
bureaucracies around the world, but those who are labelled refugees or seek 
such a status are especially so. It is our contention that Northern European 
welfare state bureaucracies maintain a level of discipline and control over 
the daily lives of their welfare clients that reproduces axes of exclusion and 
inclusion through mundane everyday interactions. Such tension between 
welfare and discipline calls for specific investigations of the encounters 
between refugees and the welfare states of Northern Europe.
Northern European welfare states are known for their efficiency and the 
support that their national as well as local institutions of government enjoy 
among citizens (Fitzgerald and Wolak, 2014).4 A strong claim to bureau-
cratic efficiency, either imagined or real, is an important characteristic 
that sets apart Northern European countries from Europe’s South. Asylum 
systems such as the Greek or the Italian – largely due to their geographi-
cal location, and their politically and economically subordinated position 
within the Dublin system5 – are struggling to register, process, and accom-
modate people who seek asylum (Georgoulas, 2017; Mallardo, 2017; see 
also Herzfeld 1992; Pardo and Prato, 2011; Navaro-Yashin, 2012). At the 
same time, the bureaucracies of Northern Europe can trap applicants in 
the bureaucratic iron cage discussed above, which makes steel-hard claims 
to the rule of law, primarily understood as legal correctness, certainty, and 
efficiency (Johannesson, 2017; Joormann, 2019). This being noted, it is 
important to highlight that there are significant differences between the 
welfare states of Northern Europe. Some provide only a minimum safety 
net for their citizens; the German system’s minimal financial aid to the 
long-term unemployed (Hartz IV) is a case in point. Others, for instance the 
Swedish welfare state, are meant to serve all members of society – includ-
ing, arguably, full citizens and legally residing non-citizens more or less 
alike.6
More importantly, Northern European welfare states have undergone 
processes of privatisation and marketisation that influence the overall work-
ings of welfare state institutions. Graeber (2015, p. 17) describes the current 
state of the world as ‘the age of total bureaucratisation’, in which the private 
and public sectors seem to have fused. In his view, paradoxically, the pri-
vatisation of contemporary welfare states and their services, aiming to 
reduce government interference in the economy and society, have instead 
produced ‘more regulations, more bureaucrats and more police’ (Graeber, 
2015, p. 9). This holds true to Northern European welfare states, in which 
citizens’ individual responsibility and activity are increasingly emphasised 
over the state’s responsibility to support citizens (see Pedersen, 2011; Bruun 
et al., 2015; Rytter, 2018). We believe that this is part and parcel of the 
neoliberal turn influencing welfare states in Northern Europe and, there-
fore, of special relevance to the analyses offered in this volume.
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The context of the book: re-bordering Northern Europe
Differences in social welfare policies withstanding, the reactions to the long 
summer of migration in 2015 depict the convergence in Northern Euro-
pean states’ approaches to the provision of asylum. We understand this 
as a process of re-bordering, which entails reverting back to pre-Schengen 
national border controls within the EU.7 Sweden’s government, at first, 
prided itself in receiving the highest rate of asylum seekers per capita in the 
EU (Barker, 2018). In a matter of months, however, this welcoming policy 
was replaced by the re-emergence of a strict border between the two Nordic 
countries and EU member states Denmark and Sweden through extensive 
passport controls targeting asylum seekers. As an immediate response, in 
order to avoid becoming a bottleneck for unwanted migrants on their way 
north, Denmark established general passport controls on its border with 
Germany. Having said this, it should be emphasised that travellers on their 
way south, i.e. from Sweden through Denmark to Germany, could gener-
ally continue to cross these borders without being checked at all.8 While 
stricter border controls were implemented and accompanied by a more 
stringent asylum law (Meier-Braun, 2017), Germany has not started to 
control its borders in the face of asylum seekers in the same meticulous way 
as Sweden and Denmark did (see Dietz, 2017; Meier-Braun, 2017; Hoesch,  
2018).9
We see this process of re-bordering as strongly intertwined with the 
workings of the welfare state system. For example, as part of the campaign 
for 2018’s national elections (see Figure 1 below), Sweden’s Social Demo-
crats linked immigration control to the welfare state (Lindberg, 2017). 
Below the photograph of two border patrol officers checking passports on 
one of the trains that cross the Öresund, the claim that ‘We protect Sweden’s 
security’ is followed by the announcement that ‘the Swedish [Welfare] 
Model will be developed, not dismantled’. Presenting (unwanted) border 
crossers as a threat to Swedish national and social security, one can identify 
within this advertisement a discourse that constructs migration control as 
a policy tool to ‘develop’ rather than ‘diminish’ the welfare state. As chapter 
7 in this volume shows, the legal restrictions on asylum seeking introduced 
in Sweden at the end of 2015 were strongly couched in a discourse that 
was based on the importance of the welfare state and its institutions and 
less so on engaging in an argument about the moral responsibility of pro-
viding asylum to those seeking refuge.
When considering welfare states such as Sweden, immigration policy 
brings together two fields: immigration control and welfare policy (Myrberg, 
2014). Immigration control regulates who is allowed to enter the country 
and deals with controls that are mostly external to the nation state. Welfare 
policy regulates the provision of social rights to the inhabitants of the 
country and, thus, focuses on distributive measures that are internal to the 
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nation state (see chapter 5 below). Following the argument that ‘the idea 
of distributive justice presupposes a bounded world within which distribu-
tion takes place’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 31), Swedish political scientist Karin 
Borevi (2012, p. 32; see also Öberg, 1994) argues that two general options 
can be discerned regarding the question of who is allowed to enjoy national 
welfare: 1) a system where everyone with legal residence in the country has 
equal access to the welfare policy but with limitations concerning who is 
allowed to immigrate; or 2) a system of relatively free immigration policy 
but with a differentiated right to welfare for different categories of inhabit-
ants (for example, limited benefits for certain groups of non-citizens). The 
latter system resembles the guest-worker model, where migrants are expected 
to return after some time. Varieties of this second model have been applied 
in, for instance, Germany and Austria, as well as in the Scandinavian coun-
tries in the early decades of labour migration after the Second World War. 
1 Election campaign poster for the Social Democratic Party (Sweden)
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Since the 1970s, however, the first model, focusing on equal access and 
limited immigration, has become the preferred choice for Northern Europe’s 
welfare states, although in different forms.
Over time, our three main cases (Sweden, Denmark, and Germany) have 
moved away from the first option outlined by Borevi. One example that 
clearly illustrates this approach is the temporary law in Sweden, which has 
been in force since July 2016 and will remain (at least) until July 2021. 
According to this package of temporarily more restrictive regulations, only 
applicants who receive (full) refugee status via UNHCR’s resettlement pro-
gramme (quota refugees) are granted permanent residence permits (hereaf-
ter PRPs). For other protection-seeking people whose applications have 
been accepted, temporary residence permits (hereafter TRPs) are issued.10 
Refugees who live in Sweden on a TRP, despite the fact that they are legally 
recognised as ‘in need of protection’, are granted only limited rights to 
family reunification. They indeed face increased ‘maintenance requirements’ 
for family reunification under the temporary law. This means that people 
who live in Sweden on a TRP must be able to financially provide for the 
family members who plan to move to Sweden. Furthermore, the Swedish 
welfare state has significantly reduced the benefits available for the most 
vulnerable group of people who seek asylum: rejected applicants (who 
might often be in the process of appealing their case, see chapter 2 below). 
This regulation limits assistance for maintaining livelihood and housing 
from local social services. Those aspects which led to Sweden being a rela-
tively refugee-welcoming destination until recently have been reduced to a 
‘minimum level’ (as the Swedish government used the term in 2015–2016). 
Indeed, the current situation in Sweden illustrates that the reality of govern-
ing welfare and immigration in today’s Northern European countries has 
moved away from both of Borevi’s models – 1) full access to welfare but 
limited immigration, or 2) relatively free immigration policy but with a 
differentiated right to welfare – as outlined above (for the Danish case, see 
chapter 5 below). Instead, a third alternative consisting of limited immigra-
tion and limited access to welfare has emerged.
Yet it should not be assumed that such restrictive policies are necessarily 
successful in meeting their goal of deterring people from seeking asylum 
or establishing permanent residence in their host societies. As empirical 
research has shown time and again (see Banakar, 2015), the socially prac-
tised ‘law in action’ is strongly dependent on the interpretation that the 
responsible actors perform when they apply regulations. In other words, 
those changed norms and rules of refugee reception have to be not only 
implemented but also discursively interpreted and socially practised at dif-
ferent levels. In the EU context, this administration operates at the national 
but also at the supra-national and local levels (see e.g. chapters 9 and 12, 
this volume).
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In most countries of Northern Europe, the reception of refugees is 
handled at the local level, and the pressure on municipalities across Europe 
to find pragmatic solutions has risen (Ireland, 2004, pp. 7–8; Caponio and 
Borkert, 2010, pp. 9–13). Municipalities and other local political and 
bureaucratic institutions have increased in importance for the settling and 
integration of refugees. Simultaneously, bordering mechanisms are being 
exercised within the borders of the nation state, adding another dimension 
to the process of re-bordering. In chapter 5 of this volume, Lindberg inves-
tigates this internal bordering by focusing on those Danish and Swedish 
welfare regulations and practices that are currently used to exhaust unwanted 
migrants in order to make them leave. In chapter 12, Canning takes on the 
notion of internalised bordering and highlights the micro-level, everyday 
forms of social control which deliberately encroach on the autonomy of 
people seeking asylum in the Danish, Swedish, and British contexts. Such 
encroachment replicates the experiences of borders in daily experiences and 
practices.
Given examples such as the Danish and Swedish minimum (welfare) 
rights policies that are currently enforced, the localisation of refugee man-
agement makes the encounter between forced-displaced people and state 
bureaucracies a daily affair, which would be escaped more easily were the 
state an omnipresent yet abstract actor. In those day-to-day encounters 
between the state and refugees, street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) such 
as police officers, caseworkers at the Migration Agency, language teachers, 
and social workers are crucial and often constitute the only direct contact 
with the state and its policies. In this volume, chapters 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, and 
12 highlight the clashes between refugees’ assumptions about the relatively 
welcoming societies of Northern Europe and the local realities of restrictive 
policies, asylum processing, integration programmes, and unwelcoming or 
even hostile discourses about forced-displaced people. Chapters 2, 3, 6, 7, 
and 8 probe the ways in which re-bordering is a process that is legitimised, 
justified, and also manipulated at the political, legal, and cultural levels. At 
the centre of these processes of re-bordering and their consequences, we 
argue, is a perception of risk and a desire to manage refugees through miti-
gating risks. This process of mitigating risks is characterised by bureaucratic 
violence, which we discuss in the following sections.
Deconstructing the refugee crisis: governing through risk
A critical approach to Northern Europe’s most recent refugee crisis can 
benefit from applying Ulrich Beck’s analysis of Risk Society. There is an 
abundant literature on ways that people’s mobility is seen as dangerous 
and threatening (e.g. Turner, 2007; Isotalo, 2009), and various strands of 
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research document the risks associated with migration and displacement, 
such as health risks (e.g. Kentikelenis et al., 2015), behavioural risks (e.g. 
Hosper et al., 2007), and security risks (e.g. Faist, 2002). The very decision 
to migrate is believed to entail a number of risks (see e.g. Heindlmaier and 
Blauberger, 2017). Security risks associated with migration have legitimised 
extraordinary policies related to asylum and migrant rights (Hampshire, 
2011; see also Bourbeau, 2015). Securitisation withstanding, we believe that 
the approach to migrants and asylum seekers is part of a larger neoliberal 
governmentality strategy that is constitutive of Beck’s risk society. More-
over, the sedentary bias in viewing migration and displacement (see Malkki, 
1995; Bakewell, 2002) constructs and amplifies the problems associated 
with the mobility of people. When sedentarism is naturalised, mobility, 
movement, and migration pose a problem and an anomaly, and the mecha-
nisms of control have to ensure that certain cross-border mobility is cur-
tailed (Malkki, 1995) and contained. There is the risk that ‘bogus’ claims to 
asylum are presented; government practices and employees have to ensure 
the credibility of claims. Once granted asylum, there is a risk that people 
will cluster in ethnic neighbourhoods and establish urban ‘ghettos’, which 
is controlled for by ensuring distribution of accepted refugees among the 
different municipalities to ‘share the burden’. Once settled, there continues 
to be a risk that refugees will roam around the nation state and disappear 
from the municipalities’ purview. Registering refugees and enrolling them 
in introductory programmes forces their regular interaction with state offi-
cials and their continuous surveillance. Introductory programmes perform 
the added function of mitigating the risks of refugees becoming endlessly 
unemployed and, thus, long-term recipients of welfare assistance (see e.g. 
Valenta and Bunar, 2010; Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012; Schmidt, 2013; 
Myrberg, 2017). The shift to TRPs, as discussed above, is a clear reflection 
of the risk that refugees may become permanent inhabitants depending on 
social welfare in a context where many citizens experience their welfare 
state as threatened due to constant budget cuts, privatisation, and lowered 
taxes.
Settlement, introductory programmes, and temporary status are different 
examples of the logic of governmentality and its reliance on disciplinary 
power. According to Foucault (1979), disciplinary power is that which is 
exercised through administrative systems and social services, such as prisons, 
schools, and mental health services. As disciplinary institutions, they rely 
on mechanisms such as surveillance, assessment, the organisation of space, 
timetables, and daily routines, which ensure that people behave in certain 
ways or are being disciplined without having to resort to the use of corporal 
violence. Disciplinary mechanisms ensure the control of populations and 
promote norms of human conduct in modern society. In face of migration 
risks, they become increasingly important and relevant to disciplining the 
roaming populations and mitigating the risks they pose.
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Beyond disciplinary power, the heightened assumption of risk and the 
exaggerated responses they trigger create certain forms of violence. Adam 
et al. (2000, p. 215) argue that established risk definitions are a magic 
wand with which a ‘society can terrify itself and thereby activate its politi-
cal centres and become politicised from within’. In Sweden, the Social 
Democrats’ 2018 election campaign poster (Figure 1) demonstrates such 
an attempt to mobilise around policing the border. Once risks are estab-
lished, activated, and politicised, it is then expected that resources will be 
allocated by governments to regulate and manage such risks. This is also 
reflected in the construction of the need to strengthen the welfare state 
in face of the refugee influx. As evident in the Social Democrats’ election 
poster, political discourse aimed at strengthening the welfare state can resort 
to scapegoating migrants and constructing them as the cause of various 
problems facing the nation state (see e.g. Wodak, 2019). As historical nar-
ratives attest to, scapegoating is often synonymous with violence (Arendt,  
1973).
The conceptualisation of risk as mechanisms with which ‘society can 
terrify itself’ fits particularly well with Danish asylum policy. While Denmark 
had a severely restrictive refugee policy already prior to 2015, the risk of 
becoming a bottleneck for people on their way north to (or through) 
Sweden was used to further securitise Danish policies (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
2017; see also chapter 4 below). In a risk society, laws like the Danish 
‘Jewellery Law’ 11 (see chapter 2) have become widely uncontested among 
the domestic public, given the accepted state of emergency brought about 
in response to an increased number of asylum applications. More akin to 
a panic attack than a refugee crisis, the book’s three countries of focus sud-
denly perceived themselves as being threatened by a large inflow of unwanted 
bodies that they were not prepared to receive and manage (see chapter 7 
on the absence of a Swedish plan and the anxieties associated with such 
absence). Re-bordering and the more repressive policies it involved were 
immediate first reactions to the panic. The measures were considered to be 
temporary; for example, in Sweden they were presented as bringing about 
a much needed ‘breathing space’. As many of the contributions in this 
volume point to, however, they are part of a long process of control and 
exclusion that preceded the declaration of crisis in 2015.12
A risk society relies on large bureaucratic structures to deal with and 
safeguard against perceived risks. Analysing the establishment of risk 
bureaucracies that emerged following the War on Terror, Heng and 
McDonagh (2011, p. 1) state that ‘the emergence of such risk regulatory 
regimes however is neither assumed nor predicted. The subjective and con-
structed nature of risk perceptions suggests that any emergent regulatory 
framework based on increased risk consciousness can never be considered 
a foregone conclusion.’ In other words, the ambivalent nature of risk dic-
tates the continual construction and negotiation of the meaning of risk. In 
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the context of the refugee crisis, Abdelhady (2019) demonstrates that media 
discourses communicated ambivalent and incoherent representations, ulti-
mately leading to a crisis of meaning. Such an ambivalent understanding of 
risk (see also chapter 6) constructs risk as a process that can, depending on 
the perspective, have not only negative but also positive consequences. This 
conceptualisation of risk is close to how the word is used in the (neoliberal) 
language of corporate business and the global financial market: a certain 
action includes risks, but it can lead to considerable gains. Risk manage-
ment industries, which seek to reduce those risks that public discourse 
identifies as the most threatening, have increasingly permeated the approach 
of governments to immigrants in general and refugees specifically (see e.g. 
Heng and McDonagh, 2011).
Given this understanding of risk, one can argue that public discourses 
in Northern Europe approach refugee migration as a risk – if in differ-
ent ways. Refugees were imagined as real or potential terrorists, sexual 
assailants, unemployed welfare recipients, religious maniacs, and cul-
tural others – basically as risks to the norms and cohesion of the receiv-
ing societies (Abdelhady and Malmberg, 2018). As a result, throughout 
Europe’s North, the political will to control the immigration of people who 
seek asylum contributed to the expansion of bureaucracies that admin-
ister refugees through risk management techniques. Such risk manage-
ment, arguably, is interested in regulating the future. Just as the War on 
Terror that followed 11 September 2001 benefitted from the lack of an 
ability to declare the end of the need for war, risk management lacks an 
ability to declare itself successful in mitigating risks. As a result, both the 
War on Terror and risk management become infinite strategies that con-
tinue to justify the control of certain bodies and the outright exclusion of 
others.
As noted above, however, risk is subjective and constructed, and there-
fore cannot be taken as a foregone conclusion. Chapters 6 and 7 illustrate 
the ambivalent understanding of the refugee risk in the case of Sweden. 
Ambivalence emerges as a result of views stressing that refugees are a much-
needed economic resource that can contribute to the welfare state once 
integrated and turned into, among other things, docile and productive 
labour (e.g. De Genova, 2009; Holgersson, 2011). Such ambivalence, in 
this and other contexts, results in the negotiation of its meaning in daily 
interactions. The chapters in this book provide evidence of the ways risks 
introduced by the inflow of asylum seekers are defined and negotiated at 
the point of encounter between the refugees and the risk management 
industries of Northern Europe’s welfare states. The diverse effects that these 
different yet interconnected bureaucratic interventions, and the ambivalent 
attitudes towards refugees, have on the lives of people who seek asylum – 
and vice versa – is a subject matter that is empirically investigated in this 
volume. These diverse effects, however, share their foundation in risk 
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management and enactment of bureaucratic violence as we explain in the 
next section.
Refugees and bureaucratic violence
We suggest that Weber’s iron cage, one that is brought about by bureau-
cratic institutions in Northern Europe in the experience of refugees, can be 
better understood in conjunction with the concept of bureaucratic violence. 
Hannah Arendt (1969) explained the relationship between bureaucracy and 
violence as follows:
the greater the bureaucratisation of public life, the greater will be the attrac-
tion of violence. In a fully developed bureaucracy there is nobody left with 
whom one could argue, to whom one could present grievances, on whom the 
pressures of power could be exerted. Bureaucracy is the form of government 
in which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act; for 
the rule by Nobody is not no-rule, and where all are equally powerless we 
have a tyranny without a tyrant.
While Arendt’s essay was written in the context of the 1960s’ students’ 
movements and the violence they triggered in the US and France, her 
remarks draw attention to the universality of the resort to violence when-
ever revolutionary change is attempted. In Arendt’s analysis, violence is not 
physical but mostly manifests itself in the denial of rights and freedoms, 
especially the right to appeal and resist the injustices of power. A growing 
literature on the intersections between bureaucracy and violence points to 
the ‘spaces where state and bureaucratic organizations exert force and social 
control and engender struggle across multiple scales’ (Eldridge and Reinke, 
2018, p. 95). David Graeber (2015, pp. 32–33) describes the process of 
total bureaucratisation and the violence it is ready to perform as follows:
Security cameras, police scooters, issuers of temporary ID cards, and men and 
women in a variety of uniforms acting in either public or private capacities, 
trained in tactics of menacing, intimidating, and ultimately deploying physical 
violence, appear just about everywhere – even in places such as playgrounds, 
primary schools, college campuses, hospitals, libraries, parks or beach resorts, 
where fifty years ago their presence would have been considered scandalous, 
or simply weird.
Graeber’s description refers to the readiness to use physical violence in daily 
surroundings, which is only one aspect of the kind of violence we refer to. 
A different perspective on bureaucracy is offered by Akhil Gupta (2012), 
who demonstrates the structural violence (see also chapter 2) embedded 
in the practices of the postcolonial Indian state even when that very same 
state wishes to ameliorate suffering. Gupta describes the arbitrariness of 
decisions taken by bureaucrats, and the widespread corruption embedded in 
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systems of care. Such contradictory processes, the author shows, systemati-
cally reproduce and normalise suffering.
An important element of bureaucratic violence takes the form of waiting. 
As Pierre Bourdieu explains, waiting demonstrates how the effect of power 
is experienced (see also Khosravi, 2014). ‘Making people wait … delaying 
without destroying hope is part of the domination’ (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 
228). Javier Auyero (2012) also takes on the experience of waiting (see 
chapter 11) that poor people have to go through as they interact with 
state bureaucracies in Argentina, and argues for the construction of subor-
dinate political subjectivation as an outcome of bureaucracies. In Auyero’s 
book, poor people wait for identification documents, at the welfare office, 
or for relocation in a toxic industrial hinterland. This analysis allows 
us to understand the ways state interventions and bureaucracies regulate 
the lives of poor people. In the process of waiting, subordination is nor-
malised, and poor people’s citizenship is curtailed. In the end, waiting 
emerges as one of the punitive methods of state violence. Or, as Shahram 
Khosravi (2014) writes, ‘waiting generates feelings of “powerlessness and 
vulnerability”’.
In this volume, we expand the analysis of spaces where the state exerts 
bureaucratic control engendering struggle, harm, and violence. The out-
comes are analysed not only as products of abstract structures, but ones 
that are administered through processes of decision-making (see chapters 2 
and 3), paperwork (see chapters 9 and 10), mass/social media discourses 
(see chapters 6, 7, and 8), inaction (see chapter 11), and exclusion (see 
chapters 4, 5, and 12). Thus, the authors in this collection illustrate the 
ways in which bureaucracies interact with refugees face-to-face, structure 
their lives outside of these personal interactions, and reproduce different 
forms of violence that diminish their access to citizenship and human rights.
The concept of bureaucratic violence has its roots in postcolonial studies, 
which drew our attention to ways bureaucratic violence has historically 
been used to discipline or even wipe out colonised populations (e.g. Fanon, 
2008, 2014, see also Lewis and Mills, 2003; Dwyer and Nettelbeck, 2018). 
Apart from the most infamous violence of the German Nazi-government of 
the Second World War, both Sweden and Denmark have ruled and admin-
istered indigenous populations like the Sami people and the Greenlanders 
with colonial methods. Other minority groups, such as the Roma, have also 
been harshly governed (Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet, 2014). The abduc-
tion of children to foster care or compulsory schooling, and forced sterilisa-
tions directed against marginalised social groups and indigenous populations 
are cases in point (see also Broberg and Tydén, 2005; Farver, 2010; Sydow 
Mölleby et al., 2011; Sköld, 2013). When states govern vulnerable minori-
ties, violent interventions of the state are frequently considered necessary 
‘for their own good’. Duran (2006) has defined ‘colonial bureaucratic 
violence’ as the various mechanisms through which institutions alienate, 
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isolate, and oppress Native people. In the process, institutions also ignore 
and deny the importance of indigenous cultures (see also the notion of 
epistemic violence in Spivak, 1990; Evans, 1997). While Duran writes about 
Native Americans who endured cultural genocide, the definition provided 
is useful for our purposes. While we do not wish to equate colonial violence 
with neoliberal bureaucratic violence, we wish to show that bureaucracy in 
contemporary Northern Europe, in its interest in being impersonal, efficient, 
rule-based, and formal, ends up alienating and oppressing newly arrived 
refugees whose cultures and hopes and dreams are often ignored in multiple 
interactions and different ways (see especially chapters 9, 10, and 11). These 
mechanisms are equally believed to be necessary for the clients’ own good 
and should not necessarily be considered any less coercive than those carried 
out by colonial powers. As Fassin (2015, p. 2) concludes about the French 
state and its street-level bureaucrats, they ‘represent a dual dimension of 
order and benevolence, of coercion and integration.’ The chapters in this 
volume, in different ways, show that impersonal rules dehumanise and 
exclude newcomers in ways that end up replicating some of the features of 
colonial violence.
Based on the analyses we offer in this volume, it is no coincidence that 
the disciplining bureaucratic practices that intervene in the lives of refugees 
bring to mind colonial practices. Colonialism and bureaucracy (on which 
colonialism depended) aim to control every aspect of human life, as is 
evident in the bureaucratisation of schools, hospitals, municipalities, and 
social services that were all part of the colonial project. For example, 
Mitchell (1991) illustrates that the colonisation of Egypt relied on large 
bureaucracies that institutionalised order, made the colonised legible to 
colonial power, and maintained discipline over colonised bodies. In Euro-
pean discourses, racialised refugees and other non-European migrants are 
often conflated with the colonial Other of historical times. It is, indeed, one 
effect of postcolonialism that many colonised and racialised subjects migrate 
to the (former) colonial metropoles of Europe. Racial imaginations also 
influence who is considered to belong to the nation and, indirectly, who is 
considered worthy of assistance from the welfare state (see e.g. Fox, 2012).13
Writing already in the 1980s, Nobel (1988, pp. 29–30) referred to an 
‘arms race against humanitarianism’ coupled with an ‘escalation of unilat-
eral measure against refugees’. Nobel’s analysis of the phenomenon of 
forced displacement is as true today as at the time he was writing:
The overwhelming majority of the refugees originate in the Third World. The 
direct causes of their flight are conflicts kept alive mostly by super-power 
politics and by weapons forged and manufactured at bargain prices in the 
rich countries, who export death and destruction, and import the natural and 
partly processed products of the poor countries. At the same time they refuse 
to a great extent to receive the refugees who try to escape the suffering and 
the sorrow generated by super-power politics. (p. 29)
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The refusal to receive those escaping suffering is at the core of the analy-
sis provided in this book. When reception is coerced, either through legal 
resettlement or, as in most cases, by irregular entry, the problem facing the 
rich countries of Northern Europe (three of which provide the geographic 
focus of this book) becomes that of bureaucratic management. This serves 
as the basis for controlling most aspects of refugees’ lives, while simultane-
ously alienating, isolating, and oppressing them. We propose the study of 
this process of discipline and coercion of refugees in an attempt to mitigate 
their imminent risk through conceptual tools offered by the framework of 
regimes of mobility.
Regimes of mobility
The different contributions in this book are theoretically and methodologi-
cally influenced by the ‘mobility turn’ within analyses of migration and mass 
movements of people. In discussing the contours of the mobility turn, Glick 
Schiller and Salazar (2013) draw our attention to the need to analyse 
‘regimes of mobility’. According to the authors, ‘the regimes of mobility 
framework brings attention to the relationships between mobility and 
immobility, localisation and transnational connection, experiences and 
imaginaries of migration, and rootedness and cosmopolitan openness’ 
(Glick Schiller and Salazar, 2013, p. 183). From our perspective, refugees’ 
encounters with the welfare state are sites where these relationships can be 
interrogated and analysed beyond an insistence on those binaries that the 
regimes of mobility framework refutes. For example, it is within the encoun-
ters with bureaucracies that we can examine states’ interests in controlling 
mobile populations, managing their social mobility, and motivating their 
further mobility (to another country and/or back home). Similarly, it is 
within these encounters that we can understand the contradictions between 
cosmopolitan openness in state policies towards the protection of refugees 
and exclusionary practices of re-bordering (see Benhabib, 2004, 2014). The 
ongoing encounter between established bureaucracies and mobile subjects 
is one that is characterised by unequal distributions of power. Such inequal-
ity is hard to conceive when the analysis is focused on either the state and 
its policies/practices or the migrants’ narratives of mobility. It is precisely 
at the encounter between the two that the regimes of mobility framework 
– and our volume as an extension of it – enables us to specify the inequality 
and interlinks between state and migrant.
As an integral part of our reading of this framework, the reference 
to regimes brings attention to ways individual states and international 
entities regulate and surveil the mobility of individuals, often through 
bureaucratic measures. At the same time, the attention paid to the notion 
of regimes reflects the importance of analysing forms of governmentality 
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and hegemony that shape such mobility (Hall, 1997; Foucault and Ewald, 
2003; Glick Schiller and Salazar, 2013, p. 189). In our understanding, 
practices of bureaucratisation in Northern Europe often aim at handling 
both governmental policies towards mobile people and street-level bureau-
crats’ work processes in different institutions. Regimes of mobility are 
thus affected by practices that have little to do with mobility and more 
with institutional requirements and bureaucratic logics, including ‘audit 
culture’ (see also Strathern, 2000). Audit culture is the process by which 
the rules and methods of accountancy and financial management are used 
for the governance of people and organisations, and the social and cultural 
effects of this process. A focus on accountability colours policy delivery 
with increased standardisation, documentation, and evaluation. Today, this 
influences both work units and individual street-level bureaucrats within 
Northern European welfare states (see also Bruun et al., 2015). In chapters 
2, 3, and 5, Joormann, Skodo, and Lindberg analyse recent developments 
regarding refugee mobility and the ways they have re-configured the gov-
ernmentality of refugees at the local, national, and regional levels.
Within migration research, the mobility paradigm distinguishes mobil-
ity from movement by highlighting its meaningfulness: ‘to ignore the way 
movement is entangled in all sorts of social significance is to simplify and 
strip out the complexity of reality as well as the importance of those mean-
ings’ (Adey, 2009, p. 35). The meanings of mobility can come from an array 
of sources including the media, government, workplace policies, and legal 
interpretations, the latter two having ongoing direct material effects on the 
bodies of the subjects of these discourses and policies (Blomley, 1994). The 
focus on the specific constructions of and effects on refugee bodies is the 
approach taken by Abdelhady, Canning, and Jovičić: As chapters 6, 7, and 
12 show, albeit in different ways, control over refugees’ bodies is associ-
ated with institutional practices that legitimise and perform the desire to 
control.
Furthermore, focusing on meaningfulness underscores a subject-based 
approach and brings into question the power dynamics shaping these sub-
jective experiences (Rogaly, 2015). A critical approach to mobility (Massey, 
1993; Söderström et al., 2013) examines such power dynamics and demon-
strates the ways mobility entails a complex relation to places (Waters, 2014), 
a mixture of freedom and coercion (Gill et al., 2011), and simultaneous 
experiences of success and stagnation (Abdelhady and Lutz, under review) 
that need to be understood within specific institutional arrangements. In 
chapters, 9, 10, and 11, Gren, Pearlman, and Weiss interrogate the power 
dynamics integral to bureaucratic interactions that shape individual experi-
ences and the associated imaginaries that influence much of these experi-
ences. The three chapters discuss how meaning-making, aspirations, and 
mobility strategies are linked to both institutional settings in the receiving 
country and migrants’ cultural and social understandings of what a good 
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life constitutes. This understanding is key within the regimes of mobility 
framework that this book extends.
Chapters in the book
In Part I, ‘Governing refugees’, four chapters portray the political and legal 
contexts within which the refugee crisis and the accompanying mechanisms 
to manage mobility risks can be understood. In chapter 2, Joormann pro-
vides an introduction to the constructions of refugees in and through politi-
cal discourses and legal procedures in Sweden, Germany, and Denmark. His 
analysis underscores the relevance of class as a category of stratification, 
which plays an important (yet sometimes contradictory) role in the granting 
of asylum. In chapter 3, Skodo elaborates on the Swedish case by showing 
how the construction of refugees as a national risk ultimately impeded the 
ability to respond to the influx of large number of refugees in 2015. Relying 
on the analysis of a government report, the chapter unearths the official 
public theories expressed in this report and puts forth two key findings. 
First, it reveals a fundamental difference between the national and local 
government. The national government saw 2015 as a threat to sovereignty, 
while the municipalities saw it as a strain on the bureaucracy that was suc-
cessfully managed, the lessons and resources of which were lost on the 
government and the state precisely at the moment when new practices were 
established that could effectively deal with another mass entry. Second, this 
difference does not imply an entirely autonomous sphere of action for the 
local government, since the national government curtailed the autonomy of 
the local government. Skodo shows that far from threatening Swedish state 
sovereignty, as the Swedish national government and mainstream media 
claimed, the ‘refugee crisis’ has justified, asserted, and extended sovereignty 
by recourse to national and international law, and an associative chain link 
between asylum seekers, illegal immigration, terrorism, and crisis. In chapter 
4 Bak Jørgensen focuses on the framing of crisis in the Danish context, the 
deterrence policies that this framing created, and some of the reactions these 
policies triggered among certain segments of civil society. In his analysis, 
Bak Jørgensen unpacks three interrelated concepts: deterrence policies, 
institutional uncertainty, and deportable populations. Similar to Skodo’s 
analysis, Bak Jørgensen shows that the specific framing of crisis legitimised 
restrictive policy shifts that receive widespread support in Danish public 
life. These policies also feed into a climate of uncertainty and expand the 
category of deportable populations, exemplifying a form of bureaucratic 
violence. In chapter 5, Lindberg illustrates the implementation of the 
minimum rights approaches adopted by the Swedish and Danish govern-
ments in view of making their respective countries less attractive for persons 
seeking protection. While the discussed policies form part of a wider 
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European trend whereby welfare regimes are instrumentalised for the 
purpose of border and migration control, Lindberg argues that restrictions 
to minimum welfare services assume particular significance in highly 
bureaucratised welfare states, and should be understood as a particular 
form of state violence.
Part II, ‘Disciplining refugees’, is illustrated in three chapters. Jovičić, in 
chapter 6, examines visual material and associated imageries of refugees 
and shows that the changing visual discourses can best be illustrated though 
four visual frames: victimisation – refugee bodies constructed as voiceless 
victims caught in suffering; securitisation – refugee bodies enmassed and 
posing threats to destabilise sovereignty of the ‘nation state’; reception – 
images of refugees being welcomed and integrated in Sweden; and human-
isation – private portraits of people fleeing depicted as complex individuals 
and active political subjects. In chapter 7, Abdelhady expands the cultural 
analysis and shows that the refugee crisis of 2015 was constructed as a 
crisis facing institutions, as they were unable to cope with the demands 
of bureaucratically managing and assisting those who came to Sweden 
seeking help. The author underscores the salience of the institutional crisis 
rather than moral panic that shaped the public framing of crisis in 2015. 
The chapter concludes that even though Sweden sees itself as a generous, 
righteous country, a restrictive turn can still be justified through invocation 
of notions of order, discipline, control and management, without chal-
lenging the nation’s self-image. Chapter 8 continues the focus on Sweden 
and the meaning of asylum from the perspective of social media users 
who may not have experienced mobility. In the chapter, Sundström and 
Obenius analyse the debate surrounding a decision to deport an elderly 
woman, which was later overturned by one of Sweden’s Migration Courts. 
The analysis highlights the dichotomy of inclusion/exclusion as a form 
of discursive violence that is exercised bottom-up, bringing new insight 
into an important aspect of the dehumanisation of asylum seekers and 
refugees.
In Part III, focusing on ‘The meaning of refugeeness’, the counterproduc-
tive consequences of the refugee regime are further illustrated. In chapter 9, 
Gren interrogates the Swedish introductory programme that is expected to 
aid in integrating refugees. Instead of focusing on integration, Gren illus-
trates experiences of frustration, loss, and dependence, which often thwart 
the hopes and dreams of mobile youth who arrive in Sweden. Despite 
policy-makers’ attempts to individualise the programme and to offer exten-
sive support, institutional requirements and the disciplining of refugees have 
immobilising effects, not least when it comes to social mobility and higher 
education. Following the same interest in uncovering the perception of 
bureaucratic interventions from the perspective of the refugees themselves, 
in chapter 10, Pearlman brings the focus to the context of Germany. Pearl-
man’s findings echo Gren’s as they illustrate the mismatch between mobility 
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and hopes on the one hand, and frustrations and dependence on the other. 
The entrapment in different bureaucratic regulations and institutional pro-
cedures are experienced as hinderances to establishing oneself in the new 
society. In chapter 11, Weiss turns to Norway and tackles one specific form 
of frustration, that of waiting. In illustrating the ways in which the welfare 
state exerts violence on refugees, Weiss depicts the ways bureaucracies 
negatively impact lived experiences, despite attempts at empathy and care 
by individual street-level bureaucrats, of those waiting to be resettled in a 
municipality and to start a new life. Even though Weiss’ interlocutors have 
received permanent residency, lack of willingness and coordination between 
different welfare state institutions prolong the waiting and create a situa-
tion of bureaucratic violence. In chapter 12, Canning turns attention to the 
ways the externalisation of controls through physical barriers – walls, wires, 
and border policing – is increasingly supplemented with more banal and 
bureaucratic internal constrictions which work to encourage immigrants 
to leave. Detention, degradation, and destitution have become the modus 
operandi for facilitating the removal of unwanted migrant bodies in the 
UK, Denmark, and Sweden. Canning provides a vivid look into the ways 
external and internal border controls are executed in Britain, Denmark, and 
Sweden. Although there are similarities, each country uses the strategies dif-
ferently, particularly since the increase in immigration to Europe from 2015.
Collectively, the chapters in this volume investigate how refugees are 
constructed not only as a threat, and/or scapegoats for gaining votes and 
political power, but also as a specific category of people in need of welfare 
state interventions. It is the aim of this book to disentangle the different 
policy fields and to investigate their impacts on the daily experiences of 
newly arrived refugees. The importance of daily experiences also stems from 
the nature of the bureaucracies themselves. We go beyond the analysis of 
restrictive discourses, regulations, and practices and focus on the construc-
tion of different notions of ‘crisis’ and the different manifestations of vio-
lence that emerge when refugees encounter Northern European welfare 
states and their bureaucracies. Thus, we discuss asylum processes and 
integration programmes as phenomena that must be understood in the 
context of the bureaucratisation of everyday life. As such, the chapters offer 
insights that go beyond the most recent construction of crisis in 2015 to 
investigate long-term approaches to state–society relations, and political, 
social, and cultural membership in the welfare state.
Notes
1 By ‘Northern Europe’, we refer to those countries in Europe’s North-West that 
are not post-communist states and, in this sense, share a history of having 
developed into welfare states (currently neoliberalised) with a population that 
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is marked by recent immigration from Global Southern countries: e.g. people 
from the former colonies in the UK and the Netherlands, workers and their 
families who moved from Turkey to Germany, or people who came as refugees 
from various places to the Nordic countries. Thus, ‘North’ refers to the geo-
graphical location of the countries, while ‘West’ is understood historically 
(hence including, e.g., Finland but not the Baltic countries).
2 Abiri (2000) argues that the generosity of the Swedish system has in fact fluctu-
ated considerably over the years. Others such as Brekke (2004), Noll (2005), 
Barker (2012), and Joormann (2019) provide evidence that problematise the 
notion of generosity showing the inhumanity and arbitrariness of the Swedish 
refugee regime.
3 Abram and associates use the term ‘forced-displaced people’ to refer to those 
people who are ‘categorised and labelled as refugees, asylum seekers, internally 
displaced people, and stateless people’ (Abram et al., 2017: 8). When we use 
the word ‘refugees’, we use it as an overarching term, while we use ‘asylum 
seekers’ in those contexts where it is important that the person(s) in question 
are waiting for a decision on their asylum claim.
4 According to statistics published by the EU, trust in national governments is 
highest in the Netherlands, followed by Sweden, Luxembourg, Finland, and 
Germany (European Commission, 2017).
5 Since 1 September 1997, the Dublin system (currently ‘Dublin III’ [EU Regula-
tion 604/2013]) is central to the administration of asylum in Europe. With the 
Dublin system, the signatory states agree that they have the right to expel 
asylum seekers to another Dublin-signatory state. This opens up for expulsions 
to the country where the applicant is registered to have entered ‘Europe’ as 
defined by the area that encompasses the territory of the Dublin system’s signa-
tory states (see e.g. Brekke and Brochmann, 2015).
6 In the context of refugee asylum, it is important to stress that many financial 
benefits are not granted to asylum seekers whose applications are pending. Or, 
as the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, Försäkringskassan, clearly states on 
its webpages: ‘When you are waiting for a residence permit you do not have 
the right to [receive] money from Försäkringskassan. But when you have 
received a residence permit you may have the right to money from Försäkring-
skassan’ (Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2018, our translation, emphases 
added; see also chapter 9).
7 The Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985, is a treaty that guarantees the 
freedom of movement for people and the abolishment of border checks within 
the specific geographic area of Europe (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en).
8 One-and-a-half years later, in May 2017, these ‘strengthened border controls’ 
were again loosened (Joormann, 2017). By then, the numbers of asylum appli-
cations in Sweden had diminished significantly, while business interests and the 
regional authorities were pushing for a model of border controls with less 
impact on the travel of commuters, tourists, and other (wanted) border-crossers 
(Barker, 2018).
9 Even prior to 2015, scholars observed the intensification of border controls 
and criminalisation of immigration in Europe’s North (Abiri, 2000; Aas, 2007; 
Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Barker, 2013). Importantly, such accounts explain 
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that refugee migration is discursively constructed and framed increasingly as a 
security problem (see Abdelhady and Malmberg, 2018). The increased number 
of refugees arriving to Europe in the aftermath of the popular uprisings in the 
Middle East have only intensified this discursive construction of threat and the 
consequential securitisation (Abdelhady and Malmberg, 2018).
10 During the first half of 2017, 12.1 per cent of accepted asylum seekers in 
Sweden were granted PRPs, while the remaining 87.9 per cent received TRPs 
based on refugee status or another protection status. See, in Swedish, www. 
migrationsverket.se/download/18.4100dc0b159d67dc6146d5/1506929524658/
Beviljade+uppeh%C3%A5llstillst%C3%A5nd+2017.pdf (Accessed 19 October 
2017).
11 The ‘Jewellery Law’ stated that refugees’ valuables worth more than 10,000 
DKK (approx. 1,200 GBP) should be confiscated by Danish authorities (see 
Crouch and Kingsley, 2016).
12 Similarly, literature on the exclusion of Arab Americans post 11 September 
2001 points to the fact that the resulting policies followed established norms 
and procedures that preceded the terrorist attacks (see e.g. Cainkar, 2009).
13 Our three main cases, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, all had their own 
colonial ambitions/projects (although not as successful as, for instance, Great 
Britain and France).
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Social class, economic capital and  
the Swedish, German and Danish  
asylum systems
This chapter starts by problematizing the politico-legal distinction between 
‘economic migrant’ and ‘refugee’ in the Swedish and wider European con-
texts. It goes on to discuss the procedural similarities and differences of the 
Swedish, German and Danish asylum systems, their different appeal 
instances and their implications regarding the question of who can be 
granted (refugee) protection status. Drawing on insights from my PhD thesis 
(Joormann, 2019) and building on its analysis of semi-structured interviews, 
which I conducted from 2015 to 2017 with judges at Sweden’s Migration 
Courts, I develop the discussion against the backdrop of a literature review 
of other relevant studies. Besides legal procedures, the discussion focuses 
on social class. With a close look at some classed aspects of the Swedish, 
German and Danish asylum systems, the chapter argues that international 
migration marks – and is marked by – the border crosser’s access to social, 
cultural and, in particular, economic capital. Hence, relying on Pierre Bour-
dieu’s (1984) conceptualization of classed distinctions rooted in these three 
forms of capital, the chapter shares the following understanding. Migration 
and indeed human mobility in general ‘cannot be analysed without refer-
ence to class and capital [ … while] mobility in asylum seeking is both 
socially stratified and socially stratifying’ (Ihring (2016) cited in Scheinert, 
2017, p. 133).
Sweden’s migration bureaucracy and access to (economic) capital
Political scientist Livia Johannesson (2017, p. 1) stresses the assessment 
of many legal scholars, finding that ‘asylum determinations constitute the 
most complex decision-making in contemporary Western societies.’ While 
understanding law as part of society, I first need to problematize hege-
monic definitions of who ‘the refugee’ is. Embedded in dominant discourses 
about ‘deserving refugees’ (see also chapter 8) there is the (often implicit) 
demand that an armed conflict and/or the persecution of an asylum-seeking 
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individual must be evidenced so that the person in question can be eligible 
for (full) refugee status. In contrast, when individuals or families escape 
from economic hardship, this is not accepted as a reason to be granted any 
international protection status. In this context, I give an excerpt from an 
interview I recorded in 2017 with a judge at Sweden’s Migration Court of 
Appeal (hereafter MCA). The judge claimed that:
those unaccompanied [asylum-seeking] minors, especially in Stockholm, have 
been the Moroccan1 children on the street. I can say that I think that we have 
many LVU [cases that include the treatment of minors] which concern pre-
cisely unaccompanied minors, because they have a socially disintegrating 
behaviour, they are addicted to drugs, they roam around, as one talks about 
in the Social Service Act, they have not stayed in one place and so on. I think 
that, in the eyes of the people, this becomes a problem as well. So everything 
is affected by everything else in society, because it is connected. And it happens 
a lot – especially the Moroccan boys – that they do not get a residence permit, 
and then they don’t get any housing or they get housing and then one is so 
aggressive (utåtagerande) that one cannot stay at the housing. And so they 
live at Sergels Torg [a square in central Stockholm], by selling drugs, and by 
prostitution. This is a vicious circle, because this does lower people’s toler-
ance, and then, those who really need protection, they ride along in the same 
category. (Swedish judge, quoted in Joormann, 2019, pp. 28–29)
I asked the judge what was meant by ‘category’ in this context: ‘if one looks 
at how they have come, then I think that many [are] actually economic 
asylum seekers – because they need to earn a living, they have already lived 
on the street, and then they have a perspective of getting a better life’ (pp. 
28–29, my emphasis).
When following this line of argumentation, ‘economic asylum seekers’ 
(pp. 28–29) cannot be considered refugees because they have not fled from 
war, other armed conflict or (fear of) persecution. Depending on the national 
context, in the respective legal texts often referred to as ‘humanitarian 
grounds’, certain migrants might not be granted full refugee status but 
‘subsidiary protection’ (see e.g. Johannesson, 2017). If neither is deemed to 
be the case – or if, as currently in the Swedish context, a ‘temporarily’ more 
restrictive refugee policy is enforced (see also Introduction to this volume) 
– such people might not receive any protection status at all. Instead, the 
affected groups tend to be labelled ‘economic’ migrants who left their coun-
tries of origin due to material circumstances such as unemployment or 
poverty.
If we take a step back while looking at this problem, we see the classed 
aspects of it. The class background of groups facing material hardship does 
of course play a central role in the question of whether lack of employment 
in the country of origin will lead to lack of food on the table. In other words, 
while it is clear that a person’s class position is crucial to assess the risk that 
this person will starve, become homeless or lack access to (physiological 
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and psychological) health services, coming from a lower class position is in 
general not considered to be a legitimate reason for cross-border migration 
that ‘deserves’ protection (see Khosravi, 2010, p. 111; De Genova, 2015, 
pp. 192ff.). Illustrating this hegemonic discourse about ‘undeserving eco-
nomic migrants’, the Swedish office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (hereafter UNHCR) uses the term ‘economic migrant’ 
(ekonomisk migrant) on its webpages:
As a rule, an economic migrant leaves a country voluntarily to seek a better 
future somewhere else. If the person would choose to return home, they would 
benefit from the protection of the home country. Refugees flee because of war, 
conflict or threat of persecution and they cannot return safely to their homes 
under prevailing circumstances. (UNHCR Sweden, 2018)
Free will and individual, rational choice characterize the travel of the ‘eco-
nomic migrant’, this argument implies. On the other hand, as such discourse 
about ‘deservingness’ propagates, the ‘refugee’ had to leave, they were 
forced, had no alternative. The term ‘economic migrant’ is of central dis-
cursive importance here. It becomes the binary opposite of ‘refugee’. The 
‘economic migrant’ choses actively, as UNHCR Sweden (2018) argues in 
the definition cited above.
From a critical discourse-analytical perspective (Fairclough, 2003), the 
reader’s attention is drawn to ‘voluntarily’ and ‘choose’. Linked to ‘eco-
nomic migrant’, these terms contribute to the construction of the ‘(un)
deservingness’ problematized above. On the other side of this discursive 
binary, refugees ‘flee’. Yet they are supposed to ‘flee’ not in order ‘to seek 
a better future’ (see chapter 10), but ‘because of war, conflict or threat of 
persecution’ (UNHCR Sweden, 2018). UNHCR Sweden’s refugee defini-
tion, as exemplified by the excerpt above, is thereby in line with how ‘the 
refugee’ is produced as a politico-legal category with its roots in the 1951 
UN Refugee Convention. Based on the Convention and its 1967 Protocol, 
this category emerged during the Cold War and contributed significantly to 
the framings of today’s international refugee regime (Barnett, 2002; Mayblin, 
2014; McAdam, 2017).
While refugee migration is as much gendered and racialized as it is a 
classed social process (Holm Pedersen, 2012; Wikström, 2014; see also 
chapter 6), we need to pay attention to the classed selectivity of ‘Fortress 
Europe’ (Odugbesan and Schwiertz, 2018). Due to this selectivity, people 
who are socio-economically disadvantaged in their countries of origin face 
certain class-based obstacles when aiming to reach a European country of 
destination. To put it simply, there are (almost) no legal ways2 to apply 
for refugee status without first having to reach the country of destination. 
Many asylum seekers aiming for European countries need to pay for smug-
glers and forged identity papers (Khosravi, 2010). Humanitarian visas to 
enter countries like Germany are the exception (Scheinert, 2016), while 
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UNHCR-organized ‘re-settlement’ programmes to countries like Sweden 
have in recent years concerned not much more than a couple of thousand 
refugees annually (Swedish Migration Agency, 2017). Denmark has recently 
decided to restart its resettlement programme – for about 500 ‘quota refu-
gees’ a year (DR, 2019).
Taking into consideration the circumstances in many refugee-sending 
countries, as Khosravi (2010, p. 111) aptly reminds us, forced displacement 
has not only an economic but also a political dimension:
In most refugee sending societies, the boundary between politics and the 
economy is blurred. Not even forced displacement due to environmental 
disaster can be defined as completely ‘natural’ and ‘non-political’. Famine, for 
example, is a political as well as an economic phenomenon (supranote: Turton 
2003). While drought is a natural condition, famine is a consequence of politi-
cal circumstances. People who starve in a famine in fact suffer from insuffi-
cient entitlement to food; they do not starve because no food is available 
(supranote: Sen, 1981). They simply do not ‘deserve’ to have food.
The deservingness not to be exposed to hunger is, in this sense, not only 
classed but also dependent on the political circumstances that lead to certain 
groups being forced into displacement – and being or not being entitled to 
food. To give a well-known historical example, Jews were deliberately 
exposed to starvation and other of the Nazis’ necropolitics (see Mbembe, 
2003). Many of the people who were murdered in the Third Reich’s ghettos 
and concentration camps were indeed from middle-class backgrounds.
In contemporary Europe, refugees are frequently pushed into lower-class 
positions after their migration and asylum determination processes have 
been completed (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2004; Schierup et al., 2006; 
Holm Pedersen, 2012; see also chapter 9). In spite of the omnipresent, 
catch-all phrase of integration (Loch, 2014; cf. Wieviorka, 2014), social 
inclusion is often a very difficult and lengthy process for many newly arrived 
refugees (see e.g. chapter 4 in this book). An important aspect that shapes 
this difficulty is structural violence3 (Galtung, 1969), which, in today’s 
Europe, is oftentimes rooted not only in racism, orientalism and Islamo-
phobia (see Holm Pedersen, 2012) but also in those classed processes of 
social exclusion which I will further problematize below.
We see that an (upper) middle-class background can be advantageous 
when it comes to passing through not only the unauthorized (Carling, 
2007) border-crossing into Europe4 (Scheinert, 2016) but also through the 
asylum process itself. To be legally recognized as a refugee, Europe’s differ-
ent national systems of asylum determination all include the possibility to 
pay for lawyers who have specialized in immigration and refugee law (see 
e.g. Eule et al., 2019; Gill and Good, 2019). In certain countries (including 
Denmark and Sweden), the state provides publicly paid legal aid for asylum 
seekers. In other countries (for instance Germany, see Schittenhelm, 2018), 
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there is no guarantee that asylum seekers will be legally represented or at 
least receive support from a legal professional. So, how much does it matter 
if someone can or cannot pay for a lawyer who has specialized in asylum 
cases? Regarding the legal aid paid by for by the Swedish state, a judge 
told me:
unfortunately, this business, if one speaks from the side of the lawyers, is not 
so lucrative. It is quite a limited number of hours that the public counsels get 
[paid for], so how one [as a public counsel] writes an application for leave to 
appeal5 becomes, maybe, not so stringent, because it is indeed still like this. 
For us to process this [as an appeal], we need to get help from the [legal] 
parties, who stress that this question is of interest for a legal precedent. And 
not only say – sometimes when we get applications for leave to appeal at 
the Migration Court of Appeal, they [the legal party of the asylum seekers] 
say that there are reasons to grant leave to appeal, there is importance for 
the application of law, or there are special reasons, and then they don’t 
develop it. Instead, one must write indeed why there is importance for the 
application of law, which specific legal question it is that has importance 
for the application of law and lends itself to pick up precisely this [legal] 
case. And we would wish that they were better at highlighting the ques-
tions of interest for a precedent. (Swedish judge, quoted in Joormann, 2019,  
pp. 31–32)
In line with Johannesson’s (2017) findings, this part of my data adds to 
previously published criticism of the Swedish asylum system (Stern, 2014; 
Wikström, 2014; Martén, 2015; Wettergren and Wikström, 2014). Legal 
aid provided by public counsels is no guarantee that the power imbalance 
between asylum seekers and the Swedish Migration Agency (hereafter SMA) 
is affected. When decided at a Migration Court, asylum cases entail that 
the SMA becomes the legal party that opposes the asylum applicant(s) in 
court. In ‘normal’ (more than 99 per cent of)6 asylum cases, a judge then 
decides based on claims presented by the two legal parties that represent a) 
the applicant(s) and b) the SMA (Johannesson, 2017). Given several impor-
tant details not illustrated in the image below – for example, the possibility 
that a unanimous decision of the three ‘lay judges’ (nämdemän, recruited 
from the political parties) can overrule the presiding judge’s verdict (Johan-
nesson, 2017) – the Swedish migration bureaucracy’s layout is explained in 
figure 2.
When it comes to cases in which decisions are appealed to the MCA as 
the highest legal instance, I was told the following:
The SMA often has better applications for leave to appeal, because they stress 
precisely that which is of interest for a precedent, and it is not so many cases 
that they appeal. So, often, they [the lawyers of the SMA] indeed get – what 
can one say – a little bit of cream on top, because they appeal so seldom. So, 
one looks a little bit more carefully into this [kind of appeal], maybe there is 
something in it. (Swedish judge, quoted in Joormann, 2019, p. 32)
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In this excerpt from an interview with an MCA judge, the interviewee 
confirmed that the power imbalance between the legal parties also persists 
at the highest legal instance. The judge compared the public counsels’ 
applications for leave to appeal with those of the SMA and stressed that 
providing legal aid to an asylum seeker is ‘not so lucrative’. In addition to 
that, the SMA files fewer appeals, which tend to be, according to the judge, 
‘better applications’. As illustrated above, if an asylum case is decided at 
court, the SMA, which is the decision-making state agency in the first legal 
instance, finds itself in the position of opposing the asylum seeker as the 
other legal party. This is due to the adversarial principle of two legal parties 
opposing each other in administrative courts. Johannesson (2017, p. 98) 
refers to this as the ‘dual role’ of the SMA: the first instance being an ‘expert 
agency on asylum’ (p. 98); in the second instance, becoming one of the two 
legal parties. Meanwhile, as the MCA judge quoted above claimed, the 
SMA’s applications are often ‘better applications’. In other words, when 
asylum seekers and their public counsels write an appeal to the MCA, their 
formulations are often not as legally convincing as those crafted by the 
immigration law specialists of the state agency. The judge identified one 
main source of this problem. Providing legal aid as a public counsel was 
‘not so lucrative’ for a Swedish lawyer. My research thereby identified an 
institutionalized power imbalance that is built into the Swedish migration 
bureaucracy and its asylum system (Joormann, 2019). I base this finding 
on the observation that the procedural power imbalance between the asylum 
applicant and the SMA – given the SMA’s ‘dual role’ (Johannesson 2017: 
98) as, first, decision-making state agency and, then, the opposing legal 
party in the appeal instances – shifts yet persists throughout all three 
instances. To pay privately for a legal professional who has specialized in 
immigration law is a possibility to balance this disadvantage. The problem 
is that not every asylum seeker has the money to do so. This strengthens 
the link between the ability to successfully claim asylum and one’s access 
to economic resources.
(The business of) bordering Europe
In Illegality Inc., Ruben Andersson (2014, p. 273) writes about the business 
of bordering Europe. I understand this business as, primarily, a complex 
and multi-dimensional process of accumulating capital, from which various 
social actors profit. There is, of course, the business of smugglers, which 
is indeed an economic activity based on the fact that, for asylum seekers, 
there are, as mentioned above, almost no ‘legal ways’ to Europe (Scheinert, 
2017). This being noted, residence permits – and sometimes citizenship – 
can be bought entirely legally in many countries of the Global North (see 
e.g. Barbulescu, 2014; Boatcă, 2016; Keshavarz, 2016, pp. 136ff.; Farolfi et 
al., 2017). To give an example, London-based Henley & Partners is one of 
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the law firms that have specialized in providing their wealthy clients with 
legal advice when ‘investing’ in an EU country in order to gain citizen-
ship. In the case of Malta, they advertise such citizenship-by-investment as 
follows:
The Malta Individual Investor Program (IIP), which Henley & Partners was 
contracted in 2014 by the Government of Malta to design and implement, 
is the most modern citizenship-by-investment program. The IIP is one of 
the most exclusive citizenship-by-investment portfolios worldwide. It offers 
clients the opportunity to acquire citizenship in a country that has one 
of the strongest, most stable economies of the EU and Eurozone. … The 
combined upfront financial requirement, including applicable government 
charges and citizenship application fees, is just under EUR 900,000. These 
costs will increase slightly depending on the family size. (Henley & Partners,  
2019)
At the time of writing, there are no IIPs for gaining residency in Sweden. 
In other words, there are no schemes through which wealthy people can 
use their economic capital to buy a Swedish residence permit or citizenship. 
However, as Vanessa Barker (2018) has observed, since the late 1980s, the 
‘walls’ of the Swedish welfare state have opened up to a certain extent 
based on (neo)liberal ideas of attracting investment and labour. For indi-
vidual migrants, earning more than SEK 13,000 (approx. EUR 1,300) 
per month throughout the year is currently the legally defined minimum 
to receive a Swedish residence permit based on employment. That said, 
starting a business as ‘self-employed’ (egen företagare) in Sweden can be 
grounds for granting residence permits – if the applicants ‘have enough 
own money to provide for [their] livelihood and, if applicable, that of 
[their] family during the first two years (equivalent of SEK 200,000 for 
[the main applicant], 100,000 for [the] spouse and 50,000 for every child)’ 
(Swedish Migration Agency, 2019). The Swedish state, therefore, defines 
either a minimum monthly income (SEK 13,000), or a minimum of finan-
cial assets in cash (SEK 200,000 for individuals without family members) 
as needed to be eligible to apply for a Swedish residence permit based on 
(self-)employment.
In the context of refugee migration, such regulations have significance. 
As legal professionals whom I interviewed explained (Joorman, 2019), 
many asylum cases are not only concerned with the question of whether 
the application is ‘in need of protection’ but also with the applicant’s ties7 
to Sweden (including family, study, work and Swedish language skills). In 
certain cases, when asylum seekers who are already in Sweden apply for res-
idence, legal decisions can therefore justify a permit based on such ties, thus 
making an ‘exception to the rule that residence permits must be arranged 
prior to entry’ (MCA precedent MIG 2011, p. 27, cited in Joormann,  
2019, p. 201).
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The largest total number of refugees in the EU: Germany
During 2015’s long summer of migration (Odugbesan and Schwiertz, 2018), 
Germany and Sweden received the largest total and, respectively, per capita 
number of asylum applications in the EU (see UNHCR, 2016). In both 
countries, as exemplified with the description of the Swedish migration 
bureaucracy above, these asylum claims are in the first legal instance pro-
cessed by a state agency (Germany: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
(BAMF); Sweden: Migrationsverket), where case officers take decisions on 
the asylum seekers’ residence permit applications (Hinger et al., 2016; 
Parusel, 2016). In 2017, 56 per cent and 59 per cent of all first instance 
applications for international protection were rejected in Germany and 
Sweden, respectively (BAMF, 2018; Migration Agency, 2018).
If leave to appeal these decisions is granted, and if the case reaches the 
second legal instance, in both Germany and Sweden it is an administrative 
court that takes the second-instance decision (Schittenhelm, 2018). Thus, 
asylum appeals move the legal case from the inquisitorial setting of a state 
agency (case officer takes top-down decision on applicant’s asylum claim) 
to the adversarial setting of an administrative court. Compared with the 
Swedish context described above, there are no ‘lay judges’ deciding on 
asylum applications at German administrative courts; in Germany, the 
judge adjudicates and takes the second-instance decision (Arndt, 2015).
Another difference, which one can identify when comparing the two 
national contexts, is that the Swedish court system designates, as visualized 
in the image above, certain administrative courts (Förvalningsrätt) as 
Migration Courts (Migrations-domstol). Moreover, in the first instance of 
the migration bureaucracy, the Swedish system already tends to employ 
caseworkers with (some) legal training. As Karin Schittenhelm (2018) puts 
it, when comparing the Swedish and German asylum systems, many of ‘the 
[caseworkers] interviewed in Sweden were university graduates, primarily 
holding law degrees, while administrative and vocational training have been 
more common in Germany’. In Germany, migration cases are ‘Ländersa-
che’, which means they fall under the authority of the sixteen Federal States 
(Bundesländer), while the largest (Migrationsdomstolen vid Förvaltning-
srätten i Stockholm) and the most authoritative (Migrationsöverdomstolen) 
of Sweden’s Migration Courts are both located in Stockholm (Arndt, 2015; 
Johanesson, 2017).
To summarize, in Germany asylum applications are in the first legal 
instance submitted to the local branch of the BAMF. When rejected – which 
in 2017 applied to more than half of all asylum claims – the decision can 
be appealed. In the second legal instance, then, the decision is taken by a 
judge at one of Germany’s administrative courts. One important difference 
in comparison with Sweden is that asylum seekers in Germany are not 
necessarily represented by a lawyer. In Schittenhelm’s (2018, p. 7) words, 
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‘legal assistance is funded by the Swedish state and covers both legal advice 
and representation during the personal interview and all subsequent steps 
in the regular procedures … The absence of such free, institutionalized legal 
assistance by professional lawyers in the German asylum system is a critical 
difference’ (Schittenhelm, 2018, p. 7). This means that, while in Sweden 
asylum seekers can benefit from (the limited amount of) legal aid provided 
by public counsels (see above), in Germany they are largely dependent on 
their own access to economic capital when seeking professional advice and 
legal representation in court.
Temporary humanitarian admission programmes in Germany
Before the numbers of asylum applications peaked in 2015, the German 
government had established reception programmes, particularly for Syrian 
citizens (Scheinert, 2016). Outside the general rules of the asylum system, 
in which applicants must file their claims with the BAMF in one of the 
Federal States as described above, Germany implemented Temporary 
Humanitarian Admission Programmes (THAPs). As part of this initiative 
at the national level, the government had promised to receive 20,000 Syrian 
refugees in Germany. Syrians were invited to apply to UNHCR for re-
settlement to Germany, meaning that they did not have to enter Germany 
as ‘unauthorized border crossers’ (see above; Carling, 2007). In order to be 
selected for one of these programmes, however, the applicants had to fit 
into one of the following categories:
1) humanitarian criteria (special protection needs of children, sick persons, 
women, religiously persecuted persons);
2) ties to Germany (family ties, previous sojourns, language skills, receptive 
Syrian religious minority institutions);
3) ability to make a special contribution to rebuilding the country after the 
end of the conflict (possibility to expand existing qualifications in 
Germany). (Scheinert, 2017, p. 130)
In this way, until ‘mid-2015, around 35,000 admission visas had been 
granted and just over 26,000 people reached Germany’ (Scheinert, 2017, 
p. 129). Conceptually speaking, two of the categories listed above demon-
strate the importance of economic, social and cultural capital in Bourdieu’s 
terms. The second and third categories make clear that refugees with a 
certain amount of social (‘ties’), cultural (‘skills’) and economic capital 
(‘contribution’) were high on the German authorities’ wish list. THAPs 
thereby looked for an ideal type of refugee whom Scheinert calls ‘the classed 
refugee’ (Scheinert, 2017, p. 132). In the context of her study, this term 
refers to people who had sufficient access to capital to deserve the right to 
reside in Germany. In Scheinert’s analysis, it was required of refugees to 
have the financial resources to be able to pay for protection. Hence, ‘the 
admission programmes are highly selective’ (Scheinert, 2017, p. 132). To 
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take up a term that is particularly problematic ethically, family members of 
Syrian refugees were in this way asked to sponsor (Scheinert, 2017, p. 132, 
emphasis added) the residence permits of their loved ones. In a similar vein 
as Sweden’s permits for the self-employed and other European countries’ 
more straightforward ‘Immigrant Investor Programmes’, a look at Ger-
many’s THAPs thereby makes clear that, at least from a sociological per-
spective, the binary distinction between ‘economic migrant’ and ‘refugee’ 
does not make much sense.
One of the most restrictive asylum systems in Europe: Denmark
In Denmark, seeking asylum begins with the first interview, in many cases 
at a police station, where an officer takes the applicants’ fingerprints. Alter-
natively, people can file their asylum claims directly with the Immigration 
Service (Udlændingeservice) at Centre Sandholm, which is the largest recep-
tion facility for asylum seekers in Denmark (see also chapter 12 below). 
This first interview separates applicants according to three categories: 
‘Dublin’, ‘manifestly unfounded’, and ‘regular procedure’ (Canning, 2019).
Persons sorted into the first category are to be expelled to the country 
where they were registered as having entered Europe, as defined by 
the Dublin system (currently Dublin III, officially called EU Regulation 
604/2013). The second category, ‘manifestly unfounded’, means that pro-
tection is denied. These decisions can be appealed by a veto of the Danish 
Refugee Council (DRC), which is ‘an umbrella organisation consisting of 
members broadly representing civil society organisations in Denmark com-
mitted to the refugee cause’ (DRC, 2019). Such a veto moves the case to 
the category of ‘regular procedure’.
In this regular procedure, cases are once more separated and either pro-
cessed according to the normal procedure or categorized as manifestly 
well-founded. Such well-founded applications are directly granted due to 
obvious reasons for asylum. In normal cases, which are the clear majority 
of asylum applications processed in Denmark, the Immigration Services 
conduct a second interview. The outcome of this interview can either be 
that asylum is granted or a preliminary rejection (DRC, 2019). In cases of 
rejection, the appeal ‘automatically goes to [the Danish] Refugee Appeal 
Board’ and the state ‘provides [a] lawyer’ (Canning, 2019, p. 14). Given 
this aforementioned detail that Denmark also provides publicly paid legal 
aid to asylum seekers, the Refugee Appeal Board (Flygtningenævnet)8 then 
takes the final decision, which is either some form of projection status or 
a definite rejection.
To summarize, in clear contrast to both Sweden and Germany, the 
Danish asylum system does not make use of administrative courts. Com-
pared with Sweden, in Denmark there are no special migration courts (or 
Tribunals as in the UK, see Canning, 2019, p. 11) and neither is there the 
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possibility to file an appeal to a local administrative court as in Germany 
(Arndt, 2015). Instead, the Immigration Service is the first of two legal 
instances in Denmark. Its initial rejections based on manifestly unfounded 
claims can only be vetoed by the Danish Refugee Council. When vetoed by 
the DRC, manifestly unfounded asylum claims become normal procedure, 
which leads to a second interview by the Immigration Service. Rejections 
after this second interview can be appealed to and reviewed by the Refugee 
Appeal Board as the highest legal instance.
The Jewellery Law: a Border Spectacle against the ‘classed refugee’?
In spite of the news that, by January 2019, ‘three years after Denmark’s 
infamous “jewellery law” hit world headlines, not a single piece [of jewel-
lery had] been confiscated’ (The Local Denmark, 2019), the regulation 
became quite well known throughout Europe and the world over. From 
February 2016, refugees in possession of belongings worth more that DKK 
10,000 (about EUR 1,300) were to have their belongings confiscated upon 
entry to Denmark. Meanwhile, Danish police were ‘told not to take wedding 
rings or engagement rings and individual officers [were] left to determine 
the sentimental value of other items’ (The Local Denmark, 2019). Until 24 
January 2019, precisely ‘one car and 186,000 kroner in cash have been 
seized – and no jewellery’ (The Local Denmark, 2019). Clearly, measures 
like the Jewellery Law were not really there to be implemented but, instead, 
to be talked about, in order to deter and to reduce the incentives of coming 
to Denmark. In a word, that law should make Denmark (even) less attrac-
tive for migrants. In line with a now notorious photograph of former 
Danish Minister for Immigration, Integration and Housing, Inger Støjberg, 
cutting a cake to celebrate the ‘50th amendment to tighten immigration 
controls’ (Pasha-Robinson, 2017), this specific legal norm about jewellery 
was thereby highly symbolic (see also chapter 5).
Echoing Nicholas De Genova, the Jewellery Law is a good example of 
a ‘Border Spectacle’. As a scene of exclusion, ‘it affirms the obscene fact of 
a kind of subordinate inclusion’ (De Genova, 2013). This subordinate inclu-
sion was directed at all ‘deserving refugees’. Asylum seekers with less than 
DKK 10,000 of valuables should immediately be granted access to the 
procedures, while people with more than that (arguably modest) amount 
of personal belongings should first pay for their right to have their claim 
processed. Hence understandable as a form of De Genova’s Border Spec-
tacle, the law implied at least three messages with rather straightforward 
claims, yet addressed at different audiences:
1) Many asylum seekers have more than DKK 10,000 on them and they 
are not supposed to have ‘so much money’ (audience is mainly the 
Danish public);
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2) Refugees are a cost to Danish society and we will make them pay, if they 
are rich (audience is mainly the Danish public);
3) Denmark is not a welcoming country; they will take your savings from 
you when you get there. Therefore, do not seek asylum in Demark (audi-
ence is mainly the potential asylum seeker outside Denmark).
Understood as a Border Spectacle, as De Genova conceptualizes it, the 
Jewellery Law is in this sense first of all a speech-act within domestic politics 
and only of secondary importance as a measure of deterrence directed 
against unwanted migrants. Now, if one understands such policies as com-
munication primarily geared to harvest anti-immigration votes, one sees 
that they function to
a) maintain the dichotomy between economic migrants and refugees, and
b) convince the domestic public that no, ‘classed refugees’ (in Scheinert’s 
(2017) usage of the term, so defined by their secured access to capital, 
see above) will be allowed to enter Denmark without first having to ‘pay’ 
for their reception.
Firstly, thus, the Jewellery Law as a Border Spectacle gives an obscene but 
clear message: If people come here to make money (or to seek a better life, 
see above, UNHCR Sweden, 2018), they will have to start without any 
cash. In De Genova’s terms, asylum seekers are thereby subjected to victim-
ization (they are constructed as deserving if they have less than DDK 10,000 
on them), while some are exploitable (if they have more than DKK 10,000 
they must pay for the hospitality). Secondly, in this context, the ideal type 
that Scheinert (2017, p. 132) describes with the term classed refugee – who 
were relatively well-off and were therefore wanted migrants in the context 
of Germany – is an image that is applicable in a different fashion in the 
Danish case. With the spectacle of introducing the possibility (rather than 
the practice) of confiscating valuables, it is claimed that
1) there are classed refugees (relatively well-off migrants), at the same 
time as,
2) the Danish state will make sure that these people (with more than DKK 
10,000 of valuables on them) will cease to be classed refugees as soon 
as they decide to enter Denmark.
In brief, the Border Spectacle of the Danish Jewellery Law instrumentalizes 
the fear of (or hatred against) ‘undeserving’ refugees. More than anything 
else a spectacle for domestic politics – a race to the bottom for the toughest 
stance on migration – the law reifies the hegemonic discursive construction 
of the refugee as a passive victim who can only be welcomed if they did 
not leave ‘their country voluntarily to seek a better future’ (UNHCR 
Sweden, 2018, see above).
A look at the Danish context thereby highlights that, while migration 
regimes in general favour asylum seekers with more capital (as I have 
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exemplified above in the cases of Sweden and Germany), the very same 
regimes rest on the imagination that refugees must be destitute victims 
without any access to (economic) capital. In other words, the refugee regime 
becomes a Catch-22. This Catch-22 illustrates the violence built into the 
political discourse and the legal practices that define national asylum systems 
and the international migration regime at large.
Conclusion
The Danish, German and Swedish asylum systems are similar and yet rather 
different. From the viewpoint of procedural (rather than substantive) law, 
the three countries’ processes of appealing a first-instance decision are 
organized quite differently. In all three countries, initial applications are 
processed by a state agency (Denmark’s Udlændingeservice, Germany’s 
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, and Sweden’s Migrationsverket) 
according to the inquisitorial procedures of administrative law. In Germany, 
then, asylum appeals are decided by judges at the local administrative courts 
(Verwaltungsgerichte) under the authority of the sixteen Federal States 
(Bundesländer). In Sweden, appeals are adjudicated by a judge and three 
lay judges (nämdemän, that is, individuals recruited from Sweden’s politi-
cal parties) who take the decision at one of Sweden’s four second-instance 
migration courts (Migrationsdomstolar). In Denmark, the initial rejection 
of manifestly unfounded asylum claims can be vetoed by the civil-society-
based Danish Refugee Council, while rejection decisions of the Immigra-
tion Service (Udlændingeservice) can be appealed to Denmark’s Refugee 
Appeal Board (Flygtningenævnet). To put it briefly, Germany uses its local 
administrative courts under the authority of the Federal States to process 
asylum appeals, while Sweden established distinct migration courts in 2006. 
Denmark does not involve any of its administrative courts. Instead, similar 
to how the system worked in Sweden until 1 April 2006 (Johannesson, 
2017), the Danish Refugee Appeal Board processes appeals. At this board, 
asylum cases are heard by three members: an appointed judge, an official 
appointed by the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 
and a member nominated and appointed by the Council of the Danish Bar 
and Law Society (Flygtningenævnet, 2019). Given these procedural differ-
ences across the three countries, all of which are part of the Common Euro-
pean Asylum System (CEAS) operating within the overall legal framework 
of international refugee law, it is remarkable that the three national systems 
display this extent of procedural differences. This is important because it 
illustrates different institutional settings in which asylum applicants must 
make their case. If one compares, for instance, Germany with Denmark, the 
Danish Refugee Appeal Board – where a judge and another legal profes-
sional must decide together with an appointee of the Immigration Ministry 
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(Flygtningenævnet, 2019) – is clearly a more politicized appeal instance 
than a German administrative court (Arndt, 2015).
Given such differences, a class background marked by a secured access 
to economic capital can be a significant advantage for migrants who aim 
to reside in either Sweden, Germany or Denmark. Within all three asylum 
systems, paying privately for a professional immigration lawyer strengthens 
the applicant’s position (the two Nordic countries here do provide some 
hours of publicly paid legal aid for all asylum seekers, see above). Outside 
the asylum system, larger amounts of economic capital – for Maltese citi-
zenship, EUR 900,000 – open up mobility corridors for the ultra-rich (Bar-
bulescu, 2014). This exclusiveness and, consequentially, the social exclusion 
that these potential and direct advantages of access to economic capital 
imply, is indeed a classed form of structural violence (Galtung, 1969).
With a closer look at the asylum systems of welfare states such as 
Sweden, Germany and Denmark, which are arguably still strong, it becomes 
clear that, similar to other social processes, even asylum determination 
procedures are classed. Embedded within the European migration regime, 
the asylum systems analysed here do not mitigate the disadvantages that 
migrants without sufficient amounts of (economic) capital must deal with. 
This chapter has shown that, firstly, there is the difference of the German 
asylum system not guaranteeing state-sponsored legal aid. Secondly, the 
Danish migration bureaucracy does not include any formal courts but a 
politicized appeal board, at the same time as Sweden’s migration courts are 
settings of administrative law where a judge decides together with three ‘lay 
judges’ recruited from the political parties. That said, to pay privately for 
a specialist lawyer is an opportunity to profit from economic capital that 
asylum seekers in Germany, Denmark and Sweden can make use of – if they 
have the money.
Notes
1 At the time, there was a moral panic (see chapter 7) in much of Swedish main-
stream media about these unaccompanied minors – often presenting them as 
‘undeserving’ (or ‘bogus’, see chapter 8) asylum seekers.
2 Carling uses ‘unauthorized entry’ for those border crossings that are completed 
without any state official checking the traveller. Conversely, he defines an ‘autho-
rized entry’ as the border crossing during which the traveller is checked and 
allowed to enter (regardless of whether a forged or invalid passport or similar 
has been used). In relation to people seeking asylum, Carling writes as follows: 
‘Unauthorized entry is legitimate under the 1951 Geneva Convention when it is 
done for the purpose of seeking asylum. Migration can therefore be “unauthor-
ized” without being illegal’ (Carling, 2007, p. 6).
3 Going back to Johan Galtung’s Violence, Peace, and Peace Research (Galtung, 
1969), structural violence can be defined as social structures and institutions 
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that cause different forms of violence, which harm people due to, for example, 
institutionalised classism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, racism and/or sexism.
4 Here referring to those (relatively) wealthy countries whose bureaucracies 
operate with the European migration regime defined by the Schengen Agreement, 
the Dublin Regulation(s) and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
5 To have an appeal processed at Sweden’s Migration Court of Appeal, the court 
must grant leave to appeal, i.e. it must recognize that the case is (legally) inter-
esting enough to decide it and thereby turn it into a precedent. Such precedents 
will be guiding for the lower legal instances, i.e. the second-instance Migration 
Courts and the first-instance Migration Agency.
6 One notable exception to this setup would be a ‘security case’ (säkerhetsärende, 
see Joormann, 2017), which is an immigration case deemed to be of importance 
for national security. In such cases, the Swedish Security Police (Säkerhetspolisen) 
become the first legal instance (UtlL 2005:716, Chapter 16 § 6).
7 In Swedish legal terms, such ‘ties’ are called anknytning.
8 On the Board’s homepage in Danish, Flygtningenævnet is described as an ‘inde-
pendent, collegial, administrative body that resembles a court’ (uafhængigt 
kollegialt domstolslignende forvaltningsorgan, Flygtningenævnet, 2019)
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Lesson for the future or threat to 
sovereignty? Contesting the meaning of the 
2015 refugee crisis in Sweden
Following the entry of 162,877 asylum seekers in 2015, Sweden introduced 
border controls in November of that year. These were followed by new laws 
in 2015–2016 that curtailed the possibility of being granted permanent 
residence, family reunification, and the social rights of asylum seekers. Such 
measures were necessary, according to the Swedish government, because the 
large number of entries triggered a refugee crisis. These were far-reaching 
changes in a country that has long prided itself on welcoming asylum 
seekers. But, far from threatening Swedish state sovereignty, as the Swedish 
national government and mainstream media claimed, I show that this 
perceived crisis has both justified, asserted, and extended it by recourse to 
national and international law on the one hand, and an associative chain 
link between asylum seekers, illegal immigration, terrorism, and crisis, on 
the other. At the same time, I reveal how the perceived crisis has exposed 
rifts between different levels of Swedish governance, where the munici-
palities, in particular, have opposed the national government’s portrayal 
of 2015 as a fundamental threat to Swedish sovereignty and domestic 
governance. Indeed, the municipalities sought to portray 2015 as a difficult 
but valuable lesson for scaling up services and capabilities to help people 
fleeing persecution.
In this chapter, I problematize this dynamic primarily by analysing an 
official government report (Statens Offentliga Utredningar) on the refugee 
crisis. My analysis additionally rests on news articles and interviews I con-
ducted in 2017 with a Swedish Migration Agency Executive Officer and a 
local civil servant in the southeast of Sweden. The report, published in 2017, 
is entitled ‘Att ta emot människor på flykt: Sverige hösten 2015’ (‘Receiving 
Refugees: Sweden during the Fall of 2015’ – hereafter ‘Receiving Refugees’), 
and is the final product of a Swedish government commission formed in 
2016. The government directed the commission to describe the sequence of 
events that comprise the refugee crisis on the one hand, and to map how 
the national government, national state agencies, counties, municipalities, 
and civil society organizations managed it, on the other. Gudrun Antemar, 
Admir Skodo
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a lawyer and chief district judge of the Stockholm district court, led the 
commission, which was composed of academics, heads of state agencies, 
UNICEF representatives, and government officials.
Such government reports are an excellent source for the study of the 
powers, political imaginary, ideas, and discourses that shape Swedish poli-
tics and governance. They document Swedish politics both synchronically, 
as a condensed snapshot of a particular moment in history, and diachron-
ically, as source for tracing continuities and changes since 1922, when the 
first such report was published.1 Some are preparatory works for legisla-
tion, and as such they reveal processes of social and political inclusion and 
exclusion, normalization and stigmatization, of issues ranging from the 
legalization of homosexuality, to cheating at national university entrance 
exams, to the re-organization of the police academy. They are also a con-
venient way to either frame or ‘bury’ (or both) an issue to which a popular 
political solution seems unlikely, as is the case with the report studied here. 
The historian Lars Trägårdh captures well the ambiguous political role of 
Swedish government commissions which produce these reports, when he 
writes that they ‘have in fact been seen both as the epitome of deliberative 
democracy and, more cynically, as a quasi-corrupt and secretive system 
whereby a cabal of insiders representing privileged organizations have been 
able to strike favourable deals with agents of the state’ (Trägårdh, 2010, 
p. 237). A similar ambiguity permeates the report discussed in this chapter, 
as it presents conflicting viewpoints, and challenges and criticizes certain 
government assumptions and actions, but nonetheless narrows its inves-
tigation and structures its findings in accordance with the government 
directive.
Since ‘Receiving Refugees’ documents a contestation over the meaning 
and appropriate response to the events of 2015, I have found it method-
ologically useful to analyse the report as an expression of the ‘official public 
theories’ of Swedish government and state agencies.2 The study of official 
public theory examines executive decisions, laws, bureaucratic practices, 
official reports, and policies through their explicit and implicit theoretical 
justifications and assumptions (Silverman, 1992; Favell, 1998; Thomas, 
2011). According to the sociologist Adrian Favell (1998), political or policy 
documents, such as reports, decrees, orders, laws, and directives, are theo-
retical insofar as they contain statements on the following three interweav-
ing and interconnected conceptual levels:
1) Epistemological level. Statements on this level describe and conceptual-
ize the ‘basic facts’ of a social situation, such as a crisis or structural 
ethnic discrimination.
2) Methodological or explanatory level. Statements on this level theorize 
the means and applications of any political intervention and contain 
claims about the causality of political and social processes.
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3) Normative level. Statements on this level describe core values and goals 
of practices and policies on the one hand, and provide a justification for 
such values and goals on the other.
Although interrelated in practice, I separate these levels in this chapter for 
the purpose of analytical clarification.
Ideas and theorizing matter in politics and in public administration
The value of the approach just outlined is that it allows us to discern the 
nuances within and differences between how different parts of a state or 
government think about certain issues, and how that thinking imbues 
decisions, orders, actions, and policies. In the case of analysing ‘Receiving 
Refugees’, this approach leads to two significant findings. The first is that 
the statements provided to the commission by the government, state agen-
cies, and municipalities imply a significant difference in the official theory 
of the national government and the national state agencies on the one hand, 
and that of the municipalities on the other. While the government and the 
state agencies saw 2015 as an existential threat to Swedish sovereignty and 
bureaucracy, the municipalities saw it as a strain on the bureaucracy that 
was successfully managed, the lessons and resources of which were lost on 
the government and the state precisely at the moment when new practices 
were established that could effectively deal with another mass entry. The 
second finding is that the municipalities were able to contest the sovereign 
power of the government only to a limited extent, since the national govern-
ment used its theory of crisis to curtail the autonomy of the municipalities.
The national government’s use of the concept of crisis in this manner 
follows a well-established historical trajectory. Indeed, in the nineteenth 
century, historians and philosophers imagined crisis as a litmus test of 
national character and institutions (O’Connor, 1981). Nations’ response to 
a crisis, such intellectuals opined, would determine whether the nation 
would be reinvigorated, reinvented, strengthened, weakened, or destroyed. 
The historical theorist Reinhart Koselleck has shown that the concept of 
crisis took on a key role in the language of politics even before the nine-
teenth century. Starting with the political thought of the French Revolution, 
Koselleck argues, crisis takes its place as a fundamental concept on par with 
equally fundamental but not necessarily compatible concepts, such as 
human rights and citizenship. However, because the emergence of the 
concept of crisis dovetails the compression of space and time through new 
travel and communication technologies, it begins a global journey from its 
local origins and is put to a variety of different, both conflicting and comple-
menting, uses. As such, the concept of crisis has come to serve as a pivotal 
point for interpreting the past, offering diagnoses of and remedies for the 
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present, and making predictions for the future in diverse contexts (Koselleck, 
2002, pp. 14–15). In this sense, crisis is not an innocent descriptive term, 
but rather a contested and politicized concept that can be used to generate, 
structure, or re-structure social and political relationships. That is precisely 
what happened to Swedish asylum law and the political landscape following 
2015, where immigration has cut across the left and right divide and created 
some unholy alliances.
The following three sections spell out the theory of the national govern-
ment and the state agencies, followed by a section that describes the theory 
of the municipalities. In light of these findings, I conclude by discussing the 
dangerous consequence of successfully casting immigration in general, and 
asylum seekers in particular, as a fundamental threat to sovereignty or 
national security, or both – namely the rise of immigration alarmism. I 
discuss how immigration alarmism made visible the power imbalances 
between local, regional, and national governance.
Epistemological statism: the ‘basic fact’ of the crisis and its contexts
There is extensive historical research on what an event is and how it can be 
explained. Regardless of the philosophy of history one adheres to, there are 
few today who claim that events happen randomly or spontaneously. There 
are, however, different conceptions of whether events can be explained by 
individuals’ actions, by economic and material conditions, by the intellectual 
development of societies, or by repeating patterns of change – or perhaps by 
all these forces, and more. The concept of event and series of events can in 
other words be interpreted differently and we have interpreted the events 
according to the descriptions in our [government] directive. It is clear that 
the directive does not emphasize an examination of the underlying causes of 
why so many people made their way to Sweden in 2015. (‘Receiving Refu-
gees’, p. 289; emphasis added)3
This passage from the report under scrutiny barely veils the fact that the 
experts of the commission were unhappy with the government’s directive not 
to look at the underlying causes of the crisis or place it in broader contexts, 
and to only focus on describing the unfolding of events for the purpose of 
improving crisis management. At least from the perspective of history and 
refugee studies, one can see why the authors of the report did not take too 
kindly to the government’s injunction. The entry of 162,877 asylum seekers 
to Sweden in 2015 is unprecedented. It dwarfs the previous record from 
1992 when 84,018 people, mainly from former Yugoslavia, sought asylum 
in Sweden (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d.).4 Neither the government nor 
the Swedish Migration Agency expected this many to enter in 2015. One 
would think that such a dramatic change would spontaneously give rise 
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to questions of why, when, how, and not least whether the mass flight to 
Sweden could have been predicted or at least anticipated.
Yet, as the report makes clear, the way the government and state agencies 
conceptualized the basic facts of this unprecedented situation betrays not 
only an utter disregard for global socio-economic and political develop-
ments, but also the perspective of asylum seekers. Instead, for the govern-
ment and the state, the basic fact of the entry of a large number of asylum 
seekers was that it caused a crisis for the Swedish state. The context of this 
fact thus exclusively becomes the Swedish state. Consequently, for the state 
and the government, this basic fact attains meaning in the context of 
Swedish legal and bureaucratic norms, rules, laws, and institutions that 
manage migration. I call this perspective epistemological statism. In the 
report, epistemological statism is most clearly expressed in statements on 
the law and the bureaucracy, respectively.
The basic fact in its legal context
The first context through which the government and the state interpreted 
the basic fact of the refugee crisis is Swedish law. This, the report makes 
clear, is comprised of the following components: Sweden’s adherence to 
international human rights law, the rule of law (legalitetsprincipen), EU 
directives and regulations, and due process (‘Receiving Refugees’, p. 15, 
p. 41). The government found support in both EU regulations and inter-
national human rights law, and thereby Swedish law, for a violation by 
the government of those same regulations and laws because of the basic 
fact of crisis. For example, in the case of the Geneva Convention and the 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, which informs Swedish asylum law, the 
report states:
In the Declaration on Territorial Asylum (GA Res. 2312 on December 14 
1967) [ …] there is a ban on returning or removing a person who has the 
right of asylum in a country [the non-refoulement principle], to a country 
where he or she risks persecution (article 3). Exceptions may only be made 
on account of pressing national security concerns or to protect the general 
population. As examples are mentioned ‘a mass invasion of refugees’. (‘Receiv-
ing Refugees’, p. 307; emphasis added).
‘Mass invasion of refugees’ is a term that is conveniently left undefined. 
Such inexact constructions of terms can be found in both national and inter-
national law and government decisions, since at least the Cold War. We also 
find a transnational family resemblance in the powers that national govern-
ments confer upon themselves in response to the perceived threat posed to 
national security by mass immigration. In 1981 the Reagan administra-
tion, to take an example, issued a Declaration of Emergency following the 
unwanted entry of large numbers of Haitian asylum seekers. The ‘triggering 
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criteria’ for an emergency, the Declaration states, must remain ‘necessarily 
inexact’. The emergency (sovereign) powers, on the other hand, must be 
precise (‘Immigration Control (2)’, 1981). In the case of the Haitians, to 
the outcry of civil rights groups and immigration attorneys and numerous 
US Senators, these powers include intercepting asylum seekers outside of US 
territorial waters, followed by camp internment; sending new arrivals back 
to Haiti after ‘mass, closed-door hearings from which even lawyers have 
been barred’ (Thomas, 1981); and ‘expedited adjudications’ by the Attorney 
General on a case-by-case basis (‘Immigration Control (2)’, 1981). Much 
like the US in 1981 (or the ongoing inhumane treatment of Central Ameri-
can asylum seekers on the US southern border for that matter), Sweden 
in 2015 worded the crisis in imprecise terms as it fashioned a response 
with precision. The report describes one such precise move, where Sweden 
applied and was allowed to perform border controls by the EU:
The European Council decision (EU) 2016/894 of May 12, 2016 [ …] decided 
that Sweden, for a maximum period of six months, can perform border con-
trols [ …] The decision makes evident that Sweden ought to be allowed to 
continue performing such controls because ‘it is an appropriate method for 
managing a serious threat against public order and internal security which is 
tied to the secondary movements of irregular migrants’. (‘Receiving Refugees’, 
p. 109)
The Swedish government claimed that it perceived the mass entrance of 
asylum seekers as a national security threat against Sweden’s sovereignty 
and the very bureaucracy that allows it to function as a welfare state and 
uphold its commitments to human rights. Sweden’s sovereignty was threat-
ened, thereby justifying, on the very basis of Swedish and international law, 
both the violation of Sweden’s commitments to the right of asylum and the 
imposition of highly restrictionist measures (among those border controls) 
between November 2015 and July 2016. Paradoxically, although the uni-
versal right of asylum does allow for mass entry as an abstract possibility, 
as an empirical reality mass entry is discursively constructed by the Swedish 
government as a threat to Sweden’s ability to offer international protection 
to persecuted people. Or, in the words of Elisabeth Abiri, in her discussion 
of Swedish refugee policy during the 1990s: ‘a generous refugee policy can 
only be so when its generosity is not put to the test’ (Abiri, 2000, p. 25). 
Sweden, like the US and all other nation states, upholds non-territorial 
universal rights only insofar as they do not threaten perceived territorial 
sovereignty and the state’s privilege to accept or reject anyone seeking to 
exercise their universal human rights. The granting of asylum rests on the 
condition of an imagined sovereign power with absolute control over immi-
gration issues, whether real or imagined.
Such a condition is, to use Hegelian terminology, an expression of 
abstract universality. Abstract universality – a commitment to ensuring 
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human rights for all, for instance – conceives of itself as complete and 
therefore threatened by unexpected concrete events and ‘irregular’ people, 
such as those who entered in 2015. The government abides by universal 
human rights only insofar as the concrete events that trigger them, an influx 
of asylum seekers in this case, fall within the regulated sphere of migra-
tion. As long as the possibility of a large number of asylum seekers finding 
their way to Sweden remained abstract, Sweden remained committed to 
accepting them. It is as a champion of this abstract universality we must 
decipher the Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven’s speech of September 
2015 where he famously said: ‘My Europe accepts people who are fleeing 
war. My Europe doesn’t build walls’, and his subsequent statement there 
is no ceiling for how many asylum seekers Sweden can accept (‘Receiving 
Refugees’, p. 13). But it is in that very same context that we must also read 
Löfven’s speech from November 2015, in which he spoke of the need for 
‘breathing space’ from the large numbers of asylum seekers and the changed 
policies that followed.
The basic fact in its bureaucratic context
The second context in which the government and state agencies interpreted 
the basic fact of the refugee crisis is the Swedish bureaucracy. The Swedish 
migration bureaucracy divides the reception and management of asylum 
seekers between state (stat), municipality (kommun), and county (landsting/
region). The primary responsibility for receiving asylum seekers falls on 
the Migration Agency and the municipalities, which means that ‘people 
who arrive to Sweden and apply for asylum are registered and provided 
with housing in an asylum seeker compound, as well as the possibility 
of working and of economic aid according to the regulations of the law 
(1994:137) of reception of asylum seekers and others (LMA)’ (‘Receiving 
Refugees’, p. 43).
The government and the Migration Agency saw the municipalities as 
unable to understand the basic fact of a bureaucracy in crisis and manage 
the crisis accordingly. An interview that I conducted with an Executive 
Officer at the Migration Agency in 2017 offers a glimpse into state reason-
ing on this issue. I was told that it has ‘been a constant problem getting the 
municipalities to follow [the laws], or to take their responsibility’. The 
officer was referring to a situation in 2015 when finding housing for asylum 
seekers became a critical issue. Although it is the responsibility of the 
municipalities to find housing for asylum seekers after they are assigned to 
a municipality by the Migration Agency, when it became clear that more 
and more asylum seekers were arriving,
the municipalities said that we can’t accept them. Initially there was a volun-
tary aspect built into the system where the counties and municipalities would 
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sign these agreements. But they respond: ‘[we’ll take] girls in this age, or boys 
in this’, you know. As a result, the housing needs of asylum seekers were not 
being met, according to this interviewee. At that point, the government came 
in and said, now it’s compulsory to take on certain numbers based on various 
parameters. Whether it turned out well, I don’t know, but it got better. 
However, there are no sanctions in the law [emphasis added].
Because there were no sanctions to enforce the law, municipalities were 
able to contest the government compulsion to accept designated numbers 
of asylum seekers. According to the officer, it was not uncommon for 
municipalities to agree on a plan, but then make an excuse for not imple-
menting it on time. ‘Then they blame it on the politicians in the munici-
palities, or the civil servants.’ Although it is clear that the municipalities 
were able to contest the state and the government to some extent, it is 
difficult to assess the efficacy of such a contestation, especially since the 
compulsion to accept specific numbers of asylum seekers was ratified in 
a law which states that municipalities cannot appeal the government’s 
decision (Dagens Juridik, 2016). And, as we will see below, the munici-
palities saw the government as significantly limiting the municipalities’ 
activities.
Methodological statism: explaining the crisis
‘There seems to be no significant migration episode, past or present, in 
which states have not had an active, rather than reactive, hand’ and yet 
the nation state ‘conceives of immigration as an externally motivated event, 
with states as passive receivers who are forced to respond’ (Joppke, 1998, 
pp. 6–7). Sweden in 2015–2016 is no exception. As stressed above, the 
report does not make or cite any positive or substantive statements on how 
and why many asylum seekers made their way to Sweden in those particular 
years. As a matter of internal statist coherence, this makes perfect sense. 
The government directive for the authors of the report was, after all, to only 
stick to the facts and not look for underlying causes. Hence there is no need 
to consider a comparative or transnational methodology, contextualization, 
social and economic causes, or how states have had a decisive role to play 
in creating the conditions for migration patterns. The very concept of the 
state has what Liisa Malkki (1992) calls an inbuilt territorial ‘sedentary 
bias’ (see also the Introduction in this volume). It therefore makes perfect 
sense that statist explanations of essentially mobile and global phenom-
ena would conceptually wrest them precisely of their mobility and global 
nature.
It also makes perfect sense, from the statist perspective, that unwanted 
mobile people by default serve as indirect explanations of existential threats 
to an imagined normal condition of territorially limited sedentariness. The 
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report cites explanatory statements from the national government and 
various state agencies in which the asylum seekers are described as a 
national security threat, and as a collective actor which brought on a major 
breakdown in the bureaucratic capacity of the Swedish asylum system 
(‘Receiving Refugees’, p. 17). For example, the Migration Agency referred 
to the conscious and informed choices of a large number of migrants to 
come to Sweden when discussing what ‘simply’ preceded the crisis, which 
implicitly acts as an explanation of the crisis (‘Receiving Refugees’, p. 73, 
p. 291).5 There is for instance no reference to an earlier Swedish decision 
from 2013 that grants all asylum-seeking Syrians permanent residency – a 
policy that might have been a ‘pull’ factor for many Syrians forced to flee 
their homes (Ruist, 2015).
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the police, and the Migration 
Agency all described the crisis in a way that implies that essential social 
institutions and functions – such as housing, health care, and schools – were 
existentially threatened by the mass influx of migrants. For instance, in the 
words of the Migration Agency, the situation was ‘entirely out of control’ 
(‘Receiving Refugees’, p. 110). Needless to add, these agencies did not 
contemplate other possible descriptions or explanations.
Normative statism: restoring public order
It was fully in line with the statist epistemological and explanatory logic 
that Prime Minister Löfven made a normative leap when he spoke in 
November 2015 of the need for ‘breathing space’, which necessitated a 
strong state response to restore public order (‘Receiving Refugees’, pp. 
18–19). How was order restored, and how was that restoration justified? 
Drawing on the explanations of the police, the Migration Agency, and the 
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency:
[the] government on November 12, 2015 made the comprehensive assess-
ment that ‘conditions are now such that from a broad perspective there is a 
threat against general order and internal security’ and said that since ‘other 
measures have been deemed insufficient to counter this threat, inner border 
control will be effected in accordance with article 25 of the Schengen Border 
Code’. (‘Receiving Refugees’, pp. 109–110)
The Migration Agency, in fact, had written a letter to the Ministry of Justice 
on 11 November 2015 urging the enforcement of border controls. In this 
letter, the Migration Agency pointed to the importance of maintaining the 
official Swedish policy of ‘managed migration and the police authority’s 
responsibility for internal border control’. Managed migration had come 
under threat, not least because of the housing crisis, when ‘people who 
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cannot find their own housing are thrown out on the street’. A particularly 
vexing problem, according to the Migration Agency, which called for border 
controls was the existence of asylum seekers who did not intend to seek 
asylum in Sweden but wanted to travel onwards to Norway or Finland, 
and who were in Sweden without a visa or residence permits – in other 
words, they were unauthorized border-crossers travelling through Sweden 
‘illegally’ (see also chapter 2). The Migration Agency, then, conflated the 
concept of asylum seeker with the concept of illegal immigrant, a descrip-
tion which served to justify the imposition of border controls.6 On a more 
general level, the Migration Agency argued that border controls would be 
conducive to a restoration of order:
The Migration Agency has not assessed whether border controls would lead 
to more or less asylum applications in Sweden. However, there are reasons 
to believe that border controls could contribute to an increased orderly recep-
tion of asylum seekers and better control of the great number of people who 
travel into the country with other reasons that seeking asylum. (‘Receiving 
Refugees’, p. 115)
The border controls have been extended far beyond the maximum six 
months allowed by the Schengen Border Code. In an extension of the border 
controls in September 2017, Sweden cited the threat of terrorism as justi-
fication for continued border controls (Lönnaeus, 2017). The extension 
came not long after the rejected Uzbek asylum seeker Rakhmat Akilov 
carried out a terrorist attack in Stockholm in April 2017. The government 
used the same justification in its six-month long extension of border con-
trols in May 2019 (Fritze, 2019). By extending, justifying, and timing the 
extension of border controls in this manner, the government has effectively 
conflated the image of the asylum seeker with that of the terrorist. Indeed, 
in response to the Akhilov attack, Löfven stated: ‘We need to improve the 
ability to deport people’, implying that if only failed asylum seekers are 
deported, terror attacks can be avoided (Habib and Witte, 2017).
The restoration of public order began with border controls and ended 
with the passing of restrictive asylum laws. In November 2015:
The government announced the need for a ‘breathing space’ and that Swedish 
asylum law temporarily needed to be adjusted to the minimum standards of 
international law so that the right to residence became temporary and the 
right to family reunification was restricted. (‘Receiving Refugees’, pp. 18–19)
Since July 2016 there has been a temporary law ‘that limits the possibilities 
for asylum seekers and their family members to be granted permanent resi-
dence permits in Sweden’ (see also chapter 5 below). Another law states 
that ‘an asylum seeker does not have a right to assistance’ if the ‘asylum 
seeker has received a refusal of entry or expulsion order that has entered 
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into force’.7 Nor is an asylum seeker entitled to assistance if the deadline 
for voluntary return, which is four weeks, has expired. This means that the 
asylum seeker loses their free housing and daily allowance.
Contesting the statist theory: the municipalities
Apart from mapping the state’s response, the report also emphasized a deep 
tension between the state on the one hand and counties and municipalities 
on the other. The municipalities, in particular, criticized in no uncertain 
terms what they perceived as a mischaracterization of the situation in 2015 
and how it was managed by the government and state agencies. Re-described 
in terms of an official public theory, the municipalities offered an alterna-
tive theory along epistemological and normative axes. In regard to episte-
mology, many municipalities countered the view of 2015 as a crisis. For 
example:
the city of Mölndal8 did not want to use the word ‘crisis’ and claims that it 
is a word used by the state, and not by the municipalities. The municipality 
experienced a strained situation, not a crisis. And everything happened in the 
municipalities, not, for example, in the Swedish Association of Local Authori-
ties and Regions. The state was all about calculations and assessments, but 
the municipalities were all about people. The city of Mölndal believes that 
the state pushed the problems over to the municipalities. The city of Malmö9 
asked why state-owned buildings could not be used for housing. The munici-
pality of Norberg10 believes that the fact that the military could not make 
their stored beds available was strange in the eyes of the municipalities. 
(‘Receving Refugees’, p. 265)
These observations echoed in an interview I conducted in 2017 with a civil 
servant in the municipality of Simrishamn, located in the southeast of 
Sweden. The civil servant, charged with the reception of unaccompanied 
minors, stated: ‘the Migration Agency basically only provides housing and 
food. There are big gaps to be filled there. Voluntary associations [and the 
municipality] fill those gaps’. The voluntary associations, according to the 
civil servant, have been ‘invaluable’ because they befriended the asylum 
seekers, drove them to medical appointments or schools, donated clothes 
and other everyday items, helped them with their asylum cases, and so much 
more. Decision-makers from all parties – except the far-right populist party 
the Sweden Democrats – and civil servants in the municipality of Sim-
rishamn approached the reception of asylum seekers not as a problem, and 
certainly not as a crisis, but as a way to help those in need with resources 
that are available. The civil servant I interviewed told me that he had per-
sonally greeted every unaccompanied minor assigned to Simrishamn, lis-
tened to their story, informed them about the Swedish school system, 
informed them about their options, and continuously checked in on them 
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once they were enrolled in school. And because there was cross-party and 
cross-ideological agreement on this approach, the Sweden Democrat’s anti-
immigrant discourse was effectively excluded.
Another scathing critique from the municipalities in the report concerned 
the state’s assessment that the situation was entirely out of control:
Several municipalities describe how the situation with a lot of people suddenly 
ended with the border controls in November. Yet, at that point the municipali-
ties had found routines and scaled their operations for a large number of 
people, who then never came [ …]. The municipality of Trelleborg11 describes 
how many processes were started during the autumn, such as processes of 
obtaining permits for building housing for unaccompanied minors. When 
these processes were completed, there were no more minors. The resources 
of the municipalities had thus been wasted. (‘Receiving Refugees’, p. 263)
Because the municipalities offered a radically different perspective on the 
basic facts presented by the state they were led to different normative con-
clusions. Indeed, multiple municipalities stated that the ‘greatest difficulty 
was not to come up with practical solutions at short notice, but rather to 
interpret different regulatory frameworks or the fact that these frameworks 
were contradictory’.12 The choice for local civil servants was to either 
‘follow the regulations or try to solve the problems, and most chose the 
latter’ (‘Receiving Refugees’, p. 256). Ultimately, the demands of the sov-
ereign prevailed.
Conclusion
The most surprising, and arguably the most important, result in this chapter 
is the discovery that not all authorities responded to the events of 2015 
in the alarmist mode sounded by the mainstream media and the national 
government. The municipalities contested the national government’s con-
ceptualization of 2015 as a crisis, while showing that they were more 
than capable of helping asylum seekers in a way that would improve their 
capacity to receive large numbers of people fleeing from persecution in 
the future. And, equally importantly, some municipalities were able to 
form a consensus across party divides, which successfully resisted the dis-
course of the anti-immigrant far-right. Their voice, and the lessons learned 
from their practices, is important since such a future seems likely, given 
that the number of people fleeing from various types of persecution and 
extreme life-threatening conditions in the Global South will keep rising 
due to neo-colonial and neoliberal economic policies whose exploitative 
political, military, and economic practices propel people to flee in the first 
place. Their voice is also important because the social dislocation of neo-
liberal policies in Western countries will probably continue creating fertile 
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ground for nationalist anti-immigrant political parties, movements, and 
discourses.
Theorists of the relationship between bureaucracy and sovereignty, from 
Hegel (1991) to Weber (1978), have noted that in a nation state, the bureau-
cracy is either tacitly or overtly subordinated to the demands of sovereign 
power (president, monarch, national government, and so on). In times of 
peace or ‘normal’ conflicts (such as jurisdictional conflicts, political rivalry, 
contested appointments of bureaucrats, corruption, or conflicts over policy), 
such a subordinate role is barely noticeable. However, in times of perceived 
crisis, such as war or perceived social disintegration, this subordination 
becomes explicit. And in times of an imagined crisis, one might add to better 
understand Sweden in 2015, the subordination oscillates between tacit and 
overt, reflecting the ambiguity and contradictions inherent in the political 
imaginary.
The shrill cry of the government’s immigration alarmism has drowned 
out the, by comparison, measured voice of the municipalities in public 
discourse and national decision-making. This immigration alarmism, clearly 
documented in ‘Receiving Refugees’, apart from its obvious opportunism 
on the electoral successes of the far-right, bears a disconcerting resemblance 
to climate change denialism. Climate science deniers falsely deny climate 
change, when there is overwhelming evidence for the unfolding of this 
process and its effect on the natural and human environment. Immigration 
alarmists falsely assert what we might call catastrophic immigration change, 
despite a clear lack of evidence that immigration leads to social, cultural, 
or economic catastrophe. We are already seeing two detrimental conse-
quences of immigration alarmism in Sweden and other Western countries:
1) The rule of law and the division of power, fundamental to democracy 
and human rights, are undermined in favour of sovereign power, that is, 
an immigration system in which the executive makes decisions unac-
countable to any other branch, for reasons that need no justification or 
discussion. This development finds concrete expression in the deeply 
flawed legal protections afforded to asylum seekers in Migration Court 
hearings (Johannesson, 2017; Skodo, 2018; see also chapter 2 above), 
and in the prevalence of extra-legal criteria such as ‘judgment, political 
considerations, foreign policy, or national security’ (Coutin, Richland 
and Fortin, 2012).
2) Research results from various academic disciplines, including sociology, 
history, political economy, and migration studies, are undermined. We 
see this in the denial of research which shows that immigration is a 
highly patterned socio-historical process and rarely, if ever, an over-
whelming crisis (e.g. Sassen, 1999). We also see it in the denial of 
research which shows that the state investment in welfare goods and 
services during and after 2015 meant that the Swedish economic growth 
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after 2015 was four times greater than that of its Nordic neighbours 
(Rothstein, 2017).
It is difficult to remain optimistic in light of these developments, especially 
since they dovetail the near complete normalization of the far right across 
the globe. However, as history instructs us, contingency and unpredictabil-
ity lurk behind even the mightiest traditions, structures, and paths. We 
cannot know what the future holds for human affairs, but we can and 
should commit to a globalized democracy which is thoroughly equal, inclu-
sive, and open to change and examination from within and from without. 
This mountain will not come to us, we will have to go to it.
Notes
1 An excellent diachronic study of these government reports is Edenheim (2015).
2 Sovereignty has again been raised as an altar in European politics, from Brexit 
to the re-imposition of national borders between EU member states during 
2015. The question over whether state sovereignty has been buckling under 
the pressure of increased transnational migration continues to be a major issue 
in Migration Studies. There are three main interpretive strands. First, there are 
those who hold on to the nation state paradigm, arguing that state sovereignty 
and national trajectories ultimately determine the shape of today’s citizenship 
and immigration policies (Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 1998). Second, there are 
those who argue that migration policies and practices exhibit a paradoxical 
development. Although an erosion of state sovereignty through global capital-
ism and the international human rights regime, which benefits wealthy persons 
and transnational corporations, is occurring, a parallel process is unfolding 
where wealthy nations are tightening their borders and practising highly restric-
tive and punitive measures against poor and marginalized migrants (Sassen, 
1996; Benhabib, 2004). Third, there are those who argue that while there are 
transnational, internal, and global pressures on state sovereignty, these are 
addressed within the nation state paradigm through partisan politics, ‘client 
politics’, ‘shared governance’, pressure from big business, and civil society; in 
short, what Joppke calls ‘self-limited sovereignty’ (Joppke, 1999). Although all 
three theories contain truths, in the case of Sweden’s response to 2015, Joppke’s 
approach seems to yield the best interpretive framework.
3 All translations from Swedish are the author’s.
4 State and government perceptions of the refugee crisis of 1992 were in some 
ways remarkably similar to perceptions of the 2015 crisis. For example, the 
1992 crisis was seen as overstretching the capacity of the Swedish bureaucracy, 
the need to restore order was voiced, and countries like Poland and Hungary 
were seen as not sharing the burden of accepting a fair share of the refugees 
(Abiri, 2000).
5 The Migration Agency further invoked the dysfunctional EU asylum regula-
tions and the self-interest of member states as explanations. These ensured that 
the ‘country of first asylum’ regulation (the Dublin Regulation) was simply 
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ignored by most states that did not want to accept any asylum seekers. The 
Migration Agency stated that by autumn 2015 Sweden was effectively border-
ing Turkey when it came to asylum seekers (‘Receiving Refugees’, p. 292).
6 For more on the criminalization of immigrants in Sweden see Khosravi (2009).
7 This refers to Law (2016: 752).
8 A suburb of Sweden’s second largest city, Gothenburg.
9 Sweden’s third largest city and the first city encountered when crossing by train 
from Denmark.
10 In north central Sweden.
11 In the south region of Skåne and the entry point for ferries crossing from 
Germany.
12 For more on the reception, during 2015, of asylum seekers by municipalities 
see Lidén and Nyhlén (2015).
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Representations of the refugee crisis  
in Denmark: deterrence policies and 
refugee strategies
When (then) Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen gave his New Year’s 
Address on 1 January 2016 he focused particularly on the high number of 
refugees and asylum seekers who came to Europe and Denmark in 2015.1 
The number both pressed and challenged Denmark, he said and then 
continued:
Let us be honest with each other – we are challenged: it challenges our 
economy when we have to spend many more billions on asylum seekers and 
refugees. Money that could otherwise go to health, education and several 
private jobs. … It challenges our cohesion when many come from very differ-
ent cultures. Strangers to the unwritten rules and norms that are so obvious 
to us. Because we have grown up in a tradition of freedom and equality. 
… And it basically challenges our values and image of who we really are. 
(Statsministeriet, 2016)2
These statements offer a particular framing of the encounter between the 
Danish state and the refugees arriving at the Danish borders. There are 
different themes at stake here. The encounter is framed as having both 
economic, cultural, and democratic implications. It even becomes a chal-
lenge to Danish self-identity as the Prime Minister claimed.
Prem Kumar Rajaram (2015) argued that the refugee crisis must be 
understood as a representation: ‘The refugee crisis in Europe is fabricated’. 
When we seek to understand the crisis and its particular consequences, we 
need to investigate the crisis as a particular framing that works to construct 
an idea of the refugee. This framing can be compared and contrasted with 
one which has outward aims, a framing which reduces the complexities of 
the situation to an abstracted understanding, allowing policy-makers and 
commentators to treat it as an exceptional condition. The first aim of this 
chapter is to investigate how the crisis was represented and framed in the 
case of Denmark. The refugee crisis arrived in Denmark the first Sunday of 
September 2015. Before that particular day, the crisis was understood as 
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taking place on Greek islands, in Eastern Europe or at German train sta-
tions. It had little to do with Denmark. That perception changed abruptly 
during the early days of September. During the following week, 1,500 refu-
gees entered the country. The second aim of this chapter is to provide an 
analysis of the deterrence policies set up by Danish authorities from 2015 
and to investigate the rationale behind them. The third aim is to illustrate 
how civil society and refugees reacted to the deterrence policies. This third 
part provides short examples of civil society responses as well as examples 
of strategies used by refugees individually and collectively to cope with the 
(policy) regime.3 In these analyses, I focus on three main concepts, which I 
unpack in the different parts of the chapter: deterrence policies, institutional 
uncertainty, and deportable populations.
The main findings of this chapter are as follows. The refugee crisis legiti-
mised an even more restrictive policy shift than experienced during the 
previous decades. The new approach, termed as a paradigmatic shift, has 
the support of both the previous government and the present Social Demo-
cratic government. Besides creating extreme institutional uncertainty caused 
by continuous policy changes, it also extended the category of deportable 
populations to a degree where integration from both a policy perspective 
and from the perspective of the refugees becomes pointless, as the refugee 
is, with the recent policy change, always at risk of being forced to leave the 
country. The paradigmatic shift in this way becomes an example of bureau-
cratic violence legitimised through the refugee crisis (see also the Introduc-
tion of this volume).
The method used in this chapter is based on a mix of participant obser-
vation, informal interviews, desk research, and textual analysis. The mate-
rial used in the third section is part of broader ethnographic fieldwork. I 
have been working with asylum seekers both as an activist and as a militant 
researcher (Jørgensen, 2019; Lindberg et al., 2018). Militant research con-
nects to Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ (1995) call for a militant anthropology 
and the primacy of the ethical, and for anthropologists to become morally 
and politically engaged. My own approach and work draw on this norma-
tive point of departure. Here, I mainly use it to provide short examples of 
responses to the Danish policy regime and the strategies used by refugees 
to navigate these policies. Moreover, some observations stem from the on-
going data collection for a project on migrants’ digital practices (the 
DIGINAUTS project), where we focus particularly on anti-deportation and 
return strategies among migrants in Denmark and Germany.4
Framing the crisis – encounters
What made politicians, policy-makers, and, to some degree, academics 
construct what has since been called the refugee crisis in 2015? Migrants 
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had been crossing the Mediterranean for years with grave humanitar-
ian consequences. Manuela Bojadžijev and Sandro Mezzadra (2015) claim 
that the ‘geography of the current crisis is significantly different’ from the 
years before. Three events in 2015 can be said to inaugurate what has 
since been described as the refugee crisis (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b). 
The first happened on 19 April 2015, when a ship transporting over eight 
hundred migrants and refugees capsized en route from Tripoli to Italy and 
all but twenty-seven persons drowned or went missing (Bonomolo and 
Kirchgaessner, 2015). The second incident was the image of the drowned 
Syrian child Alan Kurdi, whose body was washed ashore on 3 September 
near Bodrum in Turkey, after his family’s failed attempt to reach the Greek 
island of Kos. The third event, which gave way to the narrative of the 
refugee crisis, happened the day after that on 4 September. Thousands of 
migrants and refugees had been encamped at the Budapest Keleti railway 
station, and Hungarian police had started denying them access to the trains 
and were beginning to reroute them towards detention camps outside the 
city (De Genova, 2016a). More than a thousand migrants and refugees then 
self-mobilised and started chanting ‘freedom!’ and soon took to the road, 
heading towards Vienna in what was soon called ‘the March of Hope’. The 
Hungarian authorities changed tactics and with opportunistic motivations 
assisted the marchers towards Austria and Germany who then declared 
their borders to be open (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b).
However, the crisis narrative is not only situated fluidly in time but also 
spatially constructed. For instance, for South Eastern and Central Eastern 
European countries, a triggering event was the closure of the Hungarian 
border on 15 September 2015. In Italy, the shipwreck outside Sicily on 19 
April 2015 was another triggering event. In Greece, a critical event was the 
closure of the Balkan route on 18 February 2016 and the debate over 
excluding Greece from Schengen. All these examples are given by Trian-
dafyllidou (2017, p. 199), who argues that ‘there is an interactive relation-
ship between specific events that take place and their coverage and de-/
re-construction through media and political discourse. In other words there 
is an interactive link between factual events and related representations and 
speech events’. We can continue from this premise and argue that a particu-
lar framing and coverage of an event (or encounter) can and will have 
material effects beyond the representation and speech event as it informs 
policy-making and political initiatives, as we shall see from the Danish case.
In terms of policy developments, the refugee crisis caused a domino effect 
when the migrant and refugee flows advanced from the southern and south-
eastern part of Europe towards Central and Northern Europe. Within a 
very short time, most of the EU member states claimed that they were 
unable to cope with the situation and found themselves in a state of emer-
gency, which called for – and also allowed for – exceptional measures. In 
reality, these exceptional measures breached the principle of free mobility 
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for citizens and legally tolerated non-citizens within most of the EU accord-
ing to the Schengen Agreement. This free mobility was de facto cancelled, 
at least in the south-to-north direction. Tensions arose around specific 
internal borders within the EU where border controls were re-installed, such 
as between France and Germany, Germany and Austria, Slovenia and 
Austria, Germany and Denmark, and Denmark and Sweden (Agustin and 
Jørgensen, 2019b).
The refugee crisis in Denmark
As mentioned above, the refugee crisis came to Denmark the first Sunday of 
September 2015. The Sunday encounter had its own timeline and spurred 
different reactions from both the public and the authorities. That afternoon, 
the first large group of refugees and migrants arrived at the small town 
of Rødby on the island of Lolland some 150 kilometres south of Copen-
hagen. They came by ferry from Germany, but fled beyond the nearby 
fields at Rødby Ferry Station for fear of being registered and forced to 
apply for asylum in Denmark. A larger group started to walk on the E47 
motorway towards Sweden (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b). Five hundred 
refugees crossed the border within twenty hours and the situation was 
described as chaotic and out of control (Róin, 2016). The long summer 
of migration had come to Denmark. In the media, the group of pedes-
trians were termed both migrants and refugees (e.g. TV2, 13 September 
2015).
The following Wednesday night, the police gave up detaining the hun-
dreds of refugees who refused to cooperate or be registered. As some refu-
gees had blocked trains, the Danish police gave safe passage to all the 
refugees who stayed in the towns of Padborg and Rødby, both close to the 
German border. They were allowed to move onwards to Sweden, which 
was, as mentioned, the initial destination for the vast majority of them. 
Interestingly, this decision was praised by both the (then) Prime Minister 
and the Minister of Justice (at the time). While the number of asylum 
applications Denmark received over the course of 2015 was much lower 
than in Sweden,5 the increase in asylum applications – over 40 per cent 
higher than the preceding year – was noticeable (Agustin and Jørgensen, 
2019b). During the peak of the ‘crisis’ in November 2015, Danish police6 
estimated that between 7,500 and 11,000 people were crossing into 
Denmark from Germany each week (Jørgensen, 2016).
The decision of many refugees to use Denmark mainly as a transit-
country rather than a destination paradoxically caused mixed feelings 
among the Danish public. In a way, this should not come as a surprise. 
Only months before, the Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration 
had paid for an advert in four Lebanese newspapers informing readers 
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about the conditions of asylum seekers in Denmark and restrictions in terms 
of family reunification, halving of social benefits, and so on. The advert 
begins: ‘Denmark has decided to tighten the regulations concerning refugees 
in a number of areas’ (BBC, 2015). Although the adverts must be seen as 
also being a highly symbolic act, as it is difficult to assess if any of the 
incoming refugees had heard of these particular restrictions, the Danish 
authorities were claiming it to be a success when refugees chose not to apply 
for asylum in Denmark. Some of the reasons given by refugees crossing 
through Denmark for moving on to Sweden have to do with the restrictive 
Danish policy regime. Many refugees stated that temporary residence 
permits, the negative rhetoric about refugees, and especially the restrictions 
for family reunification (in Denmark a minimum one year of waiting before 
reunification, compared to a few months in Sweden and Finland at the time) 
made them travel onwards (Christensen and Bolvinkel, 2015). Likewise, 
existing networks and the lowering of social benefits targeting asylum 
seekers played a role in deciding where to go and where to apply for asylum 
(Christensen and Bolvinkel, 2015). Among the public this caused reactions. 
Some people thought the refugees were ungrateful. Although many did not 
want them to apply for asylum in Denmark, the fact that they did not wish 
to was also seen as a problem (Jyllands-Posten, 11 September 2015). Some 
of the political opponents of the then Minister of Integration, Inger Støj-
berg, blamed her for having given Denmark a bad name (Politiken, 8 Sep-
tember 2015). Others were upset that Denmark did very little to actively 
help solve the refugee crisis and claimed that the Danish authorities should 
accept many more refugees than they had done at the time (DR, 2015). The 
decision to offer the Sweden-bound refugees safe-conduct to pass through 
the country led to criticism from other EU member states. The Swedish 
Prime Minister Stefan Löfven (from the Social Democrats) was heavily 
critical of the Danish response, and the chairperson of the Swedish Left 
Party (Vänsterpartiet) termed Denmark ‘Hungary Light’ (Expressen, 10 
September 2015).
Policy encounters – deterrence over welcoming
In outlining the ways the refugee crisis has been framed and how the Danish 
state encountered the ‘crisis’ once people started crossing the borders, 
my argument is that a particular framing has particular implications and 
consequences for how policy initiatives are developed to solve the alleged 
problems. The response of the Danish state can be analysed as comprising 
a number of different actions: re-bordering practices, the strengthening of 
deterrence policies, motivating enhancement measures to make (rejected) 
asylum seekers leave the country, and increasing bureaucratisation (see 
also the Introduction of this volume). The crisis was framed as something 
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out of control, something creating insecurity for the Danish population 
(as in discussions of the growth of terrorism or terrorists hiding among 
refugees) and something that would mean a blow to the Danish welfare 
state. The refugee crisis was thus framed as challenging Danish security. 
The efforts introduced would be means to maintaining security, order and 
welfare.
Border control: re-bordering practices
The Danish government followed the path set by other European countries 
when it strengthened border controls on 4 January 2016, due to an ‘excep-
tional’ situation which allowed for suspending the Schengen Agreement on 
freedom of movement (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b). The decision was 
made the same day as Sweden announced that it would introduce strength-
ened (förstärkta) border controls in the direction from Denmark to Sweden. 
However, already before this, six other countries (Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Malta and Norway) had implemented similar forms of border 
controls. According to the Danish Prime Minister, in early January 2016, 
91,000 refugees entered Denmark. Thirteen thousand of those applied for 
asylum, while the rest were expected to have entered Norway or Sweden 
(Kofoed, 2016). When most of the incoming refugees were only passing 
through Denmark, the situation was perceived as less grave, but with the 
de facto border closures directed against unwanted migrants on their way 
to the neighbouring Nordic countries, the perception changed.
Since then, the temporary border controls have been extended several 
times with the approval of the EU due to the alleged state of emergency. 
Across the Danish political landscape – with the exception of the most leftist 
parties, the social liberals, and Alternativet (a party resembling Green 
parties in other countries) – there has been a consensus on the need to limit 
the number of asylum applicants. Numerous political actors inside and 
outside the government welcomed the legislative changes with reference to 
the state of emergency the country was believed to be in (Jørgensen, 2016). 
Most political parties deemed the new measures to be fair and appropriate, 
considering the exceptional circumstances. A framing of the ‘crisis’ as being 
a challenge to security and welfare unfolded, which legitimised exclusivist, 
restrictive practices and policies. In October 2018, the government managed 
to get the border controls extended for another six months. The EU Parlia-
ment was against this development and, in the spring of 2018, a majority 
within the EU parliament issued a report stating that the border controls 
were damaging the EU in terms of the economy and mutual trust between 
member states. However, the Minister of Integration at the time, Inger 
Støjberg, and the rest of the Danish government showed no intention of 
changing the extended control and prioritised what they believed to be the 
interest of Denmark.
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Deterrence policies
Alongside the physical control at the external borders and the re-bordering 
practices, we also find more implicit measures, which had the purpose of 
deterring people by decreasing the alleged attractiveness of Denmark as a 
destination for asylum seekers. The former government implemented a 
number of initiatives aimed to decrease the number of arriving refugees and 
thereby the number of people being granted asylum in Denmark. I have 
already mentioned highly symbolic acts such as the adverts in Lebanese 
newspapers as one example of what we can term deterrence policies. While 
some were overt measures to reduce flows, such as of temporary controls 
at the border with Germany, others, as mentioned, were intended instead 
to decrease the attractiveness of Denmark. The most contentious of these 
has been labelled the Jewellery Law (see also chapter 2), which was adopted 
in January 2016. This bill introduced additional limitations on access to 
permanent residency, extended waiting periods for family reunification, and 
legalised the confiscation of valuables worth more than DKK 10,000 
(approximately EUR 1,300) from arriving refugees.
While different governments have, since the turn of the century, made it 
more difficult to obtain permanent residence, these conditions were further 
restricted as a response to the refugee crisis. Previously, refugees who 
had been in the country for eight years and shown what is described as 
a will to integrate, but not yet met specific goals pertaining to what is 
perceived as active citizenship, level of income, higher level of Danish 
proficiency, and employment (which are taken to signify integration and 
commonly referred to as integration criteria) could get easier access to 
permanent residency. This possibility was removed in the wake of the pro-
claimed crisis. Instead, a combination of residency duration and so-called 
integration criteria is currently required to obtain permanent residency. 
This follows a long list of attempts by different governments to restrict 
immigrants’ rights to welfare citizenship since 2001 (see also chapters 5  
and 12).
Deterrence has clearly been a primary motivation behind these and other 
initiatives. Across the political landscape – with the exception of the most 
leftist parties, the social liberals, and Alternativet – there has been a con-
sensus on the need to limit the number of refugees applying for asylum. As 
highlighted above, numerous political actors inside and outside the govern-
ment have welcomed the legislative changes with reference to the state of 
emergency the country is claimed to be in. Most political parties deemed 
the new measures to be fair and appropriate, considering the circumstances. 
For instance, the Social Democrats’ spokesperson for Integration at the 
time, Nicolai Wammen, stated that ‘We are in an extraordinary situation 
where up to 200 asylum seekers arrive on a daily level to Denmark and 
that calls for extraordinary decisions’ (quoted in Drachmann, 2015).
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The cornerstone of the government’s reforms in 2015 was the reintroduc-
tion of the integration benefit.7 This is an allowance given to newly arrived 
refugees that is purposefully low, as it is intended to encourage integration 
by incentivising work, but according to the Minister of Integration at the 
time, Inger Støjberg, it also has an outspoken deterrence goal. When intro-
ducing the regulations, she stated, ‘We must tighten up, so we can control 
the inflow of asylum seekers coming to Denmark … This is the first in a 
line of restrictions which the government will implement to get the foreign-
ers issue [fremmedesagen] under control again’ (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 
2015). The lowering of the social benefit was thus meant to reduce the 
number of people being interested in applying for asylum in Denmark. 
However, it is difficult to assess if the integration benefit had the direct effect 
the government was hoping for, as the numbers of asylum seekers entering 
other European member states also dropped after 2016. Other countries 
implemented different forms of deterrence policies. Nevertheless, we can 
also see that the number of asylum seekers entering Denmark is historically 
low. New statistics from February 2019 shows that only 5 out of 1,000 
asylum seekers entering Europe apply for asylum in Denmark. During the 
last twenty years the rate was between 10 and 15 out of 1,000 (Andersen 
and Larsen, 2019).
Despite the acclaimed success of the restrictions mentioned above and 
the very few people actually applying for asylum in Denmark, the Conser-
vative government, supported by the Danish People’s Party, used the Finance 
Bill in 2019 to introduce a number of further restrictions targeting refugees 
having obtained asylum: ‘Now, the immigration policy is being further 
expanded with a number of significant initiatives to ensure that the tempo-
rary protection in Denmark does not become permanent when the need for 
protection ceases’ (Finansministeriet, 2019, p. 25). Moreover, ‘rules and 
practices need to be adapted so that an asylum permit no longer has to be 
considered as an admission ticket to live in Denmark when you no longer 
have a need for protection’ (Finansministeriet, 2019, p. 26). In concrete 
terms, this entailed reducing welfare benefits even more. NGOs already 
point to the damaging effects of the previous benefit level and foresee 
increased and protracted levels of poverty. The lowering of the allowance 
is meant both to have a deterrence effect, making it less favourable to apply 
for asylum in Denmark, as well as sending a signal of a hard demand for 
self-sufficiency to the people already living in Denmark. The lowering of 
the benefit is only one among a number of new restrictions. They are part 
of a paradigmatic shift in immigration policy. The Social Democrats support 
this shift, which makes change difficult (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019a). As 
emphasised in the quotation above from the Finance Bill, this shift entails 
a focus on return and deportation. The integration benefit, for instance, 
was renamed as the return benefit (hjemrejseydelse), which sends an unmis-
takable message to the recipient about their stay being temporary. Other 
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policy measures include further restrictions on access to permanent resi-
dency and access to family reunification. In sum, the new restrictions make 
temporariness the central concern in the policy framework. Refugees, 
regardless of their achievements and time of residency in Denmark, are 
expected to leave. Consequently, integration (as it is portrayed in the Finance 
Bill) is basically not possible, and refugees remain deportable populations. 
Nicholas De Genova (2016, p. 2) argues that ‘within any given regime of 
immigration-related conditionalities … and contingencies, migrants always 
remain more or less deportable’ and describes this as an “economy” of 
deportability: even if all non-citizens are potentially subject to deportation, 
not everyone is deported, and not everyone is subject to deportation to the 
same degree’ (2016, p. 2).
Another set of measures are the ‘motivation enhancement measures’, 
which target rejected asylum seekers who cannot be deported, as well as 
immigrants living in Denmark on tolerated stay (that is, immigrants with 
a criminal record and/or a deportation order which cannot be executed 
because their country of origin is not safe or will not receive them (see 
Freedom of Movement Research Collective, 2018). The conditions in the 
deportation centres Kærshovedgaard and Sjælsmark, where these people on 
tolerated stay live, are extremely harsh and offer little possibility of an 
autonomous everyday life. The immigrants living there receive only a 
minimal allowance, are not allowed to cook for themselves, and have to 
register their whereabouts (e.g. Canning, 2019; see also chapter 12). These 
provisions seem to have had the desired effect for the government. New 
numbers show that 328 out of 447 people placed at Kærshovedgaard have 
disappeared without the authorities knowing where they are (Ibfelt and 
Skov-Jensen, 2019). While such disappearances may pose a security threat 
or be taken as a sign that the government is unable to achieve the desired 
control of the unwanted population, they have been used to explain the 
government’s ultimate desire, which is to expel refugees without breaking 
the Geneva Convention. When interrogated about the disappearances, Inger 
Støjberg responded: ‘The idea is of course that they have to go home to the 
country they came from. But I have always been aware that some are trying 
[to get asylum] in other countries’. The Danish People’s Party’s spokesper-
son on integration gave a similar response: ‘This is a small success. Under-
stood in the sense that they leave and travel to another European country 
and stay there rather than stay in Denmark. So in this way it is of course 
good’ (Ibfelt and Skov-Jensen, 2019).
Extreme bureaucratic and legal uncertainty
Since June 2015, the Ministry of Foreigners and Integration introduced 
more than 100 restrictions pertaining to non-citizens. Of these, more than 
half relate directly to asylum seekers. With the change of government and 
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the appointment of a new minister, this development could change but it is 
too early to tell if this will be the case. The more or less constant changes 
in immigration policy make it very difficult to navigate the system. Refu-
gees, especially, experience a system that can change overnight and where 
the procedure is never set. A new report by the Danish Refugee Council 
shows that people with a refugee background experience stress, dissatisfac-
tion, depression, and anxiety because of the constant legal changes (Dansk 
Flygtningehjælp, 2019).
In her work on irregular migrants, Bridget Anderson (2010, p. 300) 
claims that the methodical making of ‘institutional uncertainty’ helps 
‘produce “precarious workers” over whom employers and labour users 
have particular mechanisms of control’. In this context, immigration con-
trols function both as ‘a tap regulating the flow of labour’ and as ‘a mould 
shaping certain forms of labour’ (2010, p. 301). There is an inter-play of 
entrant categories, employment relations and construction of institution-
alised uncertainty steered by immigration controls to form particular types 
of labour and relations to employers and the labour market (2010, p. 301). 
The legal status of the migrant is produced by immigration control, which 
at the same time produces other types of illegality.
There is a parallel between Anderson’s analysis and the situation for 
refugees in the Danish context. Even when people with refugee status have 
found employment or education, they are never safe from deportation, as 
the principle of temporariness trumps other concerns. With the newest 
restrictions, 25,000 people who have recognised refugee statuses are at risk 
of being deported if the situations in their home countries are deemed to 
be safe, which illustrates how deportable populations are constructed within 
the policy framework. Of these, 8,700 people are now in paid employment 
and do what is expected of them in terms of integrating into the labour 
market (Andersen and Larsen, 2019). The decision to declare a country safe 
can seem quite arbitrary, as it results more from bilateral agreements with 
economic gains than a genuine assessment of security risks. As an example, 
Somalia is now considered a safe country by the Danish authorities despite 
the ironic fact that Danish civil servants from the Foreigners’ Service who 
negotiated the return agreement with the Somali government never dared 
to leave the airport in Mogadishu as it was not deemed safe enough for 
them (Ottesen, 2017). The Danish civil servants trusted the assessment of 
the Institute for Economics and Peace that the country is not considered a 
dangerous place despite its ranking as the fifth most dangerous country in 
the world.8 As a result of the agreement, hundreds of Somalis with refugee 
statuses living in Denmark now face deportation.
At the same time as the new restrictions were launched, existing practices 
such as family reunification were subjected to increased bureaucratisation. 
A lack of transparency (for example, rights being conditional on other 
policy measures such as the strategy against ‘parallel societies’ in social 
housing schemes or the discretionary power of civil servants assessing 
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the applications) indirectly serves as an exclusionary mechanism and as a 
deterrence measure. It can be argued that the Danish state is establishing 
an extreme version of bureaucratic and legal uncertainty for both asylum 
seekers and people with refugee statuses. In addition, despite the many 
public concerns for refugees’ lack of integration, the current restrictive 
policies (emphasised also by the Finance Bill) seem to make integration 
pointless or impossible.
Civil society and refugees responding to the politics of deterrence 
and uncertainty
In this section, I provide some examples of how civil society and ref-
ugees (individually and collectively) have reacted to the Danish policy 
developments.
Welcoming over deterrence
The visibility of the crisis generated a myriad of solidarity initiatives and 
created/reactivated networks seeking to help and assist refugees. Thou-
sands of people became involved in solidarity work within a very short 
period. Many people acted in civil disobedience and became criminalised 
‘humanitarian smugglers’ by offering transportation to refugees wanting to 
go to Sweden. Some sailed groups of refugees over the Öresund to Sweden, 
whereas others crossed the bridge with refugees hidden in their cars (Agustin 
and Jørgensen, 2019b). These acts presented a dilemma to the government. 
On the one hand, the people in solidarity solved a problem for the state by 
moving an unwanted population away from Denmark; on the other hand, 
the authorities were also concerned that such acts in themselves could be an 
incentive for refugees to come to Denmark. It is in this political landscape 
that Venligboerne (literally friendly neighbours) emerged. The network 
dates back longer than 2015, though. The movement was not originally 
aimed at doing solidarity work with refugees, but was developed as an initia-
tive in a social centre in Northern Jutland. The Venligboerne groups have a 
number of shared aims, such as: providing legal aid, practical help, medical 
support, language training, job-seeking assistance and everyday donations; 
creating broad alliances including both experienced activists and people 
new to solidarity work; setting up social centres; making the problems 
of the asylum process and integration into Danish society visible; practis-
ing a humanitarian approach different from the exclusivist and restrictiv-
ist approach characterising the state; and articulating the commonalities 
between people, refugees, and Danes alike (Jørgensen and Olsen, 2020). 
Venligboerne is one of the groups welcoming refugees which were active 
during the ‘long summer of migration’ and after (Jørgensen and Olsen, 
2020). With the arrival of a large number of refugees, the Venligboerne 
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initiative grew rapidly when it was introduced as an alternative way of 
meeting refugees. From here, the initiative spread across Denmark (and even 
outside the country) and received increasing attention as a way to counter 
the state’s deterrence policies (Jørgensen and Olsen, 2020). The refugee 
crisis is, without doubt, a defining moment in explaining the strengthening 
and spread of civic solidarity, but it also links in with previous solidarity 
networks (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b). Venligboerne provide many roles 
in the encounter between civil society and migrants. The local groups have 
been vital in creating a space of inclusion where newcomers are received as 
peers. The power of Venligboerne lies firstly in its ability to forge alliances 
between different civil society organisations, networks, and refugee groups, 
and secondly in its flexibility and ability to adapt to the policy developments. 
When the government tightened aspects of the Foreigners’ Law and regula-
tions for asylum seekers, Venligboerne responded not only with a critique 
(of the asylum regime) but also with concrete actions.
While a strong welcoming culture may be important in the lives of 
individuals, it does not necessarily hold the power to change existing poli-
cies. Venligboerne has had an internal discussion regarding the politics it 
performs. Some members – including the original founder – regard it as 
a non-political organisation, whereas other members regard it as a non-
formal political organisation (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b). Although 
Venligboerne has not been able to change the general political direction 
(towards increased restrictions and worsening conditions for refugees) it 
has been able to challenge the system by legal means. For instance, the 
government has made it more difficult to actually use refugees’ right to 
family reunification. Even when all conditions for bringing one’s family 
to Denmark are fulfilled, the criteria that the person applying for family 
reunification must bear all costs makes it de facto impossible. This is 
particularly the case for unaccompanied minors. To deal with this situa-
tion, Venligboerne created the group Venligboerne samler ind til flygtninge 
(friendly neighbours collect [donations] for refugees), which collects money 
to pay for these costs. The donations come from art shows, book sales and 
so on, and the organisation has created a very professional infrastructure to 
make the process efficient. In August 2018, the organisation had reunited 
more than 138 refugees and family members (BT, 2018). It has managed 
to uphold a high level of mobilisation and continuity. In 2018, three years 
after the initial mobilisation, the various Venligboerne chapters counted 
more than one hundred local groups and had more than 150,000 members 
(Fenger-Grøndahl, 2017).
Refugee activism and initiatives
One strategy used by refugees is empowerment through knowledge sharing. 
An example is visAvis, which is a publication put together by migrants. 
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visAvis describes itself as: ‘a magazine on asylum and migration, the move-
ment of people across borders and the challenges connected to this. We 
work to improve the debate on asylum and migration, among other things 
by publishing texts that people seeking asylum want to share’ (visAvis, nd.). 
The description of the background for producing the magazine continues: 
‘visAvis is produced by people with or without citizenship living in Denmark. 
From our point of view the policies regarding migration and asylum are 
repressive. People seeking refuge are made suspect and migrants are made 
illegal’ and ‘[i]n this precarious situation we wish to raise the level of debate, 
enhance the quality of information, and create a space where it is possible 
for people seeking asylum to express what is on their mind’ (visAvis, nd.). 
It represents a type of citizen journalism with the peculiar fact that it is 
produced (primarily) by non-citizens; that is, people excluded from the 
protectionist framework of citizenship. What we see here are people claim-
ing a presence and a public voice. Engin Isin (2008) regards such events as 
constituting acts of citizenship. Investigating acts of citizenship entails 
‘focus[ing] on those moments when, regardless of status and substance, 
subjects constitute themselves as citizens – or, better still, as those to whom 
the rights to have rights is due’ (Isin, 2008, p. 18). Reviving political con-
flict, here in problematising the authorities’ handling of asylum seekers and 
treatment of rejected asylum seekers, is a mode for making asylum seekers 
visible as political subjects. Refugees are active agents in constructing and 
disseminating an intrinsic knowledge about conditions, struggles and politi-
cal claims in Denmark.
Another strategy has been acts of disobedience. The conditions in the 
deportation centres Sjælsmark and Kærshovedgaard have spurred varying 
actions and confrontations. Right now, there is a network of actors protest-
ing in different ways against children growing up at Sjælsmark (demonstra-
tions, solidarity events, occupations, etc.). The network unites a very diverse 
range of actors and has received considerable attention. So far, the govern-
ment and parts of the opposition (the Social Democrats) have not reacted, 
but there are small signs of a change in opinion as the media (both national 
and international) keep highlighting the conditions in Sjælsmark. The 
rejected asylum seekers living in Kærshovedgaard tried another tactic by 
initiating a hunger strike in 2017 (see Lindberg et al. 2018). The strike also 
drew the media’s attention, and the parliamentary Ombudsman visited the 
facility. In the end, however, nothing changed and the people forced to live 
in Kærshovedgaard have to deal with worse conditions than before.
Rejected asylum seekers have started leaving Denmark but not returning 
to their home countries. For some, being able to stay in Denmark against 
all the odds has not seemed possible. From the refugees I have been in 
contact with at asylum centres and one deportation centre, life, especially 
in the deportation centre, causes anxiety, depression, and a profound sense 
of powerlessness. Families started leaving at night without the employees 
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of the centres knowing. Some people with the status of rejected asylum 
seekers have sought church asylum in Germany, which has turned out to 
be a second chance for some. German churches grant protection to refugees 
facing difficult situations, called hardship cases. The churches then present 
a request to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany for 
further examination. Venligboerne samler ind has also supported these 
actions. The organisation, for instance, helped finance an Afghani family 
to reach Germany, where they sought church asylum and obtained the right 
to stay. People with Afghani background have travelled to France at times 
when the country started re-assessing the claims of Afghani asylum seekers 
(Ibfelt and Aaberg, 2019). However, the journeys are all towards the 
unknown, and some of my interlocutors are now living as irregular migrants 
in European countries with no chance of either returning to their home 
countries or obtaining asylum under the current regime(s). It is not only 
rejected asylum seekers, who for obvious reasons live in extremely precari-
ous conditions facing forced deportation, but also asylum-seeking families 
and individuals staying on temporary residence permit who have started to 
leave Denmark.
Conclusion
What does the future look like for refugees in Denmark? The discussion in 
this chapter has firstly posed the question of how the Danish authorities 
framed the refugee crisis and, secondly, how a framing of the situation as 
a sustained and protracted emergency legitimised a long series of restrictions 
for both new asylum seekers and refugees (and migrants) already residing 
in the country. The previous government introduced a number of immediate 
policy measures to face the ‘crisis’. This included reinstatement of border 
controls and, more importantly, the introduction of deterrence measures. 
The overall policy goal has been to create a migration regime deterring 
potential asylum seekers from applying for asylum in Denmark. However, 
the policy measures not only target potentially arriving refugees but also 
the ones who have been in Denmark for years. The refugee crisis was thus 
used to expand the category of deportable populations. Whereas this cat-
egory previously included rejected asylum seekers and migrants residing in 
Denmark on ‘tolerated stay’ (see above), the category has been expanded 
to also include refugees who had their claim for asylum accepted, who were 
re-united with their families, and who are in paid employment, learning 
Danish and so on. The politicisation of the question of who can hold the 
right to stay in Denmark created enormous insecurity. The government 
described the new policy approach as a paradigmatic shift – basically 
seeking to solve the refugee issue outside the EU’s (or at least Denmark’s) 
external borders, and which stresses temporality as a main factor (Frelick, 
Kysel, and Podkul, 2018). This approach aligns with the discussions within 
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the EU of externalising the asylum procedures and establishing asylum 
application centres outside EU territories. The refugee crisis was used to 
legitimise this shift. As shown, it created extreme bureaucratic and legal 
uncertainty due to constant policy changes and to the expansion of the 
category of deportable populations. The approach bases itself on policy 
mechanisms and serves to make life unliveable in Denmark. A final conse-
quence of the shift is that, in practice, it makes integration an impossible 
task, as having arrived as a refugee will always make you prone to deporta-
tion (see also De Genova, 2016b). In June 2019, Denmark inaugurated a 
new government when the Social Democrats won the election and, sup-
ported by the social liberal and the leftist parties, formed a minority govern-
ment. It is too early to say if this will lead to any substantial policy changes, 
but everything seems to point away from a reversal of the restrictive poli-
cies. The Social Democrats support the paradigmatic shift and won the 
elections through promises of keeping the strict course on immigration 
(Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019a). However, the new Minister of Integration 
promised to improve conditions for children living at Sjælsmark, and 
recently suggested that it was time to slow down the restrictive policies, 
which could reduce the feeling of uncertainty to an extent. The government 
also opened up the possibility for allowing refugees to enrol in education, 
as was the case in the past. The main message is the same, however, and 
the foundation for restrictive policies continues to be the assumption that 
Denmark needs to be made less attractive to those wishing to re-establish 
their lives within its borders. For example, former Prime Minister Løkke 
Rasmussen explained that he understood the reasons Somalis prefer to live 
in a welfare state compared to life in Mogadishu and that he intends to 
follow existing rules.9
The restrictive policy regime has polarised Danish society. On the one 
hand, we see an organisation such as Venligboerne gaining popularity and 
being able to uphold a high level of mobilisation and engagement over time. 
On the other hand, we see continued support, not only for right-wing 
parties, but also for the restrictive position taken by the Social Democrats. 
Deterrence policies are likely to mark the future of the Danish political 
reality, and uncertainty may destroy the groundwork that strengthens the 
integration of migrants, including refugees. In the final part of this chapter, 
I have sketched out some of the nascent tendencies including the departure 
of the unwanted ones. In the end, people may decide not to stay in Denmark 
against all the odds.
Notes
1 When I mention government in this chapter I refer to the Liberal Party (Venstre)-
led governments in power from June 2015 to June 2019. In June 2019 a Social 
Democratic government took power.
2 All translations from Danish to English are by the author.
82 Refugees and the violence of welfare bureaucracies
3 In this chapter, I use both ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’. Although I prefer the term 
migrant to cover all mobile populations and thus underline their agency, several 
of the people I talked to during participant observation termed themselves refu-
gees, so in order to respect this categorical self-identification I use both terms.
4 See www.en.cgs.aau.dk/research/projects/diginauts/. Accessed 12 February 2020.
5 Denmark received nearly 21,000 applications or 1.5 per cent of the EU total, 
while Sweden received approximately 160,000 or 11.7 per cent of the EU total.
6 ‘Skønsmæssig vurdering af indrejste udlændinge’, Politi, published (last updated) 
13 June 2016, www.politi.dk/da/aktuelt/nyheder/skoensmaessig_vurdering_af_
indrejste_udlaendinge.htm. Accessed 12 February 2019.
7 The Liberal-Conservative governments from 2001–2011 implemented a lower 
social benefit, the ‘Start Allowance’, targeting newcomers who had lived in 
Denmark for the last seven out of eight years (i.e. including Danish citizens who 
had lived abroad). The Social Democratic-led government (2011–2015) abol-
ished this benefit.
8 www.atlasandboots.com/most-dangerous-countries-in-the-world-ranked/. 
Accessed 12 February 2020.
9 P1 Morgen, DR, 7 August.
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5
Minimum rights policies targeting people 
seeking protection in Denmark and Sweden
The temporary law changed the general view of Sweden in Europe. We used 
to be the generous country, and that affected us as a public agency, because 
this generous image has also characterized our approach. If you look around 
here in our office, the rooms are named after Malala, Raoul Wallenberg … 
all human rights advocates. We have the human rights convention framed on 
our walls … but now, we are supposed to adapt to an absolute minimum 
approach. We’re now at the edge of the European Convention. It’s a clear 
political signal, but we have to figure out what it means to us, this new focus 
on minimum levels and on return. (Richard, senior official at Swedish Migra-
tion Agency)
I interviewed Richard,1 a senior official at the Swedish Migration Agency, 
in February 2017, approximately one year after the Social Democratic-
Green coalition government had decided to close Sweden’s borders and 
adopt the ‘temporary law’ (Lagen 2016:752). As Richard’s reflection indi-
cates, the law entailed a restrictive shift, designed to deter people from 
seeking protection in Sweden, and enhance the rate and speed of deporta-
tions. The law increased the hurdles in obtaining protection, introduced 
temporary rather than permanent residence permits for people who had 
obtained protection status, and circumscribed their right to family reunifica-
tion (see also chapters 3 and 12 in this volume), and was accompanied by 
a political promise to enforce more deportations, expand migration-related 
detention, and increase the capacity of the border police. For Richard and 
his colleagues at the Swedish Migration Agency, it also implied a shift in 
how they approached their work.
Sweden had thus joined the so-called ‘race to the bottom’ in European 
asylum and migration policy (Slominski and Trauner, 2018). Meanwhile, 
across the Öresund, the Danish government was, at a higher speed than 
ever, issuing amendments to its Alien’s Act with the explicit aim of rendering 
Denmark unattractive for people seeking protection (see also chapter 4). In 
2018, the (now former) government declared a paradigm shift in the coun-
try’s asylum regime, which would change the focus of the asylum system 
Annika Lindberg
86 Refugees and the violence of welfare bureaucracies
‘from integration to temporariness and repatriation’ (Regeringen, 2018, 
p. 5). While having made certain concessions, the new Social Democratic-
led coalition government has declared its intent to maintain the restrictive 
course in Denmark’s asylum and migration regime.
The restrictive policy amendments have had drastic implications for 
people seeking protection in both Sweden and Denmark, and have severely 
circumscribed their access to protection as well as to welfare rights and 
services (Clante Bendixen, 2017). What is more, and as Richard’s reflection 
illustrates, they signalled a shift in how border bureaucracies were supposed 
to approach people seeking protection – even though prior research has 
shown that restrictive and rigorous border regimes are constitutive of the 
Nordic states, rather than an anomaly (Barker, 2013, p. 2017). In this 
chapter, I address the question of how state officials at the forefront of 
border bureaucracies (Brodkin, 2012) have made sense of and enforced the 
restrictive policy regimes targeting people seeking protection in Denmark 
and Sweden. I focus in particular on what I call minimum rights approaches 
that limit or withdraw access to welfare services and that are designed to 
deter unwanted migrants from remaining in the countries. In Denmark, this 
logic has applied both to people in the asylum process and to those who 
have received a negative decision and are awaiting deportation; in the 
Swedish case, I focus on the policy measures targeting people whose asylum 
application has been rejected.
The chapter is based on qualitative research conducted in 2016 and 2017, 
including interviews with Danish and Swedish police officers, civil society 
organizations, social services, migration officials and legal advisors. More-
over, I conducted participant observation and interviews with staff in Danish 
so-called departure centres (udrejsecenter) and Swedish departure housing 
units (återvändandeenheter), the latter of which are open housing units (as 
opposed to locked detention centres) where people are accommodated prior 
to deportation. Denmark and Sweden have often been discussed as two very 
different cases with regard to migration and asylum policy (Green-Pedersen 
and Krogstrup, 2010), with Sweden being a self-proclaimed humanitar-
ian great power (Parusel, 2015) and Denmark representing a more long-
standing restrictive approach. In contrast, I focus on similarities in terms 
of how wealthy, bureaucratized welfare states produce an intricate web of 
exclusionary practices, which affirm the non-belonging of people who have 
been categorized as unwanted by the state. Tracing the implementation of 
the minimum rights approaches in the two countries, I demonstrate the 
particular forms of violence enabled through the intense presence of the 
state in the everyday life of (non)citizens (see Introduction to this volume).
In what follows, I first introduce the argument that the politics of deter-
rence and minimum rights can be understood as forms of necropolitical 
(Mbembe, 2003) state violence. Second, I outline practitioners’ reactions to 
the deterrence policies justified by both governments’ declarations of a crisis 
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of asylum reception, and discuss how this political framing justified the 
adoption of policies which only aggravated the precarious condition of 
persons seeking protection. Third, I analyse the minimum welfare policies 
targeting rejected asylum seekers in Denmark and Sweden, and discuss their 
implications for the agents of enforcement as well as for those targeted. I 
conclude by arguing that these forms of violence, rather than being excep-
tional, are integral to the welfare states, and produce hierarchies of belong-
ing, rights and humanity among populations. Importantly, I recognize that 
the perspective of state officials risks overlooking the ways in which people 
seeking protection navigate and challenge the minimum rights policies and 
how they partake in shaping border regimes from a disadvantaged position 
(Mezzadra and Nielsen, 2013). Acknowledging the partiality of the perspec-
tive offered in this chapter, I nevertheless maintain that the views of street-
level bureaucrats may offer important insights into the exclusionary 
bordering mechanisms of bureaucratized welfare states.
Minimum rights as necropolitics
Much literature on migration control regimes focuses on the coercive state 
powers they mobilize, such as practices of policing, detainment and forced 
deportation (Bosworth, Parmar and Vázquez, 2018), and how they inflict 
direct, physical violence and punishment on unwanted foreign nationals. 
Yet migration control also operates through welfare services, which can be 
mobilized as instruments of migration control: for instance, when states 
adjust foreign nationals’ access to essential social rights and services to an 
absolute humanitarian minimum (Johansen, 2013) or render them condi-
tional upon cooperation with authorities in asylum or deportation processes 
(Rosenberger and Koppes, 2018). These policy measures, which can be 
understood as a form of indirect violence (Valenta and Thorshaug, 2011), 
are the focus of this chapter.
Prior research has suggested an understanding of minimum welfare 
approaches as a form of minimalist biopolitics (Johansen, 2013), which 
denies people who are conceived as unwanted by the state equal access to 
basic rights and services, including work, health care, education and welfare. 
The aim of such policies is ultimately to expel them from the territory and/
or the social body (Walters, 2011). Compared to direct, coercive regulatory 
practices, minimum welfare policies are financially and legally less costly 
for states, while they enable governments to expose ‘those physically and 
politically marginalized … to very real bodily violence … while fulfilling 
their legal obligations to those making an application for asylum’ (Mayblin 
et al., 2019, p. 15, emphasis in original). Applying a postcolonial perspec-
tive in their writing on the lived experiences of poverty and marginalization 
among people seeking asylum in the UK, Mayblin et al. (2019, p. 2) argue 
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that the minimum welfare approach should be understood as a form of 
bordering that produces a hierarchization of human life and rights. This 
hierarchization, in turn, follows a ‘logical contemporary expression of his-
torically embedded colonial/modern, racially hierarchical worldviews which 
have their roots in colonial enterprise’. The authors thus draw attention to 
how the political production of such abject ‘necropolitical’ (Mbembe, 2003, 
p. 21) conditions, where populations are ‘kept alive, but in a state of injury’, 
is ultimately rendered possible through the racialized identity of the Other 
(for example migrant). Beyond the study of Mayblin et al. (2019), the 
analysis of minimum rights approaches to people who migrate as a form 
of necropolitics has informed several contemporary studies of border and 
migration regimes in Europe and beyond (Weber and Pickering, 2011; 
Davies, Isakjee and Dhesi, 2017), which have shown how these policy 
regimes expose racialized migrant groups to slow suffering, enforced 
through neglect and deprivation.
While necropolitics is by no means a governing strategy confined to 
Northern Europe, strategies of radical exclusion arguably take particular 
forms, and differ in their effects, when deployed by highly regulated welfare 
states. As Davies, Isakjee and Dhesi (2017, p. 1269) argue:
Advanced states such as those in northern Europe have ample resources with 
which to ensure those within its borders are protected from hunger, provided 
with shelter and given the security required to live without constant fear. 
Welfare systems are relatively well funded; but just as power can be activated 
by such states through distribution of provision, exclusionary power can be 
exerted through its withdrawal.
The authors conclude that the ‘active inaction’ on behalf of states that have 
the capacity and resources to provide for persons seeking protection, yet 
intentionally chose not to do so, constitutes a form of structural violence 
(see also chapter 2). Hence, minimum rights approaches enable states to 
produce the suffering of unwanted populations through wilful neglect and 
conscious withdrawal of support (Canning, 2018).
This chapter shows that policies which produce the foreseeable margin-
alization and exclusion of certain populations are often perceived as con-
tradicting the discursive and ideological foundations of a universalist 
welfare state. In Denmark and Sweden, the narrative of an inclusive and 
protective welfare state is key to the social and political identity of the state 
(Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). However, the welfare state is, to an 
equal extent, premised on the exclusion or subordinate inclusion (De 
Genova, 2013) of non-members, whose (gendered, racialised and classed) 
difference becomes constituted as threats to the welfare state and society 
(Tervonen et al., 2018). Hence, the subordinate inclusion and infliction of 
structural violence onto unwanted others is one of the ways in which the 
welfare state (re)constructs itself and consolidates its borders (Aas, 2013; 
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Barker, 2017). Nevertheless, enforcing policies that inflict slow violence 
(Mayblin et al., 2019) onto those ‘excepted’ (Khosravi, 2010) from social, 
political, and legal membership causes dilemmas for the agents of enforce-
ment within border-oriented welfare bureaucracies. These dilemmas, and 
the ways in which border bureaucrats make sense of and address them, are 
explored in the remainder of this chapter.
The crisis of the welfare state and politics of deterrence
The 2015 summer of migration (Buckel, 2016) was followed by a restrictive 
turn in the asylum and migration policy across Northern European states. 
As detailed in other chapters in this volume (see chapters 3, 4 and also 12), 
the Danish and Swedish governments both declared a crisis of their asylum 
reception system and used it as justification for introducing a series of 
restrictive measures targeting people seeking protection. Many of the policy 
restrictions can be understood as a form of symbolic politics of deterrence 
(Lemberg-Pedersen, 2016; Whyte, Campbell and Overgaard, 2018) whereby 
the Swedish and Danish governments sought to send signals to people 
seeking protection that they were no longer welcome. The deterrence poli-
cies relied on the assumption that asylum seekers are attracted to Northern 
European states for their generous welfare benefits (Lemberg-Pedersen 
2016). Accordingly, the very presence of people seeking protection was 
presented as a threat to the welfare state, with the rational response of 
governments being to limit their access to these rights and services. Such 
narratives also circulated among street-level officials tasked with enforcing 
the new restrictions within the asylum system.
For instance, on a chilly February morning in 2016, a month after 
Sweden had installed passport controls at the borders to Denmark, I arrived 
on the platform at Hyllie train station, the first station you reach when 
travelling from Denmark to Sweden. Hyllie station, which months earlier 
had been the site where many of the people who arrived in Sweden to seek 
protection had disembarked after a long journey through Europe, was now 
curiously empty. A police van stood parked next to the metal fence demar-
cating the Swedish border. I asked one of the police officers, who stood idle 
on the platform, what she thought of the border controls. While she 
acknowledged that there was not much work for the police to do at the 
station, as the number of arrivals had dropped significantly since the peak 
in September 2015, she still maintained that the border controls served a 
purpose:
Many police officers were frustrated before, when asylum seekers were just 
allowed to pass us by and continue their journeys without applying for 
asylum. If you are really in need of protection, you wouldn’t just walk through 
several safe countries on the way. You should apply for asylum in the first 
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country you arrive in … if you don’t do that, I think one should ask what’s 
your real motivation. As a police officer, I wonder, the Refugee Convention 
… if you come straight from the dangerous country and cross the border to 
a safe country … the intention of the Convention is that people should stay 
there.
While there were no legal grounds for the police officer’s statement (nowhere 
in international law is it specified that a person seeking protection must 
register their asylum claim in the first safe country they arrive in (Joormann, 
2019)), the police officer had a clear, normative judgement of who deserves 
protection. In accordance with the Dublin Regulation (see Introduction 
above), signatory states do have the right (not the obligation) to expel 
people seeking asylum to the country where they are suspected to have 
entered Europe. Yet, in the police officer’s view, the very fact that a person 
decided to travel further to Sweden demonstrates that their real motivation 
for seeking asylum was not to obtain protection, but something else.
During interviews, police and migration officials on both sides of the 
Öresund similarly voiced their opinion that people were making their way 
to Northern Europe for its supposedly generous welfare benefits. Accord-
ingly, when reflecting on the purpose of their border enforcement tasks, 
Danish and Swedish border police officers explained that they saw their 
role not only as gatekeepers of the territorial border, but also as protectors 
of the welfare state against a perceived threat of abuse. Such narratives 
reflect a welfare chauvinist ideology, which portrays the welfare state as 
reserved uniquely for members of the national community, and depicts 
foreign nationals as potential threats to the welfare state and society (Careja 
et al., 2016; Keskinen et al., 2016). Politically, similar narratives were 
instrumentalized in order to justify further deterrence measures, which 
circumscribed access to rights and welfare for people seeking protection. 
Yet not all agents of enforcement were comfortable with the restrictions. 
Richard, the migration official quoted earlier, reflected in the following way 
on the Swedish government’s temporary law:
It was a decision made by a nervous government. They claimed that we – the 
Swedish Migration Agency – had asked them to install border controls but 
that’s simply not true … The temporary law was hastily and sloppily prepared. 
For instance, they completely forgot about Article 3 and 8 of the European 
Convention for Human Rights in their first draft, and we would simply have 
violated the human rights convention if we complied … In the end, they added 
that restrictions should be applied ‘as long as they do not breach Sweden’s 
international commitments’, which is a stupid formulation.
Richard emphasized that the law had attracted critique among several 
bureaucratic officials and legal experts, yet he also admitted that it had 
forced the Swedish Migration Agency to ‘change their mindset’ in a more 
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restrictive direction. The shift to deterrence policies thus influenced the 
attitudes of border bureaucrats, and risked placing their practices in the 
grey zone of human rights conventions.
In Denmark, one of the deterrence measures adopted in early 2016 was 
the establishment of tent camps, designed to house people who were waiting 
for their asylum applications to be processed. Commenting on the tent 
camps, the (now former) Minister of Immigration, Integration and Housing 
stated, ‘There is no doubt that the more debate there is regarding the tents 
and reception conditions, the more I believe asylum-seekers will think that 
Denmark is not the place where they should go’ (Inger Støjberg, quoted in 
Jyllands-Posten, 2016). While encampment is a long-established feature of 
Danish asylum and migration control (Whyte, 2011; Syppli-Kohl, 2015), 
the tent camps were established to indicate a state of crisis in the reception 
system. Karsten, a legal advisor for people applying for asylum whom I 
interviewed in 2016, noted that the tent camps were opened ‘despite the 
fact that there are 166,000 empty buildings in Denmark [at the time]. Just 
to show that Denmark doesn’t want them’. Whyte, Campbell and Over-
gaard (2018, p. 2) have described the tent camps as ‘emblematic of a wider 
turn in asylum policies in the Global North towards making host countries 
seem as unattractive as possible to would-be asylum seekers’. Yet, beyond 
their symbolic function, the tent camps, as well as the other restrictions in 
reception conditions for people seeking protection, also had tangible effects. 
Elmira, another legal advisor in Denmark, commented the following way 
on the ensemble of regulations designed to make people seeking protection 
feel unwelcome in Denmark:
The border closure and the issue [about the Jewellery Law] completely domi-
nated the public debate. But this has no real meaning – it’s merely symbolic, 
not interesting or particularly important for refugees … If we talk about 
humiliating policies, it is far more humiliating that they are splitting families, 
introducing more surveillance measures and harsher detention conditions, and 
the stricter conditions in asylum centres … Like now they can no longer cook 
their own food. This way, people lose … the power over their own body that 
cooking your own meals still entails. And, the asylum camps look more like 
detention camps now. This sends a signal that they are not welcome.
As Elmira notes, the regulations that had the most tangible effects on 
people’s lives included the obstacles to family life, the deprivation of auton-
omy, and everyday degradation in the camps. These stories rarely made 
the headlines but could be understood as expressions of the indirect or 
‘slow violence’ (Mayblin et al., 2019) of the deterrence regime. Similar to 
Sweden, not all officials in Denmark were comfortable with imposing this 
regime. When I interviewed staff in asylum centres in Denmark regarding 
how the new restrictions affected their work, some of them explained that 
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they tried to find ways to ‘weasel their way out’ of the policy restrictions 
and minimize the harmful effects on people seeking asylum (Borrelli and 
Lindberg, 2018, p. 171).
The deterrence policy regimes developed in both Denmark and Sweden 
thus served, on the one hand, to convey a sense of crisis, which was por-
trayed as having been caused by the people seeking protection and thus 
justifying restrictions in their access to rights, protection and services. On 
the other hand, the policies aggravated the crisis for those seeking protec-
tion, by exposing them to intensified suspicion, marginalization, and every-
day degradation. Still, the deterrence policies enabled the governments to 
go to the edge of human rights conventions without overtly breaching them 
(see also chapter 12). This was particularly true for the minimum rights 
policies targeting people whose asylum application has been rejected in 
Denmark and Sweden respectively, to which I now turn.
Enforcing the politics of minimum rights
The Swedish and Danish governments’ response to their declared crisis of 
asylum reception also entailed promises to enhance the speed and rate of 
deportations. Under the pretext of preserving the integrity of the asylum 
system, both governments increased their investments in migration-related 
detention, and introduced restrictions to the social rights and freedom of 
movement of people whose asylum applications had been rejected.
In Denmark, this regime of rights restrictions has materialized in the two 
departure or deportation centres, Sjælsmark and Kærshovedgård, inaugu-
rated in 2013, yet only in operation since 2015. The centres house people 
whose asylum applications have been rejected, including families and chil-
dren, foreign nationals having received a deportation order following a 
criminal conviction, and people on so-called tolerated stay. Tolerated stay 
refers to an open-ended status for people who have been excluded from 
international protection (§ 1F, §10 and §25 of the Danish Alien’s Act) 
because of their involvement in serious crime, or because they are suspected 
of posing a risk to national security, yet cannot be deported due to the risk 
of refoulement (see Suárez-Krabbe et al., 2018). Geographically isolated, 
located in former prison and military facilities run by the prison and proba-
tion service, and surrounded by non-secure fences, the purpose of deporta-
tion centres is to isolate and marginalize these groups of non-deported 
persons in view of pressuring them to leave Denmark ‘voluntarily’ (Suárez-
Krabbe and Lindberg, 2019; see also chapter 12). Residents are obliged to 
reside in the centres, but are not legally detained, and can therefore be held 
there indefinitely. Meanwhile, they have no right to work, and as their daily 
allowance or pocket money is withdrawn, they are left to have their meals 
during specific hours in the centres’ cafeteria.
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The conditions in the deportation centres, and the acute threat of detain-
ment and deportation that residents are exposed to, generate significant 
uncertainty, experiences of loss of autonomy, degradation, isolation and 
criminalization (Suárez-Krabbe et al., 2018; Canning, 2019). Staff tasked 
with enforcing or supervising this ‘intolerability regime’ (Suárez-Krabbe and 
Lindberg, 2019) approached their work with certain discomfort and ambiv-
alence. ‘Here we have no responsibilities compared to prisons, or even to 
migration detention’, Mikkel, one of the prison officers, remarked. ‘There, 
we are supposed to enforce the imprisonment and make it as humane as 
possible … but here we do not have the mandate for that’. Some prison 
officers enjoyed not having to take responsibility for residents’ wellbeing or 
monitor their whereabouts, while others regretted lacking the ability to 
ameliorate the harsh conditions for those held in the centres. Jonas, a col-
league of Mikkel, told me:
They say we should make life intolerable for them, to make life shit. I find 
that appalling. They should get out here and see the reality. A colleague of 
mine said that one day we’ll have to get a funeral undertaker out here, because 
what are we to do with them? … This gets right to the long-term question: 
What do we do with them? They are unwanted here … but it’s not dignified 
to treat them like that. (Quoted in Lindberg et al., 2018)
Jonas, and many of his colleagues, emphasized that the rule of intolerability 
was enforced by the structure, architecture and rules of the centres – not 
by prison officers. Still, he admitted that he found the intolerability regime, 
which subjected residents to conditions that were intentionally designed to 
‘make their life shit’, appalling. The deportation centres have attracted 
criticism from numerous human rights organizations and agents for amount-
ing to de facto detention, and for deliberately exposing residents to physical 
and psychologically harmful conditions (Helsinki-Komitéen for Mennesker-
ettigheder, 2017; Røde Kors, 2019). What is more, and as Jonas noted, the 
combination of the architectural and legal setup of the centres and their 
temporal indeterminacy risked leaving residents indefinitely stranded under 
these conditions. Indeed, the centres have not contributed to enhancing 
deportation rates but instead, as formulated by residents stranded in the 
centres, ‘left them to die, slowly’ at the margins of state and society (Suárez-
Krabbe et al., 2018).
Residents’ articulations correspond well with Mbembe’s (2003) depic-
tion of the necropolitical condition that exposes certain groups to slow 
suffering, enforced through neglect and deprivation (Davies et al., 2017; 
Mayblin et al., 2019). However, when I discussed the deportation centres 
with state officials and NGO representatives in Denmark, they maintained 
that ‘it could be worse’. For instance, Mette, who worked at a large NGO 
providing legal support to rejected asylum seekers in Denmark, noted, ‘They 
could have chosen to use homelessness as a motivation measure instead, 
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and just thrown rejected asylum-seekers out on the streets … at least we 
don’t do that in Denmark’. She might have been unaware that such a policy 
had entered into force in Sweden in June 2016.
Sweden’s amended Act (1994:137) on the reception of asylum seekers 
and others (hereafter LMA) came into force in June 2016. According to 
the law, people whose asylum application has been rejected and who fail 
to leave Sweden within the four weeks’ stipulated timeframe for ‘voluntary’ 
departure, will have their daily allowance and access to accommodation 
withdrawn. Families with children, unaccompanied minors and persons 
in need of emergency healthcare are excepted from the rule, yet the law 
urges authorities to apply exceptions restrictively (Migrationsverket, SR 
13/2016). As a result of the amendment, people are effectively deprived of 
access to basic social rights, including access to food and accommodation, 
once their asylum application has been rejected.2 When I interviewed migra-
tion officials working with deportation processes at the Swedish Migration 
Agency, many of them thought of the law as being correct in principle, as 
it demonstrated consistency in asylum policies. Maria, who worked in a 
migration-related detention centre, argued: ‘We cannot tolerate that once 
the state tells people they are not allowed to stay, we have people who 
remain in the system living off its support, or municipalities and other actors 
allowing for a parallel society to grow, and legitimating that people stay 
here without authorization.’ In the quote from Maria, we can distinguish 
the same deterrence logic that underpinned the Swedish police officer’s 
reasoning above, where the exclusion of those ‘undeserving’ of state pro-
tection (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012) from welfare services is 
posited as a necessity for keeping the welfare state solvent for members. It 
also shows a strong identification and loyalty with the welfare state among 
the street-level bureaucrats (see also chapter 7). However, the amendment 
also caused dilemmas for state officials. Susanne, another migration official, 
told me:
An option we have is to subject them to registration duties, make them register 
regularly with authorities. But with the new LMA, there is no point – they 
have no incentive to stay in the system when they are not even getting a place 
to stay. What should we tell them – ‘ok we need your address, you say you 
live under the bridge over there?’ That’s just absurd! (Quoted in Lindberg, 
2019, p. 127)
Susanne concluded that the LMA amendment, rather than obtaining the 
desired effect of deterring people from remaining in Sweden despite a 
deportation order, disincentivized them from remaining in touch with 
authorities, and consequently pushed them into illegality. As our conversa-
tion continued, Susanne mentioned that ‘it feels like we are just pushing the 
problem and the costs around between different state agencies’. Indeed, the 
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Swedish Migration Agency has reported that the LMA amendment has not 
had any tangible effect on deportation rates (see Sellin, 2018); instead, 
reports suggest that a growing number of people have been pushed into 
destitution and have become dependent on the support of non-governmental 
actors for their survival (European Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018). 
Jan, a social worker, reflected on the amendment:
We are talking about people who do not have the right to be anywhere in the 
world. Maybe their decisions are not even enforceable … the law doesn’t 
match the wider perspective, the dilemmas we encounter with this group. This 
is nothing new, it has gone on for a long time … We can no longer shut our 
eyes and pretend that the system covers it.
Jan suggested that the cause of the problem was the result of a policy failure 
and a gap in social service provision. Yet the exclusion of people with pre-
carious or no legal status from essential welfare services is, in this case, the 
direct result of a law that purposely produces their destitution. As such, 
this is nothing new; as argued by Könönen (2018, p. 53), immigration law 
invalidates ‘the universalism of rights and a residence-based welfare system’. 
Yet the minimum rights policies discussed in this chapter cannot be under-
stood as mere policy failures but are intentional, even integral, to the opera-
tion of deterrence policies that deliberately withdraw access to rights and 
services for those perceived as non-members, even though they evoke dilem-
mas and bewilderment among the agents of enforcement.
In line with findings from research on similar policy measures in other 
countries, including Germany (Ellermann, 2010), the Netherlands (Kalir 
and van Schendel, 2017) and Norway (Valenta and Thorshaug, 2011; 
Johansen, 2013), the minimum rights approaches used in Denmark and 
Sweden have had counterproductive effects on deportation rates. Yet they 
have also allowed governments to tacitly ignore the ‘slow violence’ of des-
titution, illegalization and degradation that is a direct effect of the deter-
rence policies (see Canning, 2018; Mayblin et al., 2019). The policies have 
further enabled state authorities to tacitly ignore (Kalir and van Schendel, 
2017) those unwanted on their territory and push the responsibility for their 
basic social rights either onto civil society actors, or on other European 
states. Indeed, recent reports on trends in Dublin transfers suggest that the 
restrictive conditions in Denmark and Sweden have pushed more people to 
move on to other European countries, including Germany, France and Italy 
(EMN, 2017; Ibfelt and Skov-Jensen, 2019 see also chapter 4). While access 
to asylum and to essential welfare services might be equally restrictive in 
those countries, the lack of essential service provisions might be easier to 
navigate for people with precarious legal status than in the highly bureau-
cratized Nordic welfare states. The asylum applications of specific nationali-
ties are also treated differently from country to country. Issa, who had his 
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application for asylum rejected in Denmark and spent one year in a Danish 
deportation centre, explained:
Maybe you stay in one place for a few years, then you leave to a new place, 
you have to change places and then come back again … and from what I 
have understood that’s what people do: they get frustrated in one place, they 
try their luck in another place. But when you are already in the position of 
being rejected here, it’s not the same as in Greece, Italy, or Spain … there, 
you are allowed to walk around freely without documents, because they 
cannot afford or organize your deportation. But in Sweden, Denmark, 
Germany, it’s more difficult. … The system is made to protect you but can 
also control you. That’s why, when the economic situation was good, it was 
actually ok to be a refugee in Greece, Spain, Italy … that’s why it’s so difficult 
to live underground or as rejected here. Then you are basically wasting your 
time, you will never fit in. All is regulated. (Lindberg, 2019, p. 61)
Issa suggested that it is more difficult to navigate exclusionary policies in 
bureaucratized welfare states than in Greece, Italy or Spain which, as prior 
research has highlighted, are characterized by weaker internal gatekeeping 
and larger informal economies (Sager, 2011; Triandafyllidou and Ambro-
sini, 2011; see also DeBono et al., 2015). Returning to the suggestion by 
Davies, Isakjee and Dhesi (2017) that the intentional exclusion or with-
drawal of basic services practised by wealthy, Nordic welfare states consti-
tutes a governing technique in its own right, Issa’s observation suggests that 
the minimum rights policies practised by Denmark and Sweden do have 
severe, violent effects on people seeking protection. The regulated, bureau-
cratized nature of service provisions in these states may also present addi-
tional barriers, which exacerbate the subordinate inclusion of unwanted 
populations.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the implementation of minimum rights 
policies targeting people seeking protection in Denmark and Sweden with 
the aim of deterring them from arriving or staying. The examples I have 
focused on are policy measures adopted or implemented since 2015, which 
have been fuelled by the notion of a crisis of asylum reception, where migra-
tion was portrayed as a threat to the social and political order of the welfare 
state. Focusing on indirect (Valenta and Thorshaug, 2011) coercive mea-
sures, including restrictions or withdrawal of access to basic social rights 
for people deemed unwanted or non-belonging to the welfare state, I have 
discussed the way bureaucratic violence operates through everyday degra-
dation and enforced destitution (Davies et al., 2017; Mayblin et al., 2019). 
I have argued that the logic of deterrence, which gradually circumscribes 
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the rights of people seeking protection, and the deliberate production of 
abject conditions for those whose asylum application has been rejected 
amount to necropolitical violence (Mbembe, 2003). I have demonstrated 
how the enforcement of this governance logic has evoked confusion, dis-
comfort and dilemmas for border bureaucrats, and resulted in aggravated 
marginalization, destitution and illegalization of people lacking legal autho-
rization to remain. The dilemmas that border bureaucrats experience in 
enforcing state violence reflect the paradoxes inherent in the simultaneously 
caring and repressive welfare apparatus – notably when policies aggravate 
the crisis they were officially meant to address.
There remain important differences between the minimum rights 
approaches practised in Denmark and Sweden. In Denmark, the policies 
were a continuation of previous restrictive practices, whereas the temporary 
law in Sweden constituted a more drastic policy shift. Moreover, while the 
Danish government has been remarkably explicit in their unwelcoming 
approach (as illustrated by its promise to make life intolerable for resi-
dents of deportation centres), the intent behind the Swedish government’s 
minimum rights approach is not as pronounced. This does not, however, 
mean that the Swedish government holds less responsibility for the harmful 
effects of the temporary law and the LMA amendment on people seeking 
protection; as Richard noted in his critique of the temporary law, its 
harmful effects were, if not foreseen, at least foreseeable (see also Canning,  
2018).
Political differences aside, the reflection offered by Issa is instructive for 
understanding the specific hurdles encountering people seeking protection 
in bureaucratized Nordic welfare states. Getting by without support from 
state agencies and evading their intense regulative presence in the everyday 
is challenging, and access to alternative support structures might be condi-
tional, partial and depend on kinship or other social networks, or on a 
person’s ability to find work in the informal sector (Sager, 2011; Chauvin 
and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). Still, many people endure these conditions 
of constraint – or try their luck elsewhere in Europe. Their knowledge and 
experience are crucial to consider if we are to challenge the exclusionary 
power of bureaucratized states.
Notes
1 Due to agreements on anonymity, all names of informants are fictive.
2 So far, other prior liberalizations of their social rights have not been revoked, 
notably the 2013 amendments, which granted people whose asylum application 
had been rejected, plus illegalized persons, the same right to healthcare as people 
who were in asylum procedures. Access to schooling for all children, including 
those lacking legal authorization to remain, is inscribed into national law.
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Images of crisis and the crisis of images:  
a visual analysis of four frames of 
representation of ‘refugeeness’ in  
Swedish newspapers
The period 2015–2016 in Sweden (and beyond) became largely known as 
the refugee crisis – a construct readily associated with a negative event or 
a destabilizing period of time, which can affect both individuals and larger 
groups and societies. The term crisis came alongside the word ‘refugee’ – a 
pairing which is particularly loaded and comes with highly problematic 
political impositions. For example, how did people fleeing come to embody 
the term crisis? Media coverage of the events has been vast. Images and 
video material of boats crowded with de-faced and de-named black and 
brown bodies, images of indignity such as precarious living conditions and 
police abuse, as well as death and mourning. A common photographic 
style found in newspapers is that of a bird’s-eye view – shots taken ‘from 
above’, which create a link to National Geographic’s style of capturing 
‘wild life’ that is present before our eyes yet too dangerous to approach 
closely.
Importantly, these relationships are manifestations of power structures: 
the gaze of the photographer/film-maker directed at their subject, the 
counter gaze of the subject towards the photographer and the spectator of 
the image. There are also the gaze of the editors in charge of selecting the 
right image for publishing and, importantly, the gaze of the researcher while 
collecting and analysing these very images. Therefore, naming an event a 
refugee crisis is not only a matter of language, but also that of knowledge 
production and construction of specific realities. In relation to that, Rose 
(2016) argues that images offer worldviews – they are not innocent carriers 
of a message to the world, rather, they give us interpretations of the world 
that are carried out in very particular ways. In order to explore these world-
views, and as this chapter will further illustrate, I turn to study what I call 
the crisis of images in Swedish newspaper dailies Dagens Nyheter (DN) and 
Svenska Dagbladet (SvD). What I refer to as the crisis of images is embed-
ded in the simplified, shock and threat inducing portrayal of the very 
complex issues of flight, whereby people on the move are often forced to 
embody stereotypical and violent imageries.
Jelena Jovičić
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This chapter critically examines front-page photography in Swedish 
newspapers and aims to answer the question: How is refugeeness con-
structed as a part of the refugee crisis 2015–2016 in Swedish daily news-
papers Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet? In particular, I bring 
forward the knowledge of the visual construction of the refugee bodies and 
refugees’ positioning in relation to the Swedish nation state. Finally, I go 
beyond the research fixation on the refugee as the only agent in the crisis 
discourses and point to the other actors playing a role in how we understand 
the question of flight. In the coming paragraphs I present the overview of 
literature that informs the present chapter.
Visual construction of refugeeness
Research investigating the matter of visual representation and social con-
struction of the meaning of refugeeness commonly deals with aspects of the 
physical appearance of refugee bodies in photography and the environment 
in which they are caught – the interest being that of the intersecting issues 
of gender, racialization and class (Wright, 2002; Johnson, 2011; on class 
and economic capital, see chapter 2). Moreover, another common research 
interest is that of refugee bodies and the visual composition of numbers – 
are people who are fleeing captured as individuals, small and medium 
groups or as a mass exodus of people? And what kind of knowledge do 
these different compositions disseminate to the public (Wright, 2002; 
Bleiker et al., 2013; Zhang and Hellmueller, 2017; Jovičić, 2018)? In line 
with one important theme of this book – the construction of refugeeness 
and refugee crisis in the context of Nordic welfare states – I am guided by 
the major concerns of the aforementioned research, yet I also shift away 
from the fixation on the refugee body and consider other actors that play 
a role in the visual construction of flight in the case of Sweden (on media 
discourse about refugees, see chapter 7).
The visual construction of refugeeness most commonly depends on the 
technologies of othering, which commonly perpetuate ideas of difference 
and elicit discussions on deservingness and genuineness (Bhabha, 1983). 
Research consistently points to a clear dualism in the visual portrayal of 
flight and refugees – on the one hand the victimized refugee body in need 
of protection, on the other hand the welfare and security threat – a crisis 
posed to the nation state (Malkki, 1995; Wright, 2002; Mannik, 2012; 
Bleiker et al., 2013; Jovičić, 2018). Aforementioned discussions are imbed-
ded in the Western understanding of who is a ‘genuine’ refugee and how 
refugees are imagined and represented. Visual representation, therefore, has 
important implications for the public perception of refugees, one’s willing-
ness to reflect and act on this highly politicized issue, and, most importantly, 
for the experiences of the people fleeing. In an intriguing study of a private 
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photography collection made by Estonian refugees fleeing the Red Army via 
Sweden, Mannik (2012) juxtaposes the intimate and the private in the visual 
capture of refugeehood made by people fleeing with de-individualized, 
de-historicized, and public mainstream portrayals. Whereas the private 
photography accounts for ‘personal expression and political perspectives, 
as well as myriad other human attributes’ (p. 263), the public depictions 
leave us with de-faced masses of bodies shot from distance, emphasizing the 
positionality of ‘us’ here gazing in safety and ‘them’ out there in precarity.
Relatedly, Johnson (2011) argues that since the Cold War the refugee 
has been racialized, feminized and victimized. The dominant depiction has 
changed from that of white-European refugees to those of refugees racial-
ized as non-white and localized as South from Europe; from the strong 
political figure – a man being politically prosecuted, to that of a depoliti-
cized victim – often co-opted in the imagery of women holding children. 
The victimization frame is found to work better in eliciting empathy, since 
negative emotions such as sadness or despair elicit more compassion (Small 
and Verocci, 2009). As Zhang and Hellmueller (2017, p. 502) note, these 
frames are ‘more effective to generate viewers’ sympathy and thus emotion-
ally engage viewers in the distant suffering.’ However, I argue that the issue 
at stake is more complex than this and I align with Susan Sontag and her 
thoughts about compassion fatigue – the idea that the more exposed we are 
to the images of indignity and suffering, the more normalized it becomes 
until we cannot feel anything anymore. Therefore, images have the power 
to ‘anesthetize’ (Sontag, 2008).
In the context of the visual construction of refugeeness, Johnson argues 
that ‘Victimisation removes political agency from the figure of the refugee 
establishing a condition of political voicelessness’ (2011, p. 1028). Portrait 
photography and depictions of smaller groups of people are frequently used 
to attain the above-mentioned victimization frame, especially in the iconic 
shots of the so-called ‘Madonna and Child’, whereby women and children 
are the most common visual depiction of refugees as victims (Wright, 2002; 
Johnson, 2011). On the other hand, recent research findings show that, 
across different geographical contexts, people fleeing are overall most com-
monly constructed as medium to large groups of de-faced and de-named 
bodies threatening to destabilize the nation state (Mannik, 2012; Bleiker et 
al., 2013; Zhang and Hellmueller, 2017; Jovičić, 2018). Hence, the visual 
construction of refugeeness has historically been changing (Wright, 2002; 
Johnson, 2011). Despite the complex histories and current intersectional 
struggles of refugees in Europe, very specific imageries, such as those of 
either voiceless victims or threats to national security, seem to persist into 
the present.
Additionally, the abundance of visual portrayals of people fleeing is a 
process that can have serious implications for lives of refugees. For example, 
Slovic et al. (2017) argue that the iconic image of Alan Kurdi’s lifeless body 
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(see also chapter 4) had an impact in terms of the relative popularity of 
search terms such as ‘refugees’ or ‘Syria’, as well as the spike in terms of 
donations to the Swedish Red Cross campaign supporting Syrian refugees 
in Sweden. However, the major finding of their study is that this impact 
was short-lived or, as they write: ‘Our search data show that the world was 
basically asleep as the body count in Syria rose steadily into the hundreds 
of thousands’ (p. 641). In addition to the finding of the short-livedness of 
empathetic reactions to tragic images of lifeless refugee bodies, what persists 
is the violence, and not only in the sense of depicting the current condition 
of flight but in visually reproducing the power divisions imposed by deadly 
border regimes in Europe. Whereas the images of refugee suffering in pre-
cariousness present and document the subjective violence that is lived 
through (and mediated for the rest of the world), this visual mass mediation 
simultaneously normalizes this violence (Sontag, 2003). In her work Regard-
ing the Pain of Others, Sontag (p. 72) writes:
The exhibition in photographs of cruelties inflicted on those with darker 
complexions in exotic countries continues this offering, oblivious to the con-
siderations that deter such displays of our own victims of violence; for the 
other, even when not an enemy, is regarded only as someone to be seen, not 
someone (like us) who also sees.
In the shadow of mass visualizations of direct, bodily violence lies hidden 
the symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1991; Žižek, 2009) embedded in the 
images of the refugee crisis that construct boundaries between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ (Richardson, 2015). Images depicting the crisis can further (re)
produce harm for people fleeing if they do not intend to challenge the 
symbolic and systemic violence inherent in the current border regimes. With 
this in mind I move to elaborate on the method and findings of the current 
study.
Critical visual analysis
For this chapter, I collected and analysed front-page photography from two 
of the largest national newspapers in Sweden – Dagens Nyheter and Svenska 
Dagbladet – with an average daily circulation around 260,000 and 170,000 
copies in 2015–2016, respectively (Statista, 2019). Only front-page photo-
graphs were selected for analysis, since the most pressing socio-political 
topics commonly find their way there. Final selection criteria were gathering 
images relating to national or international topics concerning asylum seekers 
and refugees. Photographs were gathered from the digitized media archive 
located in the National Library of Sweden in Stockholm. The archive offers 
access to digitized versions of most Swedish newspapers. All daily issues 
starting 1 April 2015 to 30 April 2016 were manually browsed. The sample 
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consists of all identified images: there were 70 in Dagens Nyheter and 83 
in Svenska Dagbladet – a total of 153 images. The period April 2015 to 
April 2016 was chosen because it marks the height of the refugee crisis – 
most asylum applications were received between August and December 
2015 (Migrationsverket, 2016). Additionally, most front-page images cov-
ering the crisis were recorded in the period August 2015–February 2016. 
This selection of images is not exhaustive in either of the newspapers; other 
images were present as a part of the full newspaper content. Moreover, this 
is not a direct or comprehensive comparison of the two outlets – it should 
rather be seen as a critical visual analysis of the refugee crisis in two dailies 
available to a sizeable proportion of Swedish readers.
In this chapter, I have translated and considered the immediate headlines 
and captions accompanying the front-page newspaper photography. Focus 
here, however, is on the analysis of photography; therefore the visual is 
taken as the main point of analysis, and coding and reflections are derived 
from the image itself. I make use of a more deductive approach to content 
analysis – I first coded the images freely, made descriptive notes along the 
way, double checked if any two codes were referring to a similar visual cue 
and whether they could be merged into one broader code. Moreover, I 
counted the frequency of all the codes, marked and selected the most 
common ones while keeping in mind the overarching research question and 
the theoretical and empirical framework (Rose, 2016, p. 96) within which 
I work. Finally, the most frequent codes were closely examined and then 
grouped under four visual frames – these being the victimization, securitiza-
tion, reception and humanization frames. A total of 111 images comprise 
the four frames identified here. This was a challenging task, as visual frames 
tend to overlap (Bleiker et al., 2013). For example, victimization and secu-
ritization frames can be found in the same photograph at times. These 
difficulties are acknowledged and further discussed in the findings section. 
Given the critical approach that I follow in my analysis, and since the 
premise of my approach is that the images on hand are part of a process 
whereby refugees experience violence and exclusion, I make the deliberate 
choice of not reproducing them in my analysis. These images are published 
in mainstream newspapers and are digitally archived, which makes them 
readily available for those interested in further analysis or who merely wish 
to satisfy their curiosity.
The visual construction of flight
In this section, I present the findings with the aim of quantifying the domi-
nant depictions as well as qualitatively illustrating the complexities of the 
visual construction of flight in Swedish dailies. The visual analysis resulted 
in four dominant visual frames: securitization – refugee bodies amassed 
and posing threats to destabilize sovereignty of the ‘nation state’ (see also 
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chapter 3); victimization – refugee bodies as voiceless victims caught in 
suffering; humanization – private portraits of people fleeing depicted as 
complex individuals and active political subjects; and reception – images 
of refugees being welcomed and living in Sweden. These frames were estab-
lished in a deductive manner – they arose from the images studied, yet they 
are partly in line with other research on the framing of the refugee crisis and 
constructing refugeeness in newspaper media (Bleiker et al., 2013; Parker, 
2015; Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017; Zheng and Hallmueller, 2017; 
Abdelhady, 2019).
The visual content analysis of the photographs supports previous research 
in that refugee bodies are the main motive of the visual construction of 
flight, and the representation is dominantly that of the refugee as a victim 
(in 43.2 per cent of the images), or as a security threat to the nation state 
(in 25.3 per cent of the images). The victimhood frame mainly captures 
children, or parents holding children in distress, often just after arriving to 
the European shores. The depictions of refugees as a security threat comes 
through images of large groups of unidentifiable people – the mass exodus 
(mostly men) and that of the pairing of refugee bodies with those of police 
and confinement symbols. The reception frame accounts for 18.9 per cent 
of depictions, whereas the humanization frame accounts for 12.6 per cent 
of the images (see Table 1).
In terms of locating images in relation to the Swedish nation state, there 
is a pattern of difference in depiction of events inside and outside of Swe-
den’s national borders. A total of 47 per cent of images depict events taking 
place outside of the Swedish national borders, whereas 53 per cent depict 
people and events relating to the refugee crisis positioned inside Sweden. 
Moreover, the victimization and criminalization frames are mainly posi-
tioned outside the Swedish nation state whereas reception and humaniza-
tion frames are most commonly situated inside Sweden. Beyond the sheer 
numbers, it is important to examine the visual composition of newspaper 
photographs and the kinds of knowledge they construct and reproduce. I 
Table 1 Overview of the distribution of images across four visual frames
Victimization Securitization Reception Humanization
Dagens Nyheter 24 23 6 4
Svenska 
Dagbladet
24 15 15 10
Total 48 28 21 14
Per cent 43.2 25.3 18.9 12.6
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proceed with examples of newspaper photography to illustrate ways in 
which flight and people fleeing were constructed in Swedish dailies.
Victimization frame
The victimization frame counts over 40 per cent of photographic depic-
tions of refugees in Swedish newspapers. Images belonging to this frame 
usually capture individuals and small groups of people. Importantly, chil-
dren are the overall most common depiction in the visual representation of 
a refugee crisis – they appear in a total of 33 per cent or fifty images. They 
are the common denominator of victimhood, since the visual compositions 
of mothers holding children, or the Madonna and Child, are regarded as 
iconic representations of refugees as victims (Wright, 2002; Johnson, 2011). 
Terence Wright writes about the Christian iconographic symbolism behind 
these compositions, as well as the imagery behind children holding food, or 
lack thereof, as a way to portray poverty and victimhood (Wright, 2002, 
pp. 57–58). In line with this is Image 1 (DN), dating back to 11 September 
2015, in which a woman is placed at the centre of the image while holding a 
toddler who is grabbing a bread bun tightly while eating it. The mother looks 
ahead, away from the camera, and so does the child. In the background to 
the left we see another toddler holding food. These findings are also in line 
with research on victimization and feminization of refugees (Johnson, 2011), 
and present a complex issue whereby the depiction of refugees has been 
linked to stereotypical understandings of women and children as weak and 
in need of protection. Sixteen per cent of the victimization frame, however, 
accounts for the depiction of what I call the Male Madonna – men holding 
children (Palczewski, 2005; Jovičić, 2018). Image 2 (SvD), a photograph 
from 23 August 2015, depicts a man crying while holding his daughter on 
his right and embracing his son on his left. He stands strong, dominating the 
centre of the image as he protects them. The girl is in visible distress, crying, 
her small arm wrapped around his neck, and she is holding the top of her 
dad’s life-vest. Her other arm lies on top of her yellow life-vest, close to her 
heart. The boy is captured from the side, his face barely visible. This image 
was taken just as they reached the shore on Lesvos by boat coming from 
the Turkish coast. These depictions still aim to elicit compassion through 
victimhood, yet there is a gendering aspect to them. The composition of men 
holding children is more readily linked to an active state – holding children 
high up in sign of celebration for reaching European shores, boarding chil-
dren onto trains, outdoors walking, whereas women are more commonly 
captured holding children while sitting, hugging, kissing or playing with 
them. Therefore, the iconic meaning imbedded in the picture of Madonna 
and the child and its male counterpart reproduce stereotypical gendered 
portrayals of female refugees as passive, weak and voiceless, and of male 
112 Refugees and the violence of welfare bureaucracies
refugees as active, strong and protective. On the other hand, it could also 
be argued that the Male Madonna, who shows emotions and protects his 
children, resists victimization, or at least complicates the stereotype of (male) 
refugees as posing danger, as I describe later.
One of the most striking constructions of refugees as victims in the 
Swedish public eye is therefore reduced to that of a helpless child in need 
of protection. In line with Johnson’s (2011) work on how the refugee has 
been feminized and made into a passive victim in need of protection, in the 
Swedish case we also see an infantilization of the refugee. Sweden is under-
stood as a country that takes the rights of children seriously and in 2015 
a large number, exactly 35,369, of unaccompanied migrant children were 
registered by the Migration Agency in Sweden. This is the highest reception 
number across the EU in relation to the country’s population. The recur-
rence of images of children is therefore understandable, but it also has 
important consequences for public understandings of the refugee.
Furthermore, a common depiction of refugees in the Swedish press is 
that of refugees queuing, living precariously such as sleeping rough, waiting 
in queues or crowds for food and transport, being rescued at sea, and reach-
ing European shores terrified and exhausted. Take an example of Image 3 
(DN), dating from 9 August 2015, where three women fleeing were photo-
graphed during a boat recue. This is an unusual front-page for Swedish 
newspapers; there is very little text and most of the page is covered by the 
photograph of a sea rescue where refugee bodies are stacked up on a small 
boat, only their faces sticking out of their life-vests. Three women are visible 
at the front centre of the image, their faces blank in shock, their bodies 
exposed to the dangers of the open sea. Behind them a large boat on which 
it is written ‘Migrant Offshore Aid Station’, the title accompanying the 
photograph reads ‘SAVED’. Another related visual symbol of victimhood 
is that of ragged or no clothes covering bodies of people fleeing, as is the 
linking of refugee bodies with that of outdoors, public spaces – walking 
along train tracks and fields, waiting at the border (Wright, 2002; Jovičić, 
2018). These images are of great concern when considering individual’s 
right to privacy and dignified representation.
Securitization frame
A total of thirty-three images (25 per cent) count towards the securitization 
frame of representation. With this in mind, I approach the issue of securi-
tization on two levels, by looking at the pairing of refugee bodies with those 
of the police and other confinement symbols, and by commenting on the 
de-historicized and de-individualized depictions of masses of people threat-
ening the nation state. Just as with the victimization frame, the securitiza-
tion of the refugee bodies is most commonly done by capturing images of 
people fleeing outdoors in the fields and in public spaces such as train 
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stations and ports. Most images belonging to this frame were shot outside 
of Sweden, especially during 2015, whereas after the closure of the Swedish-
Danish border and the asylum policy restrictions that followed (see also 
chapters 5 and 12 in this volume), securitization became the dominant 
frame inside Swedish national borders too. The difference to the victimiza-
tion frame is that the refugees are now amassed, de-individualized and 
de-historicised (Mannik, 2012).
Depictions of medium and large groups of people, as well as the stereo-
typical portrayal of the mass exodus of people, dominate this frame (Wright, 
2002). The mass exodus of people is a frame which captures refugees as 
stacked up, endless, de-individualized bodies, usually outdoors (Wrights, 
2002). Mass exodus is a gendered and racialized portrayal of refugees since 
it is most commonly embodied by black and brown bodies of men. Larger 
groups of men dominate the photographs, especially in Dagens Nyheter – 
their bodies are often coupled with police cordons and border officials. Such 
is Image 4 (SvD), dated 27 February 2016, depicting a long queue of people, 
visible as dark silhouettes of men standing against the sunset with their 
faces unidentifiable. The caption reads ‘Ninety per cent of refugees that 
came to the EU in 2015 are believed to have been in contact with criminals 
on their way’, whereas the title under the image reads ‘Smuggling – a 
growing industry’. This visual pairing of refugee bodies with captions on 
criminality are in line with previous research showing that refugees are 
illegalized at the border and visually constructed as a threat to sovereignty 
and security of the nation state. This visual portrayal, therefore, hardly 
challenges the reasons why smuggling of refugees is a growing business or 
exists in the first place (see also chapters 1 and 2).
Moreover, refugees are often depicted at border crossing sites, sur-
rounded by symbols of confinement such as cordons of police and barbed 
wire. This is in line with previous research on the securitization of flight. 
Bleiker et al. (2013, p. 408) write that ‘images that show small groups of 
asylum seekers next to barbed wired fences or flanked by uniformed border 
control personnel already promote different and potentially less empathy-
generating themes: those linked to illegality, invasion and potential guilt.’ 
Image 5 (DN), dating back to 25 October 2015, depicts a large group of 
refugees at the Slovenian border stacked up behind a plastic tape which 
reads ‘STOP POLICE’ (Stop Policija). At the front right of the image is a 
police officer shown from the back, with special protective equipment. He 
overlooks the group of people fleeing in front of him, their bodies countless, 
stretching across the rest of the image. In the very back we see smoke rising 
up above their bodies to the sky, most probably from the tear gas launched 
at them. In the centre of the image a man holding a toddler up in the air 
visibly crying while the mother reaches out to help and comfort; a young 
child next to them squats on the ground, looking directly into the camera. 
The title reads ‘Thousands takes new road north’.
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This photograph is an example of the impossibility for every single image 
to be assigned to only one category or frame. Here we have the victimization 
frame depicting families with children exposed to police violence, while at 
the same time we can understand this picture as the end of the victimization 
frame altogether and criminalization of all refugee bodies, including chil-
dren and families. These dynamics in turn link to what De Genova (2013, 
p. 1181) calls the ‘Border Spectacle’ – ‘a spectacle of enforcement at “the” 
border, whereby the spectre of migrant “illegality” is rendered spectacularly 
visible.’ De Genova cites Debord in saying that the spectacle is much more 
than the moment in which the image is captured in that ‘The spectacle is 
not a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship between people 
that is mediated by images’ (Debord 1995, p. 12 in De Genova 2013). Thus, 
the refugee body captured against police cordons, barbed wire and other 
symbols of confinement is being criminalized, securitized and positioned 
mostly outside of the Swedish nation state in the newspaper photography 
in the period from August to the end of October 2015.
By mid-November 2015, the securitization frame crosses the border to 
Sweden when images begin to depict police and train security officers check-
ing IDs and setting up metal fences inside the train stations. These images 
therefore follow the political U-turn in Sweden from looking at refugees as 
a humanitarian issue and responsibility (through victimization and human-
ization) to that of refugee bodies as illegalized masses posing a threat to the 
law and order of the Swedish nation state (Bleiker et al., 2013). The shift, 
from the intimate portrayals of people suffering, close up and identifiable, 
to that of ‘potential criminals’ is a stark one, since it brings the crisis inside 
the Swedish public eye by creating a security panic through the intense 
visual presence of police and policing in action. This is the same period in 
which the Swedish government, led by the Social Democrats/Green alliance, 
called for breathing space, andrum in Swedish (see also chapters 3 and 7 
in this volume), and limited taking in refugees to that of the EU minimum 
(Sager and Öberg, 2017, p. 3). In line with Susan Sontag (2008), the evi-
dence here shows that images do not create but rather support the dominant 
moral position – photography follows the naming of the event.
Furthermore, Bhambra (2017) urges us to reconsider the positionality of 
the crisis. In contrast to the securitization and criminalization discourses 
served by politicians and the media in Europe urging us that a crisis is 
‘facing Europe’, it is the people fleeing who are actually facing crisis, given 
the violence and devastation of their current condition (p. 395). These argu-
ments can be linked to the fact that, as seen in this Swedish newspaper 
photography, the majority of images portraying amassed groups of people 
fleeing, coupled with police and border officials, can be located at the physi-
cal edges of the EU – such as the Greek Islands, Lampedusa and the Spanish 
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, or at the physical borders of the nation state: 
in the case of Sweden most images are from Öresund Bridge, connecting 
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mainland Denmark with that of Sweden, where the contested border closure 
happened (Barker, 2018). The securitization visual frame is therefore con-
structed against the boundaries of the Swedish nation state.
Reception frame
The reception frame counts twenty-one images (18.9 per cent): it is best 
illustrated though images of welcome culture and refugees being integrated 
in Sweden (see also chapter 9) and the construction of whiteness against 
the refugees’ bodies. In particular, Swedish whiteness as part of the con-
struction of the crisis stands out through the depictions of Swedes as wel-
coming, such as in Image 6 from SvD, dated 7 September 2015. The image 
reads ‘Gathering for the refugees’. In the photograph, a smaller group of 
white, blond Swedes at Medborgarplatsen in central Stockholm gather at a 
large public gathering for welcoming refugees to Sweden. At the centre of 
the image is a young girl – eight years old – identified by her name and 
holding a sign that reads ‘Everybody is Welcome’ (Alla är välkomna). The 
sign is written in child-like writing and has a heart drawn on it. Left from 
her is a woman in a red raincoat whose gaze follows the girl holding the 
banner – she smiles at her in a proud, parent-like way. On the one hand, 
this image evokes warm feelings about friendly and welcoming Swedes, who 
stand in solidarity with refugees. In relation to the other numerous depic-
tions of children as vulnerable victims exposed to indignity, the Swedish 
child is depicted as a strong and active member of society. Thus, photog-
raphy capturing the reception of refugees constructs Swedes as helpful, 
welcoming, friendly and as majority white.
In line with Johnson (2011), people fleeing are commonly racialized as 
non-white, and this is often done in depicting their bodies against those of 
volunteers and other locals (Swedes), police and border patrols and teach-
ers – who, in this sample of images, are predominantly racialized as white. 
The refugee crisis, it is argued, commences with the ‘unsightly accumula-
tion of dead black and brown bodies’ after the tragic event of the 19 April 
2015 in the Mediterranean Sea, when about 850 people lost their lives 
trying to reach Europe (De Genova, 2018, p. 1). The first images from 
the period studied are the photographs depicting the Lampedusa tragedy, 
which visually marked the onset of the refugee crisis in the Swedish dailies. 
Visual representations of this tragic event and the period immediately after 
are dominated by images of boats, sea and black bodies exposed to indig-
nity (see also De Genova, 2017). Consequently, De Genova (2017, p. 2) 
puts forward the term ‘racial crisis’ when arguing that, in the wake of the 
European outer borders becoming mass graves for predominantly black 
and brown bodies, the ‘racial fact of this deadly European border regime 
is seldom acknowledged, because it immediately confronts us with the 
cruel (post)coloniality of the “new” Europe’. Given that the majority of the 
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people who are visualized as central subjects of the crisis are brown and 
black bodies publicly exposed, and that refugees account for the majority 
of these depictions, when talking about the racial crisis we need to address 
and deconstruct whiteness as a visual imagery in Swedish newspapers.
As an example, I refer to Image 7, dated 22 January 2016 (SvD), and 
Image 8 from 14 February 2016 (SvD). Both photographs capture introduc-
tory classes – in this case Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) and sex education 
(samlevnadsundervisning). The titles read ‘Newcomers Receive Sex Educa-
tion’ and ‘Swedish for Newcomers Attracts More Teachers’. Both photo-
graphs have similar compositions – they capture the white body of the 
Swedish teacher standing in front of the whiteboard and pointing at it. 
Whereas the teachers are visibly identifiable, their bodies are also con-
structed against the bodies of refugee-students, in this case black and brown 
bodies captured from behind, unidentifiable. The teachers are portrayed as 
active agents – physically they are the tallest point in the images, captured 
while working, whereas the refugees are depicted as passive and anonymous 
recipients of knowledge, being integrated.
There is a kind of fixation in research, just as there is in the media, to 
gaze at and research the refugee body as the central place of knowledge 
extraction on the matter. In this process, we tend to leave behind a sizeable 
amount of critical knowledge when we fail to talk about whiteness. As 
Werner et al. (2014, p. 43) writes, ‘whiteness is rendered invisible, all while 
attention is focused on non-whiteness.’ Whereas intensifying violence and 
death has been inflicted on the bodies of refugees, it is those same bodies 
that are being criminalized and held responsible for the refugee crisis that 
has come upon Europe (Bhambra, 2017). What De Genova calls the racial 
crisis might seldom be written about, yet it is directly co-opted in the news-
paper photography in question: black and brown bodies suffer and threaten 
the nation state while white bodies educate and defend the nation state. As 
seen here, even some visual attempts to humanize and welcome refugees 
end up reproducing whiteness and the discourses of refugee bodies posing 
a threat to the nation state.
Humanization frame
The smallest share – fourteen images or about 23 per cent – counts towards 
the humanization frame. Inside Sweden, the newspaper photography rarely, 
and only late during the sample period, depicts refugees as large masses of 
de-individualized people. Rather, within this frame, refugees are depicted 
as individuals or small groups set in private spaces such as rooms inside 
accommodation centres or public spaces such as cafes, classrooms or nurs-
eries. This finding can be illustrated by pointing to the portrait photography 
depictions. As an example, let us take Image 9 (SvD), an intimate family 
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portrait dated 25 April 2015, which shows a mother to the left, father to 
the right and their daughter embraced by both of them in the middle, caught 
in the moment of playing. The adults are looking at the camera, calmly 
with a glimpse of a smile, no extreme emotions on either end. Their full 
names are mentioned, the title reads ‘Flight Over the Sea of Death’ and 
emphasizes the violence of the border regimes that is inflicted on refugees 
trying to reach safety, yet without the sensational imagery of indignity and 
suffering.
Another depiction of humanization is through hetero-normative por-
traits of family and the home building in Sweden. These portrayals can 
also be understood as attempts to reimagine Swedishness through that of 
the newcomer Other. Image 10 (SvD), dated 12 September 2015, captures 
a father and two children standing in front of a typical Swedish yellow 
cabin house, a welcome sign hanging on the wall behind them. They are 
all smiling directly into the camera. The title reads ‘Sweden Was the Goal’. 
Another image, from 19 September 2015, depicts the playful tickling of 
a boy by his mother inside an accommodation centre. In the background 
are stacked up IKEA-like metal beds and mattresses with one matress 
placed on the ground just behind them. These visual representations of 
refugees through the symbolism of home and homecoming – and protec-
tion and care – are in line with what has been written on the construction 
of Swedish exceptionalism, especially in the context of the Swedish welfare 
state (Barker, 2012; Barker, 2018). The idea of a Swedish state-promised 
sense of social security and belonging (trygghet) is co-opted in images of 
refugees, yet this finding cannot be traced in the political and social reality 
of the refugee condition in Sweden at this time. Other than the initial gen-
erosity concerning the number of people that the Swedish state took in, 
the period from November 2015 has been dominated by restrictions and 
deterrence, as well as an increased number of detentions and expulsions 
of asylum seekers (Sager and Öberg, 2017). We can therefore conclude 
that the humanization frame did not reflect the political reality concern-
ing asylum protection in Sweden. One could argue that the humanizing 
images of refugees in Sweden attempt to balance the harsh reality of a mass 
scale securitization of refugee bodies during the refugee crisis, especially 
since the border closure with Denmark and the increased policing of the 
borders.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have used visual content analysis to critically examine the 
portrayal of flight and people fleeing, as found in the Swedish daily news-
papers. Firstly, the empirical evidence gathered points to the prevalence of 
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four visual frames: victimization, securitization, reception and humaniza-
tion of refugees. In line with previous research on representation of flight 
in newspapers, refugees are most commonly visually depicted either as 
vulnerable victims or as posing security threats to the Swedish nation state 
(Malkki, 1995; Wright, 2002; Mannik, 2012; Bleiker et al., 2013; Jovičić, 
2018). Additionally, there was a solid attempt to humanize refugees through 
visual compositions such as portrait photography of named individuals and 
small groups, hetero-normative families and home-building. This finding 
demonstrates the process through which whiteness disappears or renders 
itself invisible in most other visual frames, and instead becomes more visible 
in the instances of positive engagement such as welcoming culture, teaching 
language and integrating the Other into Sweden.
Secondly, this study shows a specific pattern of representation, whereby 
a symbolic visual boundary is constructed in relation to the refugee crisis 
inside and outside Sweden. The crisis is mainly represented through victim-
ization and securitization frames outside Sweden and at the Swedish borders, 
whereas reception and humanizing the refugees is constructed as domi-
nantly taking place inside Sweden. From the images, we learn that the 
destabilizing chaos of the crisis, as well as the indignity and suffering of 
refugees, is constructed as mainly outside of the Swedish nation state, 
whereas reception and attempts to humanize the refugee bodies happen 
from within.
Finally, in terms of the timeline of the crisis, visual frames are found to 
be shifting and different representations are re-actualized at different points 
in time (Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017, p. 1759). This is in line with 
recent research findings in which newspaper framing of the refugee crisis 
provided for a rather diffused representation, meaning that the identified 
frames would come and go throughout the time period studied (Abdelhady, 
2019). When looking at the collection of photographs as a whole, one starts 
to understand that contradiction and ambivalence are the building blocks 
of the visual construction of the crisis (Abdelhady, 2019). In the case of 
Swedish newspaper photography, this is evident in the way visual frames 
are structured over time – starting with that of the victimization in the first 
months of the crisis, moving on to the securitization in the months of 
November 2015 and January 2016, with the gradual return of the victim-
ization frame in the months in between. The humanization frame, on the 
other hand, is dispersed throughout the time studied but is most frequently 
present alongside securitization framing.
In conclusion, deconstructing visually fabricated realities is important, 
since images are not neutral or unfiltered reflections of specific events. As 
shown in this chapter, on the one hand, they follow the dominant political 
discourses and the naming of the events, whereas on the other hand they 
have the power to resist, disrupt and construct new realities through knowl-
edge dissemination on a mass scale.
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7
Media constructions of the refugee crisis in 
Sweden: institutions and the challenges of 
refugee governance
In an article entitled ‘The Death of the Most Generous Nation on Earth’, 
American journalist James Traub (2016) claims that ‘The vast migration of 
desperate souls from Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere has posed a moral test the 
likes of which Europe has not faced since the Nazis forced millions from 
their homes in search of refuge. Europe has failed that test.’ Sweden stands 
out as an exception in Traub’s analysis due to the country’s generous refugee 
reception policies. These policies, however, are bound to fail, and Traub 
argues that Sweden has to pay ‘for its unshared idealism’.
That Sweden had a generous refugee policy (see also chapter 5) is a 
component of Swedish identity, both as viewed by most Swedes themselves 
and as viewed by others, despite the variety of academic arguments chal-
lenging that image.1 To name a few examples: researchers have documented 
the negative experiences of asylum seekers awaiting a decision (Brekke, 
2004); the inhumane conditions at detention centres (Khosravi, 2009); 
the process of credibility assessment that assumes fraudulence on part of 
asylum seekers (Noll, 2005); the institutionalised power imbalance between 
asylum claimants and the authorities that challenge these claims in the 
legal process (Joormann, 2019; see also chapter 2); and the inhumane 
views of the Other that shape different levels of the migration bureaucracy 
(Barker, 2012; Schoultz, 2013; see also chapter 9). It is, therefore, logical to 
wonder how Sweden’s image as generous, humane and righteous has per-
sisted despite such evidence. Additionally, given the drastic shifts in refugee 
policies following the summer of 2015 (see chapter 3), and if we accept 
Traub’s characterisation of ‘unshared idealism’ as the basis for such shifts, 
tracing the transformation of such an idealism helps our understanding of 
Swedish cultural and political climate and the position of refugees within 
it. Importantly, and to use the arguments put forth in this book, if we 
understand the policy changes as a form of bureaucratic violence, how has 
this form of violence been formulated, communicated and consolidated in 
society?
Dalia Abdelhady
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While it is beyond the aims of this chapter to address the cultural con-
struction of refugees in Swedish society at large (see e.g. Eastmond, 2011), 
the chapter focuses on one significant snapshot. Focusing on 2015 as the 
year that brought a drastic shift in Swedish asylum policies, this chapter 
traces media representations of the inflow of large numbers of refugees 
which was later coined the refugee crisis. The analysis of mainstream news-
papers that is provided here tackles the self-understanding of Sweden’s 
image and the cultural justification of restrictive asylum policies. As such, 
this chapter has two goals: first, it provides an overview of the ways the 
refugee crisis was constructed in the media and discusses the specific forms 
of representation associated with it. Second, it focuses on one of several 
frames discussed – institutional responsibility – which is the most frequent 
frame in the selection of newspaper articles (on the visual representation of 
similar frames in Swedish media, see chapter 6). The analysis then proceeds 
to show that the refugee crisis was mostly discussed in terms of a challenge 
to the regular functions of bureaucratic institutions and approached in 
terms of management and containment. By staying away from moralistic 
arguments, mainstream media and political discourses of a refugee crisis 
were left largely uncontested and used to justify restrictive asylum policies. 
Such a strategy can be taken for granted in a society where emphasis on 
organisational efficiency and pragmatic approaches to problems are held in 
high regard (Graham, 2003).2 Representing the inflow of refugees as an 
institutional crisis, however, led to a drastic shift in asylum policies, which 
were tacitly accepted on pragmatic grounds.
The chapter starts with a brief discussion of media coverage of immi-
grants and refugees. This section also brings attention to the Swedish 
context and presents an overview of research on Swedish media with a 
specific focus on the representation of immigrants. The second section 
includes a description of the research methodology. The chapter then pres-
ents an overview of newspaper coverage of the inflow of refugees in 2015 
and highlights the strong focus on institutional arrangements and crisis. The 
last section shows that emphasis on an institutional crisis opened space for 
a previously unthinkable critique of Swedish institutions and for extreme 
rightist voices. As contending voices do not question the institutional logic 
of the crisis, the form of bureaucratic violence that proceeded was also left 
unchallenged.
Media and refugees
Mass media ‘provide the guiding myths which shape our conception of the 
world’ (Cohen and Young, 1973, p. 9). With regards to immigration in 
particular, research documents media’s role in shaping public attitudes. 
While some authors emphasise that negative media portrayals of migrants 
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and asylum seekers can foster anti-immigrant attitudes (Crawley, 2005; 
Innes, 2010; Rasinger, 2010; Balch and Balabanova, 2014), others empha-
sise that news coverage can create sites of contestation (Chavez, 2001; Clare 
and Abdelhady, 2016) where multiple articulations can be given space. Yet 
newspapers, especially those in high circulation, reflect general attitudes and 
popular ideas in society, and dominant discourses can be discerned in the 
major dailies and weeklies in a given context (Clare and Abdelhady, 2016). 
Circulation among large audiences amplifies the power of these discourses 
in shaping the construction of a given reality (Mautner, 2008). As such, the 
lens through which a reader receives mainstream news stories ‘is not neutral 
but evinces the power and point of view of the political and economic elites 
who operate and focus it’ (Gamson et al., 1992, p. 374). An analysis of 
media content, therefore, is important to understand social constructions 
of a specific phenomenon independent of the audience’s engagement and 
interpretation of media messages.
Similar to studies of migration and media elsewhere, othering is consid-
ered an important theoretical concept for understanding media representa-
tions of immigrants in Sweden (see Brune, 2000; Nohrstedt, 2006; Burns 
et al., 2007; Hultén, 2007; Tigervall, 2007; see also Gale, 2004; Nolan 
et al., 2011; Arlt et al., 2019 for other contexts). Brune (2000) observes 
that Swedish media does not discuss the particulars of immigrants’ back-
grounds or everyday life but makes them exclusively visible in connection to 
events that she describes as conflict-filled. For example, Brune (2000; 2004) 
shows that immigrants and refugees are repeatedly represented in stories on 
deportation, mass migration and crime. This sort of coverage, again as the 
studies cited above show, is connected to who media rely on as the source 
of the story and whose perspective gets to be represented. For Brune, the 
perspective of governmental and official institutions tends to be central 
in media representation, in terms of who defines the issues and proposes 
solutions. Consequently, refugees and migrants end up being represented 
in the form of an invading mass, which triggers anxiety and frustration 
instead of sympathy and support (Brune, 2000). Specifically, refugees tend 
to be ‘described as objects of various control measures, while representa-
tives of the Swedish government, who are the focus of interest, emerge as 
a brave-but-tired everyone’s salvation army’ (Brune, 2000, p. 11; see also 
Hultén, 2007). Both Brune and Hultén stress the ways media homogenise 
the refugee/immigrant populations while separating them from the Swedish 
host. Additionally, faith is put in the Swedish model of cooperation and 
the welfare state to solve the problems of adaptation and incorporation 
into Swedish society. I find these strategies to be common in news cover-
age in 2015, albeit with stronger emphasis on control and management 
as is shown in the analysis. Additionally, newspapers’ constructions of the 
refugee crisis in 2015 open up space for questioning norms and institutions 
in ways that may have been previously unthinkable.
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Methodology
In the age of digital media, paid circulation of newspapers does not reflect 
a newspaper’s actual readership but can still be taken as a proxy for the 
general level of readership the newspapers attract. For the analysis offered 
here, I chose to include the two largest daily national newspapers, Dagens 
Nyheter (DN) and Svenska Dagbladet (SvD), and one tabloid, Aftonbladet 
(AB), as it has the largest circulation of all newspapers in Sweden.3 Using 
the Retriever search-engine, three independent searches for each of the 
newspapers (print version) were conducted, using the search words refugee/
immigrant, Middle East and Sweden (respectively, flykting*, invandrare, 
mellanöstern and Sverige). Search words are limited in their utility for 
research and, in this case, the results included large numbers of newspaper 
articles that were later read and coded or discarded based on their content.4 
For example, a large number of articles made no reference to Sweden and 
were, therefore, discarded, given the interest in relating the construction of 
the refugee crisis to Sweden’s self-image and the rationalisation of Swedish 
policy changes. A total of 370 articles are included in the analysis from 
2015.
The way news media presents, selects, emphasises or downplays certain 
aspects of social processes, events and issues in news coverage, sometimes 
at the expense of others, is theoretically understood as framing (Tuchman, 
1978; Gitlin, 1980; Benson, 2013). Frames are ‘interpretative packages’ 
that give meaning to an issue (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989), and refer 
to ‘the ability of a text – or a media presentation – to define a situation, 
to define the issues, and to set the terms of a debate’ (Tankard, 2001, p. 
96). Frames are also considered interpretive frameworks that represent 
‘windows on the world’ through which people have the opportunity to learn 
about themselves and others (Tuchman, 1978). Research into media frames 
demonstrates that news coverage relies on a variety of specific frames to 
communicate the news to audiences, and that different frames can influence 
readers’ or viewers’ perceptions of public issues (for reviews see McCombs 
et al., 1997; Scheufele, 1999; McCombs and Ghanem, 2001). Semetko 
and Valkenburg (2000) assert that media reports (on diverse topics) tend 
to fall within five specific frames: conflict, human interest, economic con-
sequences, morality and responsibility. In analysing the articles collected 
for this chapter, these frames were found to be of great relevance and were 
distributed according to Table 2. In this distribution, however, morality was 
merged with human interest or institutional responsibility.5 The analysis 
that follows focuses on the selection of articles falling within the institu-
tional responsibility frame. As Table 2 shows, this selection is two-thirds of 
all the articles found in the study and is taken to be the most significant in 
understanding the construction of the sense of crisis in Sweden. Referred to 
as the responsibility frame by some authors, this frame presents the issues 
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‘in such a way that the responsibility for causing or solving a problem lies 
with the government, an individual or group’ (d’Haenens and de Lange, 
2001, p. 850). The significance of this frame can be elucidated after a brief 
discussion of the other three frames. This discussion draws upon and is 
further detailed in Abdelhady (2019).
Conflict as a frame speaks the most to the sense of a ‘crisis’, as it empha-
sises tensions between individuals, groups or institutions while reducing 
complex social and political problems to simple conflicts (d’Haenens and 
de Lange, 2001). Research on immigrants in Western media confirms the 
overwhelming focus on conflict-filled (or hostility-themed) stories (Leudar 
et al., 2008, p. 188) where immigrants and immigration are presented 
foremost as a threat (van Dijk, 2000; Benson, 2013). The threat frame 
portrays immigrants threatening wage systems or taking jobs from domestic 
workers, bringing diseases, draining the welfare system and depleting 
national resources (Greenberg and Hier, 2001; Leudar et al., 2008; Benson, 
2013). Often it includes some sort of security frame, which relates immigra-
tion (and especially refugees) with criminality (Greenberg and Hier, 2001; 
Leudar et al., 2008; Steimel, 2009; Threadgold, 2009; Bradimore and 
Bauder, 2011). While my data shows that conflict is not the largest frame 
used for portraying Syrian refugees in the wake of the declared refugee 
crisis, many of the narratives within this frame parallel findings of previous 
research on the portrayal of immigrants and refugees. Given the relative 
infrequency in which this frame is used, it cannot be taken as an entry into 
understanding the construction of the refugee crisis.
Neuman et al. (1992) find the human-interest frame to be, next to con-
flict, the second most common frame across a variety of news content. 
Valkenburg et al. (1999, p. 551) argue that the human-interest media frame 
‘brings an individual’s story or an emotional angle to the presentation of 
an event, issue or problem’. By doing so, a human-interest frame describes 
the news in terms that personalise, dramatise and emotionalise the news. 
D’Haenens and de Lange (2001) find the human-interest frame to be the 
frame most commonly used in their analysis of refugee coverage in Dutch 








Aftonbladet 13 21 4 68 106
Dagens 
Nyheter
23 25 1 90 139
Svenska 
Dagbladet
19 21 9 76 125
Total 55 67 14 234 370
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newspapers. In Swedish mainstream newspapers, however, the human-
interest frame is the second largest used.
In discussing the framing of economic consequences, d’Haenens and de 
Lange (2001) explain that this frame is often used to clarify the economic 
consequences of an issue to the public and as a result involve the public 
more closely with the issue. As Table 2 above demonstrates, this frame is 
negligible in the Swedish context. Moreover, the discussion within this 
frame relates to institutional reform, as it often highlights the need for the 
labour market integration of refugees in order to offset the cost of welfare 
expenditures, turning the argument to institutional responsibility. This 
further highlights the importance of the institutional frame in the Swedish 
context, which is detailed in the following section.
Institutional framing of the refugee crisis
The importance of efficiency in Swedish society has been remarked upon 
by numerous commentators (e.g. Milner, 1989; Lane, 1991; Graham, 
2003). Describing the scene at the Migration Agency in Malmö, Traub 
(2016) narrates:
When I arrived at the migration office a little past noon, 50-odd people stood 
on a line that snaked outside the building in order to be interviewed, while 
another 200–300 asylum-seekers stood or sat inside, waiting to be assigned 
a bed for the night. Some recent arrivals had to wait a day or two – but no 
longer – to be processed. Refugees in Germany have rioted at food lines, while 
conditions at the refugee camp in Calais, France, known as ‘The Jungle’ are 
notoriously dismal. The atmosphere in Malmö, by contrast, was remarkably 
calm and quiet. Nobody shouted; I don’t recall hearing a child cry. The Swedes 
were efficient and extraordinarily protective of their charges … The interview 
line moved smartly. Officials had abandoned an earlier effort to gain back-
ground information about applicants; now interviewers simply asked their 
name, date of birth, and home country, and took a photograph and a set of 
fingerprints. (emphasis added)
This narration points to the omnipresence of order and efficiency even when 
the narrator is not interested in making that point (recall Traub’s interest 
in making a moral argument). Despite the appearance of order and effi-
ciency to the outside observer, the refugee situation was constructed as a 
crisis as a result of institutions’ inability to fulfil their mandates efficiently. 
The specific axes along which the refugee crisis was narrated in Swedish 
mainstream newspapers are: the lack of preparations; new challenges 
(transit migrants, see also chapter 4), which meant the inability to work 
according to established rules; and the need to discipline asylum seekers 
(and refugees). I discuss each of these themes individually before I turn to 
the discussion of foreseeable solutions.
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The need for (and failure of) a Swedish plan
As early as 28 February 2015, the need for a refugee strategy and concrete 
plan was called for when dealing with the increasing arrivals of individuals 
seeking asylum in Sweden. An article published in DN focuses mainly on 
the need for a strategy to help Syria and Iraq but also includes the need for 
a home strategy for dealing with asylum seekers (Malm, 2015). The latter 
point is elucidated in an SvD article on 23 May 2015:
We need to take a national approach, possibly adding more resources and 
taking action. We look at the process to see if we do the right things, if we 
overhaul certain pieces and if we can make the process easier, says Ljepoja, 
operations expert at the Operational Management and Coordination Unit at 
the Swedish Migration Agency. (Delling, 2015)
The plan, according to the author of the article, would bring about faster 
refugee management. The pressure produced by the continuous increase in 
the number of people seeking asylum is approached pragmatically. For 
example, referring to Malmö as the municipality that receives the highest 
number of new arrivals, the added work pressure is simply discussed as: 
‘This should be facilitated by the director to plan long term’ (Assarsson and 
Svanberg, 2015). The process of coming up with a plan still reflects domi-
nant Swedish cultural norms such as coordination, cooperation and con-
sensus. For example, one article is simply titled ‘Coordinator saves the 
world’ (Gudmundson, 2015a). An article in DN, published on 4 October 
under the title ‘When We Cooperate We Accomplish a Lot’, argues that an 
organised reception plan can proceed as ‘the government has invited author-
ities, organizations, companies, unions and voluntary associations, to a 
national assembly for the improvement of the establishment of the newcom-
ers’ (Eriksson, 2015).
The inadequacy of the Swedish plan was a conclusion that was quickly 
drawn by the autumn of 2015. As one article describes that conclusion: 
‘Several authorities, municipalities and NGOs are involved in refugee recep-
tion, but as the inflow of refugees has escalated, the lack of coordination has 
become increasingly evident’ (Treijs, 2015). Another article, which focuses 
on the perspective of county-level administration, claims that ‘the counties 
describe the situation as critical for foundational social functions such as 
schools and social services if the wave of refugees continues to the same 
extent as today’ (Kärrman and Olsson, 2015). A third example discusses 
the responsibility of labour unions. The article was published in DN on 12 
October and does not miss the opportunity to critique the Prime Minister, 
Stefan Löfven, saying that ‘his plan is incomplete and inadequate’ (Dagens 
Nyheter, 2015a, p. 4). Finally, when ID checks were introduced on the 
border with Denmark, the discussion concluded that it was necessary to 
regain control and revise the plans. For example, an article in AB published 
on 12 November uses a quote from a refugee as its title ‘We Are Already 
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Too Many’ (Nygren, 2015). The story presented in the article claims that 
newly arrived refugees welcome the strengthened border controls that were 
introduced on that day: ‘Hanni Abdel Fattah, 21 years old, said: “close the 
border. We who have come are absolutely too many. They cannot take care 
of all of us”’ (emphasis added). The article continues to say that the staff 
of the Migration Agency are too stressed, that people are sleeping on the 
floors in the corridors of the building, and that families have to wait for 
twelve hours before getting a room. Another male asylum seeker is quoted: 
‘Amer Anaout from Syria, 37 years old, said “I am surprised how it is in 
Sweden. If they cannot take care of us in an orderly manner, so they should 
not take in so many”’ (emphasis added). Having found asylum seekers who 
are best representatives of the firm attitude needed and later taken by the 
Swedish government, the journalist turns to softening the story by describ-
ing the situation of the children: ‘many children have thin clothes and 
place their hands on bus lamps to stay warm.’ Looking back at 2015, an 
article published in December argues that the failure witnessed in receiving 
refugees is due to a lack of planning or, as the title of the article describes, 
‘Sweden’s preparedness did not hold when the crisis came’ (Dagens Nyheter, 
2015e, p. 8).
Thus far, I have highlighted the prominence of institutional arguments 
within Swedish mainstream press in the construction of a refugee crisis in 
2015. The need for an adequate plan, and the ultimate failure to deliver 
one, are presented as the foundation of Swedish failure to meet the demands 
of the increased flow of people seeking asylum. The various problems 
that were posed as challenging to the Swedish government or administra-
tive systems are namely: transit, integration and discipline. These three 
problems relate to the need for the management and control of individu-
als showing up at the Swedish border, which further supports my claim 
that the refugee crisis was constructed around issues of governance rather 
than morality (see also chapter 3). In the next paragraphs I illustrate the 
three problems and then move to a discussion of the tensions within these 
constructions.
Sweden as a transit country
Swedish reception of asylum seekers is based on the assumption that people 
are seeking asylum in Sweden. In other words, there are no policies or 
mechanisms to address the needs of those transiting through Sweden. One 
article from AB explains:
But at the same time, we are facing a new situation. Many of those who come 
to Sweden are not at all interested in seeking asylum here. It may be contrary 
to our self-image as the most perfect and best little country in the world, but 
a significant part of those who get off the trains at Malmö Central want to 
move on. They see their future in Finland or Norway. Our system is not 
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equipped for these so-called transit refugees. (Karlsson, 2015, p. 6, emphasis 
added)
Transit migrants were almost exclusively helped by volunteers, playing a 
significant role in mobilising volunteer efforts to begin with. For example, 
another article from DN quotes a volunteer with Stockholm’s City Mission, 
Marika Markovits, who explains: ‘What we did not expect was that there 
would be so many who did not want to seek asylum in Sweden. These are 
outside the system and have no one to help them, it is for them that we 
must mobilise non-profit forces’ (Ahlstrand, 2015, p. 33, emphasis added).
Sustainable integration
As discussed earlier, the lack of a clear plan that rendered Sweden ready to 
receive refugees was the basis of the media construction of crisis in 2015. 
The perception of inadequate planning was similarly brought about when 
discussing the absence of plans to integrate refugees. As early as March and 
April, there were references to problems related to integration. Two exam-
ples from SvD are worth mentioning. First, an article published on 28 
March argued that (proposed) policy changes would not result in a decrease 
in the numbers of Syrians seeking asylum in Sweden. Instead, the article 
critiqued the policies for their potential to worsen the conditions under 
which Syrian refugees would be expected to ‘integrate’ to Sweden (Ruist, 
2015). A second article also critiqued the government, but for its inability 
to plan for the integration of the increasing numbers of low-educated refu-
gees (Jansson, et al., 2015).
Following the long summer of migration, debates on integration contin-
ued. One article from DN stressed the importance of societal-level coordina-
tion between the different actors, and not only government and immigrants 
(Dagens Nyheter, 2015b). Equally important, an article from the same 
newspaper posed the question as to whether welfare policies facilitate inte-
gration. The article, published on 3 November under the title ‘Politicians 
Must Create a Sustainable Integration’, listed housing problems, school 
deficits and police lack of resources as obstacles to integration. These prob-
lems are all institutional and relate to the governance of the daily activities 
of refugees and immigrants in general (Frykman, 2015, p. 25).
Disciplining bodies
The inability of various organisations to maintain order over the inflow of 
asylum seekers is best understood as the portrayal of a lack of control over 
refugee bodies. Institutions such as housing, healthcare and education, 
which all perform important disciplining roles in society as per Foucault’s 
(1979; see also Hewitt, 1983) analysis, were recurrently highlighted as 
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facing serious challenges following the long summer of migration. Concerns 
for finding accommodation for asylum seekers featured in almost every 
description of the institutional crisis facing Sweden. Accommodation was 
needed for unaccompanied minors:
The situation is pressured. Many municipalities say that they find it difficult 
to receive more refugees, regardless of age, and that they do not have enough 
accommodation for more single children. (Lifvendahl, 2015, p. 4)
Recently, heavy overcrowding in municipal housing has occurred. It affects 
both the children and the staff. … Today, the Swedish Migration Agency is 
unable to register the children at the rate they come in, which means that the 
system is being violated. (Jammeh, 2015, p. 6)
The municipality must fight every day to find sleeping places for the children. 
Several of them are sick with MRSA, TB and scabies. (Dagens Nyheter, 2015e, 
p. 8)
Accommodation was also needed for those who found internships and were 
on their way to settle:
So our concern is to find accommodation for those who have jobs or intern-
ships so that they can continue … says Emilia Ciokota, team leader at the 
accommodation in Västberga. (By, 2015a, p. 4)
Warning signs that the capacity to accommodate asylum seekers had 
been reached were repeated in October and the beginning of November. 
The lack of planning to deal with the situation was derided in one article 
from AB that explained: ‘Stefan Löfven expects that over 150,000 will have 
applied for asylum if the flow continues at the same pace. There are places 
to live in the schools, gyms, but when they are filled, tents might be the 
only last solution’ (Holmqvist and Wågenberg, 2015, p. 14). Just a few 
days before instating ID checks at the border with Denmark, one article in 
DN declared that ‘there is no roof over the head’ of asylum seekers (Larsson 
and Kärrman, 2015). While referring to 50,000 new beds in converted 
sports halls, which were offered by the Migration Agency, the article quoted 
the Minister for Migration stating that Sweden had reached its limit and 
run out of sleeping spaces. The Minister for Migration, Morgan Johansson 
continues:
Until this week we have managed to give all [those in need] food for the day 
and a roof over the head. But if this continues for another week or fourteen 
days, we will end up in a position where we must deliver such a message to 
asylum seekers that they cannot secure a roof over their heads. (Larsson and 
Kärrman, 2015, p. 9)
The narrative of running out of space was further strengthened the day after 
border controls were instated when an article, describing the problems faced 
by the city of Malmö, refered to camps of tents having become a reality: 
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‘There is no longer space for everyone that arrives to sleep somewhere, 
some had to sleep outside the Migration Agency’ (Lindberg, 2015, p. 2).
The strong emphasis on housing and the need to provide accommodation 
for asylum seekers stems from the general need to organise society in a 
particular fashion. Asylum seekers must be registered before they can be 
provided accommodation. Importantly, once within the provided housing, 
an asylum seeker is monitored and controlled. While asylum seekers narrate 
their sense of being controlled in these facilities (see e.g. chapter 12), news-
paper coverage verbalises the process in much simpler terms. For example, 
when referring to an asylum seeker who was suspected of being involved 
in planning a terrorist attack, an article from SvD offered the following to 
deny the accusations: ‘Living in an asylum centre means that you are being 
watched and everyone knows your whereabouts, so there is no possibility 
that the man was involved in planning anything in Stockholm’ (Gummes-
son, 2015, p. 9).
The importance of the disciplinary power of the state is further exempli-
fied when reading news articles that emphasise the role of schools and 
health care facilities in maintaining the social order. These institutions do 
not have the ability to control asylum seekers and their children the same 
way as housing does, but they play multiple roles of educating asylum 
seekers and their children, monitoring them, and controlling them to make 
them fit for integration into Swedish society and culture. For example, 
schools ‘survey refugee children’ (By, 2015b), and provide ‘the key to life 
as a Swede’ (Kadhammar, 2015) even if the child sits in a room that is not 
designated for teaching. Similarly, free health care has the dual role ‘to 
explain the system, and control the spread of disease’ (Gustafsson, 2015, 
p. 4), and ‘increases the possibility for work and strengthens parenting’ 
(Fried and Ekblad, 2015, p. 8).
Resolving the crisis: institutions versus morality
In this section, I analyse news articles that debate specific proposals or 
approaches to dealing with the constructed refugee crisis in Sweden. While 
differences between the three newspapers were not significant in under-
standing the construction of the crisis, discernible differences can be found 
in the debates over how to deal with it. The most significant differences are 
between SvD and AB, which are located, at least initially, at opposite ends 
of the political spectrum.
SvD comes close to what Wodak (2019) terms a post-shame discourse. 
In the post-shame era, ‘refugees and migrants serve as the scapegoat and 
simplistic explanation for all woes’ (Wodak, 2019, p. 2, emphasis in the 
original) alongside ‘the normalisation of far-right ideologies in both content 
and form’ (Wodak, 2019, p. 2). In a post-shame discourse, agreed-upon 
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norms and values are ignored and what was previously unsayable and unac-
ceptable becomes normalised. In the constructions of a refugee crisis in 
2015, SvD provides room for the previously unsayable as the following 
examples indicate.
Institutional framing of the refugee crisis inevitably included the ques-
tioning of the Swedish welfare model, which is considered one of the most 
sacred institutions in Swedish national culture. The Swedish welfare model 
depicts a society without any significant class barriers, where everyone, 
regardless of their background, has a chance at an education and a career. 
In one example, the authors of an article published on 4 February 2015 
declared that ‘opening our hearts is not enough … the consequences [of 
refugee migration] are seen as regards to dependency, housing, segregation 
and child poverty’ (Sonesson and Westerlund, 2015, p. 5). The article pro-
ceeded to mention that ‘the Swedish social model is not adapted for exten-
sive refugee migration of low-skilled people’ and urged political actors to 
‘assess the capacity and limitations of Swedish society to receive and inte-
grate people fleeing to our country’ (Sonesson and Westerlund, 2015, p. 5). 
A second example posed the question of ‘Where is the Limit to Welfare?’ 
In this editorial, the author argued that ‘the conflict between the welfare 
state and free movement has been known for a long time. Nevertheless, 
Sweden seems to respond by continuously expanding welfare commitments. 
In the long run, something has to go, either mobility or welfare, maybe 
both’ (Gudmundson, 2015b, p. 4). These two articles question Swedish 
welfare policies, and specifically the principle of ‘The People’s Home’ 
(folkhemmet, see e.g. Lawler, 2003). This vision of universal welfare, coined 
by Social Democrat leader Per Albin Hansson in 1927, has – at least from 
the early 1930s until the late 1980s – been considered sacred in Swedish 
public culture.
Additionally, the post-shame discourse is exemplified in providing space 
for politicians from the ultranationalist and extreme rightist Sweden Demo-
crats (SD) to present their views on refugee policies and thus normalising 
the role played by such a party in Swedish political discourse. At the height 
of the long summer of migration, an article authored by three SD politicians 
referred to the restrictive policies initiated by Denmark and explained that 
‘the efficient policies of our Nordic neighbours are entirely in accordance 
with the [Geneva] convention and nothing prevents us from following their 
example’ (Bieler et al., 2015, p. 6).6 It is important to note that the post-
shame discourse takes on a specific Swedish flavour as it continues to 
emphasise the importance of international institutions and legal frame-
works, their capacities and limitations, and even their directives, as dem-
onstrated by the reference to the Geneva Convention by SD politicians.
At the other end of the political spectrum, AB contradicts the post-shame 
discourse by arguing that ‘immigration is an asset for Sweden, as well as 
a moral question’ (Pettersson, 2015, p. 2), and that temporary residence 
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permits are expensive, lead to worse integration (Rehbinder, 2015) and 
increase the institutional pressures on the Migration Agency, since refugees 
have to re-apply every three years (Dahlin et al., 2015). The leftist politics 
that historically marked the debates within AB can still be observed in the 
coverage of refugee policies and reception. In one example, an editorial 
poses the question: ‘Which System is Collapsing?’ and goes on to explain 
that ‘Swedes are getting richer. The OECD predicts positive Swedish growth 
and a decrease in the unemployment rate. At the same time, Swedes will 
buy Christmas gifts for sixteen billion crowns this year’ (Aftonbladet, 2015, 
p. 2). In these examples, despite the occasional reference to asylum being 
a moral question, the argument does not shift away from the institutional 
framework: immigration is an economic asset, temporary permits are an 
institutional hurdle, and Swedish economic institutions are performing 
positively.
DN is positioned in the middle of the political spectrum, and news 
articles oscillating between the two ends are observable along its coverage 
of the refugee crisis. On the conservative side of the debate, a number of 
articles stress the lack of institutional capacity to welcome more asylum 
seekers and draw on some of the expressions that were made popular and 
most associated with the construction of the crisis. In one example, an 
article interviews the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström, who 
refers to the much-discussed notion of ‘system collapse’ in Swedish debate 
and explains that:
most people know that we cannot maintain a system where there maybe 
190,000 people arriving every year, in the long run our systems will collapse 
… We want it to offer a worthy reception of those who come here … We 
believe that a good society to live in is a society that is generous, but it’s also 
a society that is functional. (Stenberg, 2015, p. 8)
An editorial published on 6 November 2015 explained that ‘to say that the 
Migration Agency and the municipalities are overworked is no malicious, 
calculated exaggeration – it is a painful reality’ (Dagens Nyheter, 2015d, p. 
4). The next day, an article continued the narrative of this ‘painful reality’ 
and stated that, ‘it is clear, however, that if Sweden fails with the integration 
of new arrivals, tension in society can be large. At the moment we do not 
even have tent places for everyone, and the housing issue is at least a chal-
lenge’ (Dagens Nyheter, 2015c, p. 4). In this line of narration, notions of 
collapse, challenges, tensions and responsibility come together to explain 
the institutional problems associated with refugees and asylum seekers. 
Implicitly understood is that these challenges are temporary, and hence the 
need for temporary recourse to extreme measures. It is noteworthy that, at 
times, a reference to morality and values is made in order to deny possible 
misunderstandings that the author supports the closure of the border based 
on value judgements. Even the SD politicians referred to above would not 
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engage in a moral argument in mainstream news media, which affirms that 
a moral argument is not a conceivable avenue to support policy 
restrictions.
At the other end of the debate, there are a number of articles published 
by DN that offer a different view on the institutional crisis. While many 
articles refer to the unequal distribution of asylum seekers within Europe 
and call for the need to share the burden, one example takes the argument 
further by emphasizing the collective European responsibility:
The EU crisis has absolutely nothing to do with the inability to receive sixty 
million refugees – a situation that does not exist at all. It is about the Union 
as a whole not having a common answer on how to help six hundred thou-
sand asylum seekers – this year perhaps up to one million – in an area with 
five-hundred million inhabitants.
People do not have to suffocate in trucks on European highways. People do 
not have to be overrun by high-speed trains on the English Channel. People 
must not drown in the Mediterranean. That it has become so is our own 
inability to bring about political solutions at the European level, solutions 
that safeguard the rights of those in need of help. This is our real crisis. And 
it’s homemade. (Wolodarski, 2015, p. 5)
While not specifically questioning the morality of Swedish society, the 
author of the article highlights the political failure in resolving the plight 
of refugees. Another example denounces the changes in asylum policies that 
were introduced in November 2015 and uses the discourse of risk society 
(see the Introduction to this volume) in order to mobilise support:
It is also time to distinguish between costs and investments in the economic 
debate. It is a cost to establish border controls that prevent refugees from 
claiming their right to asylum, but it is an investment to give asylum-seekers 
a good reception and rapid integration. We can lend to investments because 
it will pay our pensions in the future. (Westin, 2015, p. 35)
Again, the author does not question the morality of Swedish society but 
brings attention to the political failure. While the author points out that 
politicians failed as they did not act in a moralistic manner and build a 
better world, the focus is kept on the rationality of offering help to refugees 
by rendering it productive and profitable (as also discussed in the Introduc-
tion above). One final example, on Christmas Eve a number of church 
leaders expressed their concerns:
We have respect for the courage of our politicians in the difficult decisions 
made. Municipalities and county councils are faced with major stresses in 
terms of housing, care and school. At the same time, we are worried about 
the new decisions on the country’s asylum rules … Temporary residence 
permits make life insecure, complicate integration and increase administration 
for our authorities. (Dagens Nyheter, 2015f, p. 8, emphasis added)
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These last examples are important attempts to redefine the notion of crisis 
and to draw attention to the failure of political institutions in coming up 
with morally sound and institutionally effective policies, which would aid 
the refugees and strengthen the welfare state’s ability to fulfil its goals of 
supporting the people. As the examples provided from DN and AB show, 
views that challenged the specific ways the refugee crisis was constructed 
and used to justify policy shifts do not contest the institutional logic that 
informed the very construction of the crisis.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have traced the construction of a refugee crisis in 2015 in 
Swedish mainstream newspapers. Focusing on the most dominant frame, 
institutional responsibility, I demonstrate that a sense of panic emerged 
when increasing numbers of people were seeking asylum in and through 
Sweden. This panic transpired when old rules and regulations were found 
inadequate to promptly address the needs of the asylum seekers. The inabil-
ity to categorise and order people (transit migrants for example) rendered 
these people illegible for the welfare state, increasing the sense of heightened 
risk and the additional needs for management. An ongoing desire to disci-
pline refugees’ bodies through mechanisms of control in housing, schooling 
and healthcare services added to the pressures on the welfare state institu-
tions to act and manage the risks associated with refugees. Institutional 
failure to manage refugees and asylum seekers gave rise to a sense of crisis. 
Thus, the emphasis on institutional crises and the failure to manage and 
mitigate risks associated with refugees and asylum seekers was drawn by 
mainstream media to signify the refugee crisis. Political institutional failure, 
rather than the inadequacy of moral ideals, justified extreme policy mea-
sures. These were left largely uncontested in mainstream media, given the 
cultural context of faith in pragmatism, bureaucratic efficiency and wide-
spread support for Swedish institutions. When constructed as an institu-
tional need, policy restrictions can proceed without challenging the domi-
nant Swedish self-image of being generous, ethical and efficient. This 
strategy opens up space for a post-shame discourse where (previously) 
unthinkable and unsayable arguments can be presented. A few contending 
voices remind us of the moral responsibility towards refugees, but they do 
not challenge the institutional logic predominant in the debates. As a con-
sequence, violent measures are implemented and self-perceptions of a 
society that is benevolent and efficient are left unchallenged.
Notes
1 It is not my intention to refute Sweden’s generosity. An objective argument that 
is often taken up to support such a view is that, in 2015, Sweden received the 
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largest number of refugees per capita compared to other countries in the Global 
North (UNHCR 2017). The contention here, rather, is the ways that perception 
of generosity was not challenged by reversing refugee reception policies.
2 Anthropologist Mark Graham (2003) argues that in the Scandinavian context 
in general, and the Swedish case in particular, there is an emotional continuity 
between bureaucracies and the people they serve, which facilitates service and 
ensures popular support. This emotional continuity helps reproduce the ideology 
of the welfare state.
3 A few studies on Swedish media argue that, historically, there has existed a 
partisan structure of the national dailies that has kept them closely affiliated 
with political parties in their content, ownership and readership (Hadenius, 
1983). Aftonbladet has been a left-leaning newspaper and is currently described 
as an independent socially-democratic newspaper. Dagens Nyheter is described 
as liberal, while Svenska Dagbladet is characterised as moderate. Over the last 
few decades, however, political affiliations have reduced and there has been a 
change towards more market-driven journalism, which focuses on newsworthi-
ness rather than political affiliation (Asp, 2006; Pettersson et al., 2006; Ström-
bäck and Nord, 2008). Strömbäck and Nord (2008) refer to this change as part 
of the mediatisation process, which is characterised by professional journalistic 
values and the adoption of a media logic (what is news-worthy) as opposed to 
a political logic in news coverage (see also Nord 2001).
4 I am grateful for the research assistance provided by Sara Lundgren, Gina Frist-
edt Malmberg, Pernilla Nilsson and Serena Nilsson in compiling and coding the 
newspaper articles. They also provided an important sounding board for sharing 
insights about Swedish media analysis. All translations provided here were 
carried out by the author.
5 d’Haenens and de Lange (2001, p. 850) explain that ‘the morality frame adds 
a religious or moral charge to an event, problem or subject’. The religious charge 
was seldom observed in the articles referred to in this analysis. The moral charge, 
whenever strong, was often used in human-interest stories or discussions of 
institutional responsibility, as is shown in the analysis.
6 It should be mentioned here that Denmark has been criticised for not ful-
filling international conventions with regards to family reunifications (http://
denstoredanske.dk/Samfund,_jura_og_politik/Jura/Enkelte_navngivne_
retssager/Tamilsagen) and stateless people (www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/forstaa-
statsloese-sagen-paa-5-minutter) (Accessed 13 March 2020).
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(De-)legitimation of migration: a critical 
study of social media discourses
‘She is old and sick and will not live for many more years, you have to be 
humane by letting her stay and not be so damn bureaucratic (two angry 
smileys)’.1 The quote comes from a comment adding to a discussion on 
Facebook about the case of Sahar, a 106-year-old woman whom the Swedish 
Migration Agency denied a permit to remain in Sweden.2 The Agency 
argued that despite Sahar’s old age and poor health, there was no reason 
for her not to return to the province of Kunduz in Afghanistan, which used 
to be her home. According to the Agency, this province was safe for Sahar 
to return to. That she was blind, partly paralysed, unable to speak, and had 
no one who could look after her in Afghanistan did not make her a ‘par-
ticularly vulnerable person’ 3 in need of refugee protection on humanitarian 
grounds, in the eyes of the Agency. The decision of the Agency was later 
overturned by the Migration Court, who argued it would be objectionable 
from precisely a humanitarian perspective to deport Sahar and that the 
deportation would amount to an inhumane and degradable treatment in 
violation of Article 3 (the right to life) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Instead, the court granted Sahar a temporary permit to 
remain in Sweden for 13 months. As this chapter reveals, the case of Sahar 
and the court’s decision came to be much debated by the public in Sweden, 
especially on social media.
The chapter provides a critical analysis of the debate about this particular 
asylum case, using Van Leeuwen’s analytical tool for analysing discursive 
(de-)legitimation, which is inspired by Habermas’ understanding of public 
discourse and legitimacy. The aim of the analysis is to explore how social 
media users (de-)legitimised the decision of the court while they were dis-
cussing it on the Swedish evening paper Expressen’s Facebook page. The 
collection of data followed recommendations on collecting data online by 
Sveningsson et al. (2003). Firstly, a broad search was conducted, followed 
by a progressive limitation of the material. The keywords used when search-
ing on Facebook were the Swedish word for ‘Migration Court’ (Migration-
sdomstol) and ‘Migration Court of Appeal’ (Migrationsöverdomstolen). 
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The search results were then filtered by choosing posts from some of the 
most recognised and largest newspapers in Sweden within the time frame 
2015–2017. When searching for Migration Court cases that are discussed 
on social media, the case of Sahar had considerably more comments than 
similar cases discussed on established newspapers’ commentary fields. The 
article about Sahar was posted by Expressen on 4 October 2017 and the 
comments were posted 4–7 October 2017. At the last date of data collection 
(18 December 2017), the article had 84 comments (74 of relevance for this 
study, 10 off topic), 21 shares and 1022 reactions.
As our study is set in Sweden at a time when it is increasingly difficult 
to be granted asylum, and many unsuccessful applicants are deported to 
unsafe situations and places (see chapter 5), the findings of our analysis are 
addressed while taking into account the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy that 
nation state borders imply (Fauser et al., 2019). This means that the dis-
courses analysed correspond to either the inclusion or exclusion of asylum 
seekers like Sahar. In the analysis, we interpret the dichotomy of inclusion/
exclusion through the conceptual lens of discursive violence; that is, when 
‘groups or persons’ (in this case asylum seekers), through discourse, ‘are 
cast into subaltern positions’ (Jones et al., 1997, p. 394). Much like how 
borders are always violent (Jones, 2017), discourses on the (unwanted) 
crossing of state borders inevitably contain forms of violence (see also 
chapter 2). By adding the notion of discursive violence to the analysis, it 
becomes more relevant to both critical migration research and socio-legal 
studies. The application of discursive violence as the guiding concept illu-
minates how discourses subordinate and dehumanise migrants, making it 
legitimate to exclude them from the nation state.
While scholars have devoted considerable attention to the discursive 
legitimacy and political discussion generated by the authorities with top-
down approaches (see e.g. Joormann, 2019), as well as to how traditional 
media (Strömbäck, 2009; Callaghan and Schnell, 2011) and courts affect 
the public discourse (e.g. Ura, 2014; Clark et al., 2018), they have paid 
relatively little attention to bottom-up discourses on legitimacy in civil 
society, particularly on social media. The growing importance of social 
media in the political landscape, however, makes it an important area to 
study (Bruns and Highfield, 2015). By focusing on one particular case at 
the micro-level, that is by going into the specificities in the discourses on 
the case of Sahar, we gain a novel insight into some of the processes that 
dehumanise asylum seekers and refugees.
According to Habermas, the ‘deliberative legitimation process’ (2006, p. 
415) encompasses political discourses on three levels, affecting each other 
top down and bottom up: institutionalised discourses, mass media dis-
courses and civil society discourses. Although this study focuses on the level 
of civil society, these levels are not isolated from each other, with the dis-
courses in civil society being affected by the discourses on the other levels 
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and vice versa. By adding a contemporary layer to the Habermasian under-
standing of public discourse, inasmuch as it takes place in social media, we 
argue that social media is potentially more inclusive when it comes to 
discussing and ultimately (de-)legitimising migration law and policy. In this 
sense, the chapter fills a gap in the literature of socio-legal research on 
discourses about legitimacy and legality in contemporary (civil) society.
Public discourse as grounds for law’s legitimacy
Habermas, having published extensively on the rule of law and its roots in 
the process of democratic will formation in Western liberal law contexts 
(Habermas, 1996), views the concept of public discourse as a fundamental 
part of legitimacy, rather than understanding the law’s legitimacy in terms 
of legal correctness (Alexy, 2000, p. 138f.) To Habermas, it is the consensus 
achieved through a reflective public discourse that establishes what is con-
sidered as fair and good (Habermas, 1997). Thus, in order to understand 
legitimacy, one needs to turn to the discourses that emerge in the public 
sphere. It is here that critical discussions on law are to be found (Habermas, 
1996, p. 42). Consequently, like in the case of Sahar, many discussions 
among citizens in the public sphere serve to legitimise law (Jacobsson, 
1997). Moreover, it is not just the discourses that occur in the incipient 
stages of the law-making process that legitimise law. Habermas argues that 
‘Deliberative politics acquires its legitimating force from the discursive 
structure of an opinion- and will-formation that can fulfil its socially inte-
grative function only because citizens expect its results to have a reasonable 
quality’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 304). The implementation of law, and the 
outcome of such, is critically reviewed in the public discursive formation of 
opinion (Habermas, 2006). Public opinion in the singular ‘only refers to 
the prevailing one among several public opinions’ (Habermas, 2006, p. 
417). Habermas suggests that both media and everyday conversation form 
such opinions in this phase of the legitimation process (Habermas, 2006).
In our analysis, this means that it is equally important to analyse the 
discourse about the court’s decision as part of the discourse on migration 
policy and legislation (such as the regulations of the Swedish Migration 
Agency or the national Alien’s Act 2005: 716). In the context of migra-
tion research, a strictly Habermasian understanding of gaining legitimacy 
through public discourse is problematic, however, since the participants 
within such discourse are, first and foremost, full or ‘native’ citizens (Fraser, 
2007). The people that are most directly affected by immigration policies – 
asylum seekers, in the context of this study – are normally excluded from 
critical discussions about the legitimacy of these policies. Nonetheless, 
when public discourse takes place on social media, anyone with a stable 
internet connection, a registered user account for the respective social media 
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platform, and sufficient command of the language in which the discussion 
happens can partake. Arguably, this makes social media a more inclusive 
platform than those of traditional public debates. Yet this inclusion is 
not unproblematic. Whilst it enables potentially anyone, including asylum 
seekers themselves, to have a say, social media today also hosts an impor-
tant share of far right and racist discourse.
The case of Sahar
Our analysis of the discourse in the case of Sahar is carried out by using 
Van Leeuwen’s analytical tool, which is comprised of four discursive catego-
ries (e.g. Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Van Leeuwen, 2007). These 
categories can be used separately or combined. Thus, several categories can 
be identified in the same comment. This is also evident in our analysis, 
where some categories overlap at times. The four categories are: authorisa-
tion, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis. The latter category 
only figures briefly in the analysis and involves (de-)legitimation through 
narrative, with cautionary tales being one subcategory (Van Leeuwen, 2008, 
pp. 117–118).
Our analytical work started with organising the comments into those 
who legitimised and those who de-legitimised the court’s decision. Although 
there are many more legitimising comments than de-legitimising ones (forty-
six legitimising, twenty-six de-legitimising and two indifferent), there is no 
consensus. After organising the comments into these two categories we 
identified Van Leeuwen’s discursive categories in the comments before inter-
preting the discursive dichotomy of inclusion/exclusion through the concept 
of discursive violence. Introduced above, the concept of discursive violence 
is defined as processes and practices through which statements are made, 
recorded and legitimised through linguistic and other means of circulation.
Discursive violence, then, involves using these processes and practices to script 
groups or persons in places, and in ways that counter how they would define 
themselves. In the process, discursive violence obscures the socio-spatial rela-
tions through which a group is subordinated. The end effect is that groups 
or persons are cast into subaltern positions. (Jones et al., 1997, p. 394, italics 
in original).
Authorisation
The category of authorisation contains several subcategories: the authority 
of conformity, authority of tradition, expert authority, personal authority, 
role model authority and impersonal authority (for an example of laws and 
courts, see Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 106). When de-legitimising the court’s 
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decision, references to the Migration Agency and (their interpretation of) 
migration regulations are made, for instance in this quote:
She is registered and documented as a refugee in Croatia. Therefore, the 
Migration Agency made a correct decision, as the rules say that you should 
stay in the first safe country … The authority must comply with the rules, 
then it is up to the Court if they want to break or follow them. If it becomes 
custom to break them due to high age being ground for asylum, it will be 
tough on the municipalities.4
This comment refers to impersonal authority when de-legitimising the 
court’s decision whilst at the same time legitimising the Agency’s decision. 
Furthermore, the last sentence can be seen as an example of mythopoesis 
and its subcategory of cautionary tales: The author claims that the court, 
a part of the Swedish state bureaucracy, is acting illegitimately. This comment 
refers to the Migration Agency’s decision to legitimise Sahar’s expulsion, 
thus excluding her because she is a non-citizen, because it is, as the com-
mentator states, in accordance with the law. Thus, the commentator refers 
to the bureaucratic implementation of Swedish migration law to legitimise 
exclusion: ‘Invoking the power of the Law legitimises the means by which 
inclusion and exclusion takes place’ (Lynn and Lea, 2003, p. 427).
Moral evaluation
Van Leeuwen’s category of moral evaluation concerns discourses connected 
to moral values. Such moral values are contextual and dependent on cul-
tural values of ‘common sense’. The values can be more or less explicit, or 
implied by using adjectives such as ‘bad’ or ‘good’. The category of moral 
evaluation is also divided into two subcategories: abstractions and analo-
gies. (De-)legitimation through evaluation links adjectives describing how 
a practice, action or phenomenon occurs, to a quality, which the discussants 
either praise or criticise. Abstractions refer to practices connected to moral 
qualities or values (Van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 109–112). The subcategory of 
analogies refers to comparisons between actions, or events, which relate to 
certain moral values. The comments that are identified as belonging to the 
category of moral evaluation almost exclusively legitimise the court’s deci-
sion. This corresponds to Van Leeuwen and Wodak’s (1999, p. 111) conclu-
sion that ‘legal systems must ultimately always be grounded in moral 
systems’. Only two of the comments that de-legitimise the decision fall into 
the subcategory of abstractions. These comments question Sahar’s age and 
her sincerity in claiming that she is 106 years old. By doing so, they refer 
to the practice of lying, which is generally considered immoral. Since she is 
perceived to be lying, she does not deserve a residence permit. Interdiscur-
sively,5 these comments can be seen as similar to certain streams of the 
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discourse about unaccompanied refugee children in Sweden. In such dis-
course, people argue that the children are lying about their age, claiming 
to be younger than eigtheen (Stretmo, 2014, pp. 41, 151–153). This is also 
seen in several of the comments analysed, where one commentator writes: 
‘Funny that she knows her age when there are grown men who do not know 
if they are 16 or 40 (laughing smiley).’ 6 Asylum seekers are also accused of 
lying about other things, such as their sexuality (Parker, 2015) or their 
religious beliefs (Lillian, 2006). This adds up to a violent discursive con-
struction of asylum seekers as liars. By linking asylum seekers to an immoral 
practice these discourses ascribe refugees with negative attributes, which 
serve to other them (van Dijk, 1999).
Although the most commonly found subcategory in the legitimising com-
ments is that of evaluation, there are also several legitimising comments that 
use abstractions. These comments are often short and contain words such 
as ‘humanity’, ‘unethical’, ‘charitable’, ‘inhumane’, ‘humanistic’, ‘shame-
ful’ and ‘humane’.7 Their shared feature is that they include some kind of 
adjective regarding a quality that encompasses a moral value. In addition 
to de-legitimising the Migration Agency’s decision, these comments also de-
legitimise the comments that oppose the court’s decision in favour of Sahar’s 
asylum application, and in doing so they legitimise the court’s position.
One longer comment of moral abstractions also contains theoretical 
rationalisation and evaluation by referring explicitly to bureaucratisation: 
‘She is old and sick and will not live for many more years, you have to be 
humane by letting her stay and not be so damn bureaucratic (two angry 
smileys)’. This commentator uses ‘humane’ as a moral value, putting it in 
contrast to bureaucracy and its practices. A similar comment states that: ‘It 
shouldn’t have been any hassle from the start. What kinds of robots are 
working with this? Happy for her sake.’ 8 This comment uses the metaphor 
of ‘robots’ making decisions at the Migration Agency – and robots cannot 
be humane. Correspondingly, the following comment indicates that bureau-
cracies tend to interpret rules in a rigid way, with no room for values and 
humanity: ‘I understand that there are regulations et cetera, but to throw 
out a 106-year-old??!! Thank God that someone used their brain and 
[showed] some humanity’.9 Furthermore, the comment can be seen as refer-
ring to theoretical rationalisation (which is legitimation by referring to truth 
claims, as discussed later in this chapter) in stating that Sahar is old and 
sick, since it is known that this will result in her passing away in the some-
what near future – thus, she does not risk becoming a burden on the welfare 
state and its taxpayers. This refers to a common fear of the risk of migration 
(see the Introduction to this volume) and of a lack of (economic) integration 
of newcomers.
There are a few comments that can be placed into the subcategory of 
analogies. For example, one commentator writes that one should: ‘Show 
solidarity with those who are vulnerable in the world. However, I get very 
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sad when those who are wanted due to links to terrorist groups are not 
expelled at once! They should not be here for one second longer!’ 10 Con-
structing asylum seekers as potential terrorists, and thus a potential threat 
to the host society, is a common phenomenon when asylum seekers and 
refugees are represented in public discourse (for example, see Goodman and 
Speer, 2007; Innes, 2010; Abdelhady and Malmberg, 2018). Other com-
ments in the thread contain slander about migrants in general (including 
asylum seekers as well as refugees), such as the claim that they commit 
crimes and are engaged in raping, killing and shooting. This construction 
is also manifest in other studies on discourses about migrants (see e.g. 
Masocha, 2015; Devlin and Grant 2017; Moore et al., 2018). It forms a 
part of the discourse that constructs asylum seekers as a threat. When 
claiming that some are involved in criminal (read: immoral) practices, so 
posing a threat to the citizens of the nation, the above comments also serve 
to position certain groups (for example retired native Swedes versus asylum 
seekers, refugees and migrants in general) against each other.
The discursive construction of the asylum seeker as a threat is related 
to the discursive construction of ‘genuine’ and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. The 
‘bogus asylum seeker’ is portrayed as the problem (Lynn and Lea, 2003, 
p. 433). It is claimed that these are people who are not in sincere need of 
protection, whilst ‘genuine’ asylum seekers have a real need for refuge. 
‘Genuine asylum-seekers appear to earn their claim to citizenship rights’ 
(Lynn and Lea, 2003, p. 434), while the ‘bogus’ asylum seeker does not. 
‘Bogus’ asylum seekers are presented as being a threat to, and sabotage 
for, the ‘genuine’ ones (Lynn and Lea, 2003). This construction has gen-
erated a perception that many asylum seekers are bogus, which in turn 
questions ‘the legitimacy of all asylum seekers’ (Goodman et al., 2017, p. 
106). This construction is also used as a rhetorical strategy by politicians 
to legitimise a restrictive immigration policy (van Dijk, 1993). Along with 
other studies, for example the one provided by Lynn and Lea (2003), this 
chapter shows that the discursive construction of bogus asylum seekers has 
become so established in Sweden and many other countries that it is no 
longer questioned.
The quote above also shows how the discursive construction of genuine 
and bogus asylum seekers is used as a rhetorical disclaimer against accusa-
tions of racism (see Hewitt and Stokes, 1975). By stating, ‘Show solidarity 
with those who are vulnerable in the world’, the commentator alleviates 
criticism of being a racist in the forthcoming argument that some asylum 
seekers and migrants are terrorists: ‘However, I get very sad when those 
who are wanted due to links to terrorist groups are not expelled at once! 
They should not be here for one second longer!’ The main moral aspect of 
the legal decision on the case of Sahar (that is, should an elderly and sick 
woman be granted refugee status?) is often illuminated in the media (Jenkins, 
2009) and tends to engage the public (Eriksen and Weigård, 2000). Even 
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if there is no consensus within the legitimation process in Sahar’s case on 
social media as we analysed, the dominant position legitimises the decision 
by appealing to morality. Habermas argues that moral norms transcend 
diversity and plurality in a modern society, but it is not only moral norms 
that are important and visible in legal discourse (Habermas, 1996, pp. 
106–111). Collective goals, social problems and material conflicts are also 
significant (Eriksen and Weigård, 2000, p. 175). This becomes evident in 
the comments below that refer to cost, taxes and other problems that should 
be prioritised. Such comments claim to be concerned about the welfare of 
‘our own’ Swedish pensioners, which we discuss in the next section.
Rationalisation
The category of rationalisation describes the legitimation strategy by refer-
ence to rationality (though it can also contain traces of morality). Following 
Van Leeuwen’s model, there are two subcategories of rationalisation: instru-
mental rationalisation and theoretical rationalisation. The first subcategory 
is applicable when discussants (de-)legitimise a practice by referring to 
goals, purposes, uses and effects together with an element of moralisation 
(Van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 113–117). Theoretical rationalisation is (de-)
legitimation through ‘truth claims’, such as a discussant claiming to describe 
‘the way things are’ (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 116).
A few comments suggest that giving Sahar a residence permit poses a 
threat to Swedish welfare. Several commentators question who is paying 
for her living costs (health care, accommodation, dental care, etc.), and 
argue, for example, that: ‘She has not contributed a penny to the pension 
system. Nor paid taxes. [But only] takes from Swedish pensioners!’ 11 This 
comment, along with similar comments that de-legitimise the court’s deci-
sion to let Sahar stay, refers to instrumental rationalisation inasmuch as it 
claims that it is an immoral practice to use someone else’s money (which 
Sahar does not deserve, as the argument continues). The principle idea of 
this argument is that those who pay taxes are those who are eligible to 
benefit from the welfare system in Sweden (see also Introduction in this 
volume). Such discourse shifts the focus from asylum seekers’ need of pro-
tection (Lynn and Lea, 2003) to constructing asylum seekers as scroungers 
(Anderson, 2013).
It also implies a rhetoric of ‘us versus them’, in which the refugees are 
‘them’ in their deviancy. In the case of Sahar, the ‘us’ is akin to Swedish 
citizens (or possibly even white native Swedes), with an emphasis on Swedish 
pensioners. Meanwhile, Sahar is categorised as ‘them’. The ‘us’ are those 
who should be the primary beneficiaries of the Swedish welfare system, 
whereas ‘their’ claims to such rights are highly disputed. By presenting a 
group, in this case Swedish pensioners, as vulnerable, such comments try 
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to seize the ‘opportunity to maximize the sense of injustice, and heighten 
the feelings of animosity generated’ (Lynn and Lea, 2003, pp. 437).
There are several similar arguments where asylum seekers and refugees 
are considered to pose a threat to the Swedish economy. One commentator 
writes: ‘We cannot take care of all foreigners over 100. Contrary to what 
some think, we do not have unlimited resources. She should have never 
come here!’ 12 Conclusively, Sahar is considered a threat to the Swedish 
welfare state because she needs welfare provisions, and so is seen as taking 
from Swedish citizens who are legitimate welfare recipients. A similar inter-
discursive argument is evident in a study by Joormann (2019, p. 125) on 
asylum cases decided by the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal. In ‘the 
legal discourse of MIG 2007:25 [one of the court’s decisions] … one impor-
tant argument for the final decision is the “threat” of every sick child in 
the world coming to Sweden for healthcare.’ Many such descriptions are 
also found in the wake of the refugee crisis of 2015. This has been defined 
as ‘the economisation frame [which] perpetuates the image of asylum 
seekers and refugees as economic burdens and threat to the host country’s 
economic prosperity and welfare by referring to large quantities of money’ 
(Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017, p. 1756, italics in original). When 
asylum seekers and refugees are constructed as an economic threat to the 
host state and its welfare system, they are, at the same time, being de-
legitimised as eligible recipients of Swedish welfare resources. Swedish citi-
zens are, in such discourses (as represented in the quote above), perceived 
as legitimate inhabitants of the nation state, hence eligible to the state’s 
welfare resources. By constructing refugees as a threat to the Swedish 
welfare system, the ‘walling’ of the welfare state through restrictive migra-
tion laws and policies (Barker, 2018) appears to be the rational response in 
the Nordic context (see also chapters 6 and 7).
Some of the legitimising comments also refer to instrumental rationalisa-
tion. Several of them state that they do not mind if their taxes go to Sahar, 
or individuals in her situation. This can be seen as creating a counter dis-
course to the one trying to safeguard native Swedes’ welfare. One com-
mentator, for instance, writes: ‘Don’t be afraid, I can cover all the costs, if 
the Migration Agency accepts it (heart emoji)’.13 This comment entails the 
(moralised) purpose of letting Sahar stay, and the means to achieve that 
goal is the commentator’s money. This is a more humanitarian approach 
visible in the discourse on refugees in the aftermath of the perceived refugee 
crisis. It opposes the economisation frame, addressing humanitarianism (see 
Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017). As seen above, this humanitarian 
approach is also evident when legitimising the court’s decision due to moral 
evaluation.
Another comment from this counter discourse states that: ‘She will get 
about 3,800–4,300 Swedish crowns a month, so do not worry, your tax 
money will probably not go to her.’ 14 This comment contains elements of 
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theoretical rationalisation as the commentator argues that Sahar will get a 
very low pension, as if this was the truth and ‘the way things are’ (Van 
Leeuwen, 2008, p. 116). On the other hand, other comments containing 
truth claims de-legitimise the court’s decision by referring to theoretical 
rationalisation: ‘Afghanistan is safe almost everywhere’ 15 and ‘You do not 
have to flee from Croatia!’ 16 They are stated as short sentences and as truth 
claims, with no need for the commentator to provide further arguments.
Discursive violence and inclusion/exclusion
In the comments on social media about the case of Sahar, discursive violence 
is manifest through the exclusionary discourses that ascribe migrants and 
asylum seekers with inferior attributes. These discourses define who is 
legitimately excluded from, or included within, the borders of the state. For 
example, when a commentator claims that Sahar does not have valid 
reasons for seeking asylum, the discourse constructs her as a liar, which 
undermines her credibility. This is an example of discursive violence inas-
much as someone is described in a degrading way. The process of discursive 
violence may have material effects when the discourse serves to legitimate 
a decision that will deny Sahar asylum.
Imperative to the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy of the borders of the 
nation state is the construction of the legal identity of being an asylum 
seeker or refugee. To belong to this identity is not built upon anything like 
a common origin, ethnicity or culture. It is rather the experience of being 
‘a victimised object of bureaucratic intervention’ (Fernando, 2016, p. 395). 
To be recognised as an asylum seeker or refugee makes a person hyper-
visible, such as in public discourses like the case of Sahar.
Many of the comments that legitimise the decision refer to morality, 
where the consensus is that it is wrong of the Swedish migration bureau-
cracy to expel Sahar. By doing so, they argue that what would be morally 
legitimate is to let her stay and to include her in Swedish welfare provisions. 
Reasons for being inclusionary in this case are frequently illuminated in the 
comments that ‘we’ should take care of Sahar, being sick, elderly and 
female. The understanding and framing of the comments are that Sahar is 
a victim in need of protection (i.e. inclusion), where health status, age and 
gender are of great significance. These attributes match the construction of 
the female asylum seeker as being vulnerable and helpless (Malkki, 1996; 
Fernando, 2016; Lugones, 2016). Accordingly, she is perceived by the 
authors of these comments as a ‘legitimate refugee’, meaning that she 
‘deserves’ the inclusion within the Swedish state through a residence permit. 
An inclusionary discourse is also evident in comments referring to instru-
mental rationalisation on economic resources; for instance, where one com-
mentator argues that they are willing to pay for her.
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This inclusive discourse is countered by an exclusionary one, based on 
who is considered as an illegitimate recipient of the Swedish state’s welfare 
resources. Such comments claim that Sahar has not paid any taxes and 
therefore should be excluded from Swedish welfare provisions such as 
health care and pensions. This exclusionary discourse is based on a rhetoric 
of ‘us versus them’, in which Swedish pensioners are the core of the ‘us’, 
and Sahar and other asylum seekers are not only constructed as ‘them’ but 
even claimed to be a threat to, for instance, Swedish pensioners and welfare 
resources more generally. In this discourse, Swedish citizens are already 
included in the welfare system. They have paid taxes and are, therefore, to 
be considered legitimate recipients of welfare resources.
Another example of an inclusionary discourse is that Sahar is asserted 
to be a ‘genuine’ asylum seeker by some commentators. Nonetheless, when 
expressing solidarity and inclusion towards Sahar, there is also a construc-
tion of the ‘bogus’ asylum seeker embedded in their argument. The con-
struction of the ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, who pose a threat towards the 
welfare state, is mainly built on the argument that it is the perceived mass 
of migrants that is problematic (Lynn and Lea, 2003). By referring to masses 
of bogus asylum seekers there is a legitimate case for excluding all asylum 
seekers. This discourse legitimises the exclusionary practice of re-bordering 
through restrictive migration laws and border controls, in order to protect 
the welfare state against such risks (see also the Introduction to this volume).
Conclusion
The chapter contributes to the understanding of the discursive underpin-
nings of contemporary discourses about asylum seekers and migrants. In 
critically analysing how discourses on social media (de-)legitimise the court’s 
decision on the case of Sahar through an inclusionary/exclusionary perspec-
tive, we have also identified discursive violence against asylum seekers, refu-
gees and migrants in general. There are nearly twice as many Facebook 
comments that legitimise the court’s decision to grant Sahar a thirteen-
month residence permit compared to those that de-legitimise it. The anal-
ysed material also includes, however, discursive violence against asylum 
seekers, refugees and migrants through the use of binaries such as Us and 
Them on the one hand and ‘genuine and bogus’ asylum seekers on the other. 
Discursive violence is also illustrated in the comments that ascribe asylum 
seekers with inferior attributes and supposedly immoral behaviour, such as 
lying. Asylum seekers are constructed as a threat to the welfare state 
through an economic framing where the monetary costs are attached to the 
de-legitimatisation of claims for asylum like Sahar’s.
This study adds a contemporary layer to socio-legal studies of migra-
tion by focusing on social media discourses. Adopting a contemporary 
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Habermasian perspective on law’s legitimacy as something attained through 
public discourses on social media, we have illustrated how these discourses 
not only (de-)legitimise the court’s decision in the case of Sahar, but also 
how the recently adopted restrictive migration laws and policies in Sweden 
can be legitimised. According to Habermas, it is crucial to study the discur-
sive ‘deliberative legitimation process’ (Habermas, 2006, p. 415) on three 
levels, one of them being that of civil society. Thus, in order to understand 
the complexities of the legitimation processes of the current re-bordering of 
the Swedish state, we argue that it is important to study the discourses in 
civil society by using a bottom-up approach. Our analysis of social media 
comments on the case of Sahar exemplifies this approach. This analysis does 
not only contribute to an understanding of the normative and discursive 
dimensions of the legitimation process in civil society, but also constitutes 
a novel addition to critical migration research in Sweden. At the same time 
as we learn a lot about Sahar, which arguably serves to humanise her, both 
the discourses that legitimise and de-legitimise the court’s decision also 
contribute to the dehumanisation of Sahar in the sense of othering her. That 
is, by debating and scrutinising Sahar and her story on social media she is 
made into an object. The refugee. The Other.
Notes
1 ‘Hon är gammal och sjuklig och kommer inte leva så många år till då måste 
man va human och låta henne stanna och inte va så jävla byråkratisk (två arga 
smileys)’.
2 The Swedish Migration Agency makes the initial decision on applications for 
visa, residence permit, Swedish citizenship or asylum. In the event of a rejec-
tion, the applicant can appeal the decision to the Migration Agency. If the 
Agency does not change its decision, the appeal is brought to the Migration 
Court (The Swedish Courts, 2018; see also chapter 2 above).
3 Chapter 5 paragraph 6 of the Aliens Act SFS 2005:716.
4 Hon är registrerad och dokumenterad flykting i Kroatien. Då beslutade migra-
tionsverket rätt då reglerna är sådana att man ska stanna i första säkra land.. 
Myndigheten ska följa reglerna sen får domstolen välja om de skall bryta mot 
dem eller inte. Blir det praxis att bryta mot dem med hög ålder som asylskäl 
blir det tufft för kommunerna.
5 Interdiscursivity is the link between different discourses (Vaara and Tienari, 
2010, p. 245).
6 ‘Roligt att hon vet sin ålder när det finns vuxna män som inte vet om de är 16 
eller 40 (skrattande smiley).’
7 ‘mänsklighet’, ‘oetiskt’, ‘välvilligt’, ‘omänskligt’, ‘humanistiskt’, ‘skamligt’ and 
‘humant’.
8 ‘Skulle inte varit strul från början. Vad är det för robotar som jobbar med 
detta? Glad för hennes skull.’
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9 ‘Jag förstår att det finns regelverk osv men att slänga ut en 106-åring??!! Tack 
och lov att nån använde hjärnan och använde lite medmänsklighet’.
10 ‘Visa solidaritet med de utsatta i världen. Däremot blir jag väldigt ledsen när 
de som är efterlysta för kopplingar till terrorgrupper inte blir utvisade med det 
samma! De ska inte vistas här en enda sekund!’
11 ‘Hon har inte tillfört pensionssystemet ett öre. Inte betalat skatt. Alltså tar hon 
från Svenska pensionärer!’
12 ‘Vi kan itnte ta hand om alla utlänningar över 100. Till skillnad från vad 
somliga tror har vi inte gränslösa resurser. Hon skulle aldrig kommit hit!’
13 ‘Va inte rädda jag kan stå för alla kostnader om migrationsverket accepterar 
<3’.
14 ‘Hon kommer få ca 3800–4300 I månaden så va inte orolig din skatt går 
förmodligen inte till henne.’
15 ‘Afghanistan är säkert nästan överallt.’
16 ‘Man behöver inte fly från Kroatien!’
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PART III
The meaning of refugeeness

9
Living bureaucratisation: young Palestinian 
men encountering a Swedish introductory 
programme for refugees
My dream is to study at the university. But when you go to [the caseworkers], 
they do not listen to your ambitions and dreams. They make you believe that 
you can tell them what you want. In the end they will write in their plans 
what they want. You want to study? Okay, you are going to study. They write 
‘Amir wants to continue his education. Amir wants to study Swedish. Amir 
is going to take the social integration course. And this basically means that 
according to this [action] plan, you should show us that you have attended 
[language] school.’ (Amir)
This chapter discusses the experiences of young Palestinian men in an 
introductory programme for refugees in Sweden. The programme was 
designed to support people who had been accepted for asylum in learning 
Swedish and introducing them to the labour market (Larsson, 2015; Enne-
rberg, 2017). Despite the good intentions of policy-makers, my interlocu-
tors, like Amir who is quoted above, often feel that it is a waste of time to 
follow the programme. The programme is not adjusted to their individual 
aspirations, and they have few possibilities of deciding what to do with 
their own lives while being enrolled in it. In this chapter, I argue that their 
frustrations can be understood primarily as reactions to a bureaucratisation 
of daily life and to the institutional requirements that limit their sense of 
agency. Bureaucratisation in this case leads to resistance but also to hope-
lessness and readjustments of personal ambitions.
Many migrants from war-torn and poor countries are well prepared for 
multiple losses in life and for enduring hardships (Jackson, 2008). Among 
Palestinians, there is even a frequently used term, sumud, for patience or 
endurance, which means to keep going despite all (Peteet, 2005, pp. 148ff.). 
However, migrants are seldom prepared for the bureaucratisation of every-
day life that is set in motion in Northern European welfare states when 
dealing with different institutions and authorities as asylum-seekers or refu-
gees (see also chapter 10).1 The Swedish street-level bureaucrats are, in 
general, described as friendly and caring by my interlocutors; still, their 
practices are, as we will learn, experienced as constraining and excluding.
Nina Gren
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In addition, I claim that the bureaucratic labelling of my interlocutors 
as ‘refugees’ (Zetter, 1991), whose reason for migrating was fleeing persecu-
tion and violent conflict, conceals their aspirations to attain or continue 
higher education. This co-existence (or sometimes blending) of different 
motivations for mobility, and its connection to imagining a better life in 
faraway places after migration, is well-known within anthropology (Salazar, 
2011), even though this particular mixing of political reasons for fleeing, 
on the one hand, and aspirations for social mobility through education, on 
the other, has received little attention. Appadurai (1996) emphasises that 
the practice of imagining (for example distant places, upward social mobil-
ity, safety) is a driving force behind increased migration globally. Imagina-
tion seems vital when deciding to migrate: either one does so in a context 
of war and violence or unemployment and poverty, or both. Appadurai 
(2013, pp. 286ff.) sees the capacities to imagine and to aspire as grounded 
within local systems of value, meaning, interaction, and opposition, even 
though recognisably universal. The frustrations my interlocutors experi-
enced while being in the introductory programme highlight that wishes to 
find ‘safety’ often mingle with imagination of what a good life constitutes 
for many Palestinian refugees. The need to flee does not automatically 
diminish other needs or wishes in life. For migration agencies, introductory 
programmes and other parts of national bureaucracies, such co-existence 
seems difficult or even impossible to handle. As a result, my ethnographic 
material shows that from the perspective of some refugees, introductory 
programmes that do not take educational ambitions into account may seem 
meaningless, and refugees may, either deliberately or not, ignore bureau-
cratic requirements in an attempt to break out of conditions that are expe-
rienced as immobilising.
After a section on methodology and a theoretical framework, I briefly 
discuss Palestinian migration to Sweden, Palestinian desires for education, 
and Swedish introductory programmes for refugees in general. Then, I 
discuss my material in two ethnographic sections. First, I examine the 
procedures within the introductory programme, and the feeling of being 
stuck that my interlocutors experience. Second, I outline the tactics they 
use to juggle institutional requirements while maintaining their aspira-
tions for higher education. The final section includes a summary of my 
findings and more general conclusions about my interlocutors’ future in 
Sweden. My analysis points out that a focus on institutional requirements 
within introductory programmes for refugees may create hopelessness and 
frustration among participants to an extent that they give up on their 
aspirations for higher education and instead focus on getting employed in 
a low-status job or, possibly, migrating onwards. Ironically, the introduc-
tory programme, which aims at the socio-economic integration of refu-




This chapter builds on ethnographic material collected since 2011 among 
Swedish-Palestinians. The bulk of fieldwork was carried out in relation to 
an introductory programme for refugees in a city in southern Sweden during 
2014–2015. The Swedish Public Employment Service (SPES, Arbets-
förmedlingen) coordinates the introductory programme; my fieldwork 
included participant observation, qualitative interviews and informal con-
versations with staff at a local branch of the authority, and with refugees 
enrolled at the programme. I also attended information meetings for new 
refugees and held meetings about preliminary findings with personnel to 
get additional perspectives from a wider range of staff.
In this chapter, I concentrate on the accounts of four young Palestinian 
men with whom I established more long-term relationships. They were 
between twenty-five and thirty-three years of age and had waited for asylum 
for six to nine months before starting the introductory programme. I did 
not intend to focus on males but since Palestinian migration is dominated 
by young men this is how my snowballing turned out. The four men come 
from different parts of the Middle East: one grew up in Gaza, two are from 
the West Bank and one is from Syria. They have different socioeconomic 
backgrounds and have grown up in Palestinian refugee camps run by United 
Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East 
(UNRWA).2
Being a Swede and thus a native in the receiving society was initially a 
disadvantage, since some refugees, out of courtesy, hesitated to be critical 
of the introductory programme in front of me. When I got to know them 
better such politeness disappeared. In this chapter, all names are pseud-
onyms and some personal details have been changed so to ensure the ano-
nymity of individuals interviewed and the confidentiality of the local office 
of the SPES where I conducted fieldwork.
Bureaucratisation in welfare states
Weber’s work (2013 [1922]) is the point of departure for most contempo-
rary research about bureaucracy. He saw the convenience of a well-managed 
bureaucracy, which can promote trust and smooth interactions between 
citizens and representatives of the state, even though he also feared the 
expansion of bureaucracy, which he saw as an inevitable and self-reproducing 
aspect of capitalist production. Weber famously termed the entrapments of 
modern societies building on bureaucratic over-rationalisation rather than 
tradition and higher values as ‘an iron cage’ (Bauman, 1989; Cochrane, 
2018). When people meet and interact with bureaucracy, they thus risk 
being turned into cases and divested of their individuality.
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For Eisenstadt (1959, p. 312), bureaucratisation implies that bureau-
cratic activities and power expand to many different areas of social life and 
that bureaucratic service goals tend to become less important in relation to 
the interests of bureaucracy itself and/or the society’s elite. In this chapter, 
bureaucratisation is primarily about the extension of bureaucracy and less 
about the underlying power interests, even though the displacement or 
dwindling significance of service goals can be taken as signs of power and 
control. This also implies that the tentacles of bureaucratisation have 
reached areas of social life that many hoped would be free from bureau-
cratic regulations.
Scandinavian welfare programmes have intervened in people’s private 
lives to a larger extent than in many other places (Olwig, 2011, p. 180). 
There are, however, differences between categories of citizens and residents 
and their relation to the state (Lister, 2007; Lundberg and Strange, 2017). 
Healthy and employed citizens are left at peace, while those who are directly 
economically dependent on the state, such as citizens on sick leave or newly 
arrived refugees on state allocation (that is, with asylum and residency but 
not yet taxpayers or citizens) tend to face more interventions. The latter’s 
everyday lives are bureaucratised and controlled to a larger extent than 
those who can provide for themselves. There are strong ideals of reciprocity 
in the social contract between welfare systems and citizens within Scandi-
navia; a ‘good’ citizen does not remain dependent on the welfare state, but 
rather works and pays taxes so as to continue to receive benefits and recip-
rocates all the benefits that the citizen has received since birth (Olwig, 
2011). In a comparable way, the introductory programme under scrutiny 
expects the inscribed refugees to reciprocate benefits (such as allocations 
and free courses) by following institutional procedures, for instance, by 
attending language classes as agreed, and thus showing that they are becom-
ing ‘good’, responsible and self-supporting citizens.
Refugee labels
The people who are allowed to follow the programme discussed in this 
chapter have been accepted for asylum and are thus legally defined refugees. 
Since a ground-breaking article with examples from the Greek-Cypriot 
refugee situation by Zetter (1991), many scholars have argued that the 
bureaucratic labelling of refugees is a complex and dynamic process occur-
ring inter-relationally between people who have fled and the international 
and national institutions that attempt to assist them (e.g. Peteet, 2005; 
Ludwig, 2013; Janmyr and Mourad, 2018). Implicit values guide refugee 
assistance, and the labelling of target groups is not neutral (Zetter, 1991, 
p. 45). Through labelling, a process of stereotyping occurs. Refugees become 
conflated with certain characteristics and needs depending on the context 
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they are in, and on the degree and nature of control and opportunities 
provided by institutions within host countries and aid organisations (Zetter, 
1991, p. 41).
As Zetter (2007) notes, the international refugee regime has changed 
significantly since the early 1990s. Today, it is often governments in the 
Global North, rather than NGOs and humanitarian organisations in the 
South, that form and transform the refugee label. In the case of Sweden, it 
is primarily the Migration Agency that forms the refugee label by interpret-
ing the Aliens Act, accepting some individuals and groups as refugees or in 
need of protection and granting them asylum, and refusing others. However, 
it is in everyday practices of many different authorities, among those the 
SPES, that refugees are labelled and stereotypes are acted upon.
Refugees tend to experience ‘speechlessness’ (Malkki, 1996), since the 
production of authoritative narratives about refugees is frequently done by 
refugee relief and policy-making rather than by refugees themselves. In the 
case discussed here, the problem seems to be an unwillingness or inability 
within bureaucratic practices to make use of the capacities and wants of 
refugees, even when policy documents clearly state that interventions should 
be focused on individual needs and resources (Regeringens proposition, 
2009).
Refugees do not always remain docile to their helpers or to bureaucratic 
procedures, however. Zetter (1991, p. 49) notes that the primary concern 
of refugees within, for instance, rehabilitation is often to reconstruct pre-
existing identities. Such wishes seem key to understanding my interlocutors’ 
frustrations with the introductory programme. By looking at what the label 
implies and refugees’ experiences of institutional practices, we can under-
stand that irritations among the refugees grow because the programme did 
not address their main aspiration. My Palestinian interlocutors have prob-
lems finding meaning in the introductory programme since it does not help 
them to pursue their dream of upward social mobility through reassuming 
or starting their higher education. In my research material, it is apparent 
that refugees with political reasons to move also have ambitions for higher 
education. However, the refugee label – often coloured by victimhood, pas-
sivity and emergency (Malkki, 1996; Janmyr and Mourad, 2018) – does not 
connote long-term migratory aspirations and future hopes other than safety.
Palestinian migration to Sweden and desire for education
Palestinian migration to Sweden started in the 1960s and rocketed in the 
1980s during the Lebanese civil war (Lindholm with Hammer, 2003; Chris-
tou, 2017). But, as many Palestinians live without citizenship in unstable 
countries in the Middle East, their migration continues and at times intensi-
fies, recently due to the Syrian war. It is unclear how many individuals of 
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Palestinian origin reside in Sweden, since they have often been registered as 
‘stateless’ or ‘of unknown citizenship’, but estimates suggest that there are 
at least 70,000 individuals (Gren, 2015). Palestinians are, however, a minor 
part of the refugee migration to Sweden, which amounts to half a million 
refugees 1980–2014 (excluding family members) (Migrationsverket, n.d.).
Although most Palestinians in Sweden arrive due to violent conflicts, 
some come for educational purposes (Lindholm with Hammer, 2003). In 
the Palestinian territories, it is common to migrate for higher education to 
the neighbouring Arab countries (Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 123f.) and many are 
educated in Eastern European countries, such as Belarus and Ukraine, thanks 
to comparably low university fees. During the Cold War era, there were also 
various scholarships that Palestinians could apply for via various Leftist 
political parties with links to Eastern Europe (Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 125).
There is a wish for education among Palestinians that is related to the 
war and the following losses in 1948 when the state of Israel was estab-
lished and the hope for Palestinian independence was put on hold. About 
750,000 Palestinians fled during the same war (Pappe, 2004, p. 139), and 
the majority of those who ended up in camps had limited schooling (Peteet, 
2005). During the 1950s, the UN built schools in Palestinian refugee camps 
in neighbouring countries, making schooling available to everyone. Palestin-
ian refugees used education as a way to recover from displacement and loss 
of resources, for instance by employment in the Gulf economies during the 
1960s and 1970s (Peteet, 2005, p. 64). Importantly, higher education has 
often been a family project rather than an individual trajectory to upward 
social mobility (Rosenfeld, 2004). Nowadays in Gaza and the West Bank, 
increasing numbers of people study at local colleges or universities (Gren, 
2017).
Higher education has also been considered crucial for the Palestinian 
national project. Since Israel is overwhelmingly powerful militarily and 
economically, a way for Palestinians to fight back is supposedly by becom-
ing educated. In the long run, this strategy reflects their desire to change 
the rules of the game and gain international support for their cause (Akesson, 
2014, pp. 197ff.).3 My interlocutors were, of course, affected by the impor-
tance most Palestinians put on higher education. If they do not succeed in 
continuing their higher education in Sweden, their feelings of failure are 
compounded given the need to explain to their families and friends why 
they have failed to get educated in a country where you get student aid and 
do not pay any university fees. Failure is further accentuated because many 
of their peers in the occupied territories are finishing up their education.
Swedish introductory programmes for refugees
Swedish official discourse has underlined the necessity for refugees to become 
self-supporting (Borevi, 2014), although there is recognition of the need to 
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assist those refugees who are unable to provide for themselves (Byström, 
2015).4 The requirements of the Swedish labour market have influenced 
both rhetoric about refugees and the different introductory programmes 
that have been in place since the 1980s (Graham, 2003; Eastmond, 2011). 
Employment is not only an economic issue but is seen as both producing 
and proving integration (Valenta and Bunar, 2010; Larsson, 2015).
Employment rates among refugees used to be high until the 1980s (Schi-
erup et al., 2006, p. 207). However, since an economic crisis in the early 
1990s, ethnic divisions in the Swedish labour market have become striking; 
immigrants, either work migrants or refugees, have typically entered the 
labour market through low-income, low-status jobs and many have remained 
in such jobs (Larsson, 2015 p. 36). In particular, those who are foreign-born 
and/or assumed to be ‘culturally different’ have problems getting access to 
employment (Lundborg, 2013, p. 219). Although actual employment rates 
among groups of immigrants vary between nationalities and legal statuses, 
as well as change over time (Belevander and Pendakur, 2012), the percep-
tion in society is that large groups of foreign-born depend on social welfare 
or unemployment compensation. Public debates reflect concerns that it 
takes too many years for immigrants, and especially for refugees, to become 
employed (Larsson, 2015, p. 44). Today, this is increasingly seen as a soci-
etal problem and/or a waste of human resources.5
Due to the widespread concern about unemployment among refugees, 
the responsibility of refugee introduction was moved from municipalities 
to the SPES in 2010 (Regeringens proposition, 2009/10:60). The SPES is a 
governmental agency with many local offices, and one purpose of the 
reform was to make the accommodation of refugees equal and fair, inde-
pendent of local and regional policies. In the new regime, the SPES functions 
as a coordinator, collaborating with many other institutions, such as munic-
ipalities, social services, the Migration Agency and language schools. The 
introductory programme is called Etableringen in Swedish (literally the 
Establishment, referring to gaining a foothold in the labour market) and 
goes on for about two years (Arbetsförmedlingen, 2013; Larsson, 2015; 
OECD, 2016; Ennerberg, 2017).
There are strong norms about the necessity of speaking Swedish to be 
formally employed in Sweden, even for rather simple jobs (Eastmond, 
2011). Thus, the programme places much emphasis on language training. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that language proficiency has become a sign 
of national integration. The programme also includes courses on Swedish 
society, culture and the political system; Swedish language for specific pro-
fessions; validations of previous work experience and foreign degrees; 
internship opportunities; and government-subsidised employment. Through 
‘active participation’ in the programme, a refugee is entitled to a modest 
sum of money to cover living expenses, distributed by the Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency. This allocation is about SEK 1,504 per week (about EUR 
150).6 Participation in the programme is voluntary, but in practice only 
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those refugees who are economically independent can afford to not follow 
the programme, since attendance is bound up with the distribution of 
allocations.
The main goal of the introductory programme is not that refugees should 
become educated, but that they should become employed or at least employ-
able. Eastmond (2011, p. 283) concludes that, since 1998, Arbetslinjen, a 
policy prioritising employment of all citizens and residents, reflects increas-
ing worries about people remaining jobless and consequently eternal welfare 
recipients (see also Larsson, 2015; Ennerberg, 2017). For the Swedish state, 
education of refugees thus seems important when it leads to quick employ-
ment. Basically, refugees without advanced degrees are only included in the 
Swedish labour market if they accept blue-collar jobs. They are seldom seen 
as equals who have their own hopes and dreams of a good life.7
‘Integration’ is an unclear concept that is used in multiple ways in daily 
life and for diverse political and scientific purposes (Diedrich and Hellgren, 
2018; Rytter, 2018). Although the introductory programme is mostly 
focused on economic integration, a number of cultural and social agree-
ments are part of the practices and settings of the programme. Similar to 
Norwegian integration measures, ‘a compulsory re-socialisation’ based on 
cultural conventions about how to properly behave in society are promoted 
and expected to be followed (Engebrigtsen, 2007 p. 733). Hence, it seems 
that a collective self-perception of Swedes as punctual, active, hard-working 
and willing to follow agreed-upon plans also influences how the introduc-
tory programme is carried out in practice.
Stuck within the introductory programme
In a dull office building close to the city centre, a big room is filling up with 
people. The people who enter are gathering around three different persons 
– the interpreters between Swedish and Arabic or Dari or Somali. A middle-
aged, blond woman from the SPES introduces herself as Fredrika Lundgren 
and distributes brochures, congratulating everyone for having been granted 
asylum. Then some general information follows about the SPES and its 
introductory programme. It is underlined that the programme is individu-
alised and that each refugee should talk to their caseworker so as to adjust 
the programme according to one’s health, previous experiences and wishes. 
Fredrika explains about the compulsory and individual action plan, a docu-
ment where caseworker and refugee collaboratively schedule a programme 
for the refugee’s participation. Specific courses, language training, intern-
ships and other events should be chosen ‘according to your thoughts about 
the future’, Fredrika adds. Moreover, she explains that the action plan 
should be similar to a ‘normal job’, which is why eight hours per day should 
be scheduled Monday to Friday. The aim is that the refugees should ‘become 
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part of society’ in Fredrika’s words. On her power-point, Fredrika shows 
the local addresses of two authorities that the refugees need to visit as soon 
as possible as to get their allocations: the Swedish Tax Agency and the Social 
Insurance Agency. She explains that the Tax Agency manages the civil reg-
istration and that everyone needs to have a local postal address to register. 
By registering, everyone will get a personal identity number. Several people 
nod, seemingly aware of the importance of having a personal identity 
number in Sweden. Fredrika continues to explain that with a personal 
identity number, each one will also be able to apply for a Swedish ID card. 
Furthermore, to be able to receive their allocations without further ado, 
Fredrika recommends a certain procedure:
First, you visit the Tax Agency to get your personal identity number and then 
your ID card. Second, you visit a bank of your choice. You bring your ID card 
and you open a bank account. The third step is to visit the Social Insurance 
Agency – bringing your ID card with your personal identity number and the 
number of your bank account. Then you will start to receive allocations.
As she touches the computer’s keyboard to show the next slide on her 
power-point, Fredrika tries to joke: ‘If you haven’t noticed that yet, we like 
papers in Sweden, especially at authorities.’ Nobody laughs while she goes 
on to explain the four valid reasons for being absent during the programme.
An action plan for each individual refugee is a significant document 
within the introductory programme. The action plan should be filled with 
assignments such as language training and internships, during 40 hours per 
week, which equals the working hours at an ordinary full-time job in the 
Swedish labour market (see also Larsson, 2015, p. 49). The idea is that in 
this way the refugees will learn about working life in Sweden. In contrast 
to most employees, people who follow the introductory programme do 
not have the right to vacation during the two years of the programme. In 
practice, there are often gaps in the implementation of the action plans, 
however, which means that people may, for instance, have to wait for a 
course to start, and some of the activities are not as ‘demanding’ in reality 
as on paper.
The second significant document is what staff and refugees call the school 
card, that is, the attendance form, which not only proves attendance at 
language school but at all assignments scheduled in action plans. Once a 
month, refugee clients stand in line, waiting to hand in their cards to the 
staff who send them onwards in the system so the refugees receive money 
from the Social Insurance Agency. This is a monthly procedure, which is 
debated among the employees. In fact, all unemployed people registered 
with the SPES need to fill in attendance forms but, unlike the refugees, 
others can fill in their activities online and thus avoid the tedious queuing. 
Some of the employees feel that the queuing is disgraceful and makes the 
refugees unnecessarily uncomfortable. Others argue that this is something 
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‘normal that one has to do at any job.’ Attendance proved by the school 
card is the basic institutional requirement for cash distribution.
Except from the hassle when starting the programme, my interlocutors’ 
daily routines quickly fill with Swedish lessons, meetings with mentors, 
queues to hand in attendance forms, occasional meetings with their case-
workers, evaluations of previous educational degrees, the writing of CVs, 
and the search for internships and jobs. But they also often find themselves 
waiting: waiting for the exam papers to be returned from the authorities, 
waiting for a rewritten action plan, waiting for a new course on the Swedish 
political system to start or a caseworker to agree on a specific internship. 
Waiting is an exercise of power, especially when delaying but not totally 
destroying hope, argues Bourdieu (2000). For my interlocutors, experiences 
of waiting add to the dampening effect on the excitement of coming to a 
new country and fulfilling their dreams (see e.g. Khosravi, 2014; see also 
chapter 11).
To my interlocutors, the programme and its bureaucracy, as well as 
individual bureaucrats, hinder rather than support their future aspirations. 
One case in point is Yousef’s story. After a series of arrests, which included 
beatings by the Israeli security forces, Yousef managed to get out of the 
West Bank and travel to Sweden. After eight months of waiting, he was 
granted political asylum. He has some work experience at a Palestinian 
municipality and a bachelors’ degree in social work from a local university. 
His caseworker promised to send in his exam papers to the Swedish Council 
for Higher Education, which is in charge of evaluating foreign degrees and 
exams but, unfortunately, she forgot. When he discovered this after months 
of waiting, he was furious and sent his papers himself, but all this meant 
that the evaluation was delayed by several months. His degree was eventu-
ally recognised in Sweden. Meanwhile, Yousef studied Swedish and finished 
his language exam quickly and was thus given a financial ‘award’ from the 
authorities. The only problem is that now there is not much for him to do 
within the introductory programme. His caseworker advised him to take 
the same Swedish course he had just finished one more time. Frustrated, 
Yousef tells me: ‘The [Swedish] system makes you sleep and eat and smoke. 
For two months, I have been waiting for a new course, I have nothing to 
do.’ He wants to study academic English to be able to follow an interna-
tional MA programme at a Swedish university, but instead he ends up doing 
an internship at an Arab friend’s falafel kiosk ‘to practise Swedish’, as it 
was framed by his caseworker.
Part of my interlocutors’ frustration is that the introductory programme 
is not flexible enough to meet their needs. As discussed earlier, neither 
bureaucracy nor refugee labelling leaves room for individualisation (due to 
educational background, work experience, health issues and so on), but, on 
the contrary, emphasises standardisation. However, at the local office where 
I conducted interviews and participant observation, as well as in the policy 
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documents of the programme, individualisation is repeatedly underlined as 
a necessity for successful matching between refugee and labour market (see 
also Ennerberg, 2017, p. 192f.). Bureaucratic practices and limited resources 
limit individualisation. In the end, standardisation and procedure become 
the rule.
Rarely can individualisation occur, and only after long negotiations, 
often including a number of medical certificates. For instance, Rashid, a 
Palestinian from Syria, has finally succeeded in getting his action plan 
adjusted to his own needs. Since his arrival in Sweden, he has been suffering 
from depression and other psychological issues. The little energy he has is 
mostly spent on his work in a Syrian activist network, for instance by going 
to conferences on the Syrian war in other Swedish cities. Attending such 
conferences sometimes leads to his absence from language school, which 
his first caseworker did not accept or, as Rashid phrases it: ‘she did not 
understand that those events are also important to me, otherwise I’d get 
more depressed.’ He tried to gain his caseworker’s trust by showing her 
documentation of his participation but, despite this, she threatened to lower 
his allocation due to his absence. In his own words, his encounter with this 
first caseworker was a total collision with Swedish bureaucracy. He felt that 
she cared about his mental health but at the same time she neither under-
stood what he was going through nor shared his priorities. Her caring for 
his health stayed within the confines of medicalised understandings that did 
not necessarily extend to seeing the need for Rashid to pursue activities that 
are meaningful to him but may contradict the action plan. Rashid explains 
this lack of understanding in ethnic terms: this caseworker is an ethnic 
Swede without any migrant background, while the two successive ones both 
come from families with their own stories of flight. In his third caseworker, 
Rashid meets an employee who acknowledges his problems:
It was my third caseworker who [finally] tackled my case as an individual 
and who saw potential in me. … She found a particular law to help me. Since 
then, I do three days of work because of my depression and I’m allowed to 
follow SFI [Swedish for immigrants] in a flexible way. I was crushed when I 
came to her. She pushed me to get medical certificates from my doctor and 
from a psychologist.
Even though he feels that bureaucracy in Syria is worse than in Sweden, 
since it has often been used as ‘a political tool to humiliate some people’ as 
he says, there are rules that can be ignored. In Sweden, on the other hand, 
everything is supposedly about laws, especially when his caseworker wants 
him to do something in particular. Yet, to Rashid, the law is used in an 
arbitrary way in Sweden. The law, as he phrases it, seems to be focused on 
the refugees living up to the institutional requirements of the programme: 
being active 40 hours a week, keeping to the action plan by following the 
schedule or having pre-approved reasons not to. The system has problems 
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dealing with refugees who are not well, who are traumatised or who just 
intend to do something different than what has been entered in the action 
plan. In this context, being able to integrate seems to mean following the 
programme and its institutional requirements, not necessarily being or 
becoming employable or part of society more generally speaking.
This does not mean that the caseworkers I interviewed within the intro-
ductory programme are unaware of the heterogeneity among their refugee 
clients. On the contrary, they underline the differences they note among 
refugees, for instance, depending on national background, education, age 
and gender. They are acutely aware that, for instance, lack of housing, 
worries about family members abroad and experiences of torture or other 
kinds of extensive violence often influence their clients’ ability to follow the 
programme. It seems clear that neither politicians nor bureaucrats have 
intended to standardise the programme. However, there are a limited 
number of courses and activities that can be part of an action plan. Those 
bureaucrats also have limited time with each of their clients in addition to 
budget restrictions.
As Yousef notes, the caseworkers have mixed educational and profes-
sional backgrounds. Few have a degree in social work as Yousef does 
himself and he concludes: ‘There should be social workers at the SPES who 
could help us. My mentor doesn’t know anything about society. It is just 
that her Swedish is good. Knowing the language is like having a PhD in 
this country.’ To Yousef, the support that is given within the programme is 
not of the right kind. Nobody is able to advise him on university studies, 
for instance.
Juggling institutional requirements and aspirations for the future
My interlocutors navigate the Swedish politics of integration while trying 
to keep up hope and pursuit of a good future on their own terms. While 
the young Palestinians I interviewed were granted asylum on political 
grounds, their migration is associated with aspirations they have for their 
own lives that go beyond escaping political persecution and war. For many 
of them, migration and integration involve pursuing the life trajectories that 
they were on before fleeing. In other words, they attempt to conform to the 
demands of the introductory programme while simultaneously aspiring for 
and imagining a better life.
As mentioned, higher education is one of the common forms of aspira-
tions for my interlocutors. For instance, Rashid, who belongs to a highly 
educated Palestinian family in Syria, sought to restart his university studies 
as soon as possible:
I have a job that the SPES pays for.8 But I plan to go back to university. … I 
didn’t graduate from university in Syria. It was because of the ‘normalisation’ 
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of the abuses. There was a detention centre at the university, so I boycotted 
the exams. … I want to study for a BA at a Swedish University. But our grades 
[those of the Syrian and Swedish grading systems] are not comparable so it’s 
hard to get accepted. I have also been outside academia for a while and I’m 
psychologically affected [by the war and by fleeing].
Syria, where Rashid grew up, used to be the host country in the Middle 
East that gave most rights to Palestinian refugees prior to the on-going war, 
including the right to attend higher education for free (Gabiam, 2016). 
Thus, many of the Palestinians who flee the war in Syria already have higher 
education or had expected to get a university degree without obstacles.
My interlocutors’ aspirations for higher education tend to clash with the 
caseworkers’ prioritisation of the programme’s institutional requirements 
and the rules for the allocation. Amir explains to me that he has two goals 
with his migration: first, getting away from Gaza and the threats of both 
Hamas and Israel, and second, starting a university education. For the 
Swedish Migration Agency, he emphasised the first to obtain asylum, and 
for the SPES, he underlines the second. However, when he prioritised his 
aspirations to be accepted at a university through taking a Test of English 
as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), he failed to fulfil the requirements of the 
introductory programme.
I told [my caseworker] that I don’t have English B [that is an English course 
required for university studies in Sweden] so I have to do an exam instead. 
And I can’t pay for this. It costs like 3,500 Swedish crowns. But [the SPES] 
rejected. … I needed to study English but at the same time I had to go to SFI. 
I said that I didn’t want to go to SFI, I want to do the English test. I had even 
borrowed money for this exam and I registered for it. I studied and studied. 
I didn’t go to SFI and they rejected my application for money because I hadn’t 
been at SFI. ‘But I told you in my action plan that I want to continue my 
education so I need to do this exam.’ So I went [for the exam] anyway. I was 
so stressed. I couldn’t sleep very well and then I did the exam and I failed.
The requirement of the course English B to apply to university studies in 
Sweden can be fulfilled by taking an evening class or a TOEFL. In Amir’s 
case, it is clear that taking a TOEFL was not the course of action that is 
expected from him during the introductory programme; he was not follow-
ing the expected procedure. Quite the contrary, according to the logic of 
the programme, he should continue to study Swedish and only later, after 
finishing the programme, would he be advised to take an English course or 
perhaps a TOEFL. In my interviews with the caseworkers, dreams of higher 
education are often taken rather lightly as long as the refugee in question 
is not already highly educated within a shortage occupation, such as medi-
cine. If discussed at all, higher education is referred to the time after the 
introductory programme. Besides, there are no funds that are earmarked 
for expenses such as the TOEFL in the budget of the SPES. According to 
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Amir, he has been financially punished by the system for not having fol-
lowed the action plan as he was engaging in a trajectory that he hopes 
will bring him closer to his aspiration for higher education. Additionally, 
the Swedish my interlocutors learn during the introductory programme is 
not enough for following an academic programme in Swedish; hence, the 
desperate attempts to improve their English. In relation to this, another of 
my interlocutors, Hassan from the West Bank, notes that Swedish language 
instruction seems less efficient than in other countries. For instance, he 
knows Palestinian students in Ukraine who only spend a year on language 
training; thereafter, they are able to continue their university studies in 
Ukrainian.
Within the SPES, enrolling in the introductory programme means being 
‘ready to follow the programme as agreed’, neither suffering too much nor 
being too agentive, too independent or too ambitious. Some individual 
initiatives, such as actively looking for internships or job opportunities, are 
praised, but only within limits. According to my interlocutors, some enter-
prises, such as Amir’s skipping Swedish classes for some weeks to study for 
an English language exam, are definitely not acceptable and even punished 
by holding back cash distributions. Other acts, like Yousef finishing his 
Swedish exam too quickly, become difficult to handle bureaucratically, even 
though on paper he does what he is supposed to. Neither should people be 
too traumatised – they should basically be governable according to the 
action plan. Such bureaucratic demands have a dampening effect on my 
informants’ ambitions and plans.
Being aware of their limited options and living with experiences sup-
pressing their dreams, the young Palestinians re-formulate their ideas about 
the future after the introductory programme. Hassan, who was mentioned 
above, has given up on a university course in academic English that he 
started. He is unemployed and dreams of going back to the Gulf state where 
he partly grew up due to his father’s work. Such dreams are at least attempts 
to indirectly ward off the risk of remaining uneducated and unemployed in 
Sweden. Amir has already tried leaving. He still hopes to start a university 
education or at least get a job according to his work experiences from 
international NGOs in Gaza, but it seems impossible in Sweden. He has 
visited the UK, Denmark, Spain and Germany trying to find a ‘suitable’ job. 
Sometimes he was successful, but then the authorities in those countries 
stopped him, since he is not a Swedish citizen and thus needs work permits 
to work in another EU country. Now he is back in Sweden and delivers 
newspapers in the early morning hours. Amir has adjusted his immediate 
plans so they are more in line with Swedish society’s expectations of him 
to hold a low-paid, low-status job.
My two other informants experience different levels of success. Rashid 
is one of four who is back to university studies after the two years at the 
introductory programme. His achievement is probably related to the fact 
that his parents had advanced university degrees from Syria, which is not 
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the case with the parents of the other three. Yousef wants to study for an 
MA in social work in English, but is, for the time being, pleased to have 
found a job. He had a temporary post at a home for unaccompanied 
minors – a job that fits his education in social work – but he now works 
in a more profitable unskilled job. This job is more desirable than the 
alternative unemployment, which would also mean continuous interaction 
with the SPES.
Conclusion
My interlocutors’ frustrations and disobedience within the Swedish intro-
ductory programme should be read as responses to a bureaucratisation 
of their daily lives that leaves little room for individual agency. In addi-
tion, they are pushed to focus on the immediate institutional requirements 
rather than their own long-term goals of higher education and upward 
social mobility. To the refugees, the programme and its content often seem 
meaningless since their dreams for the future are seldom prioritised. On 
the contrary, some of their initiatives that focus on higher education are, at 
times, punished because they are not scheduled in the programme. Events, 
such as a caseworker forgetting to send in a diploma for validation or the 
absence of accurate information about university studies in Sweden, are 
read as an institutional neglect of this group of refugees’ main aspiration, 
namely higher education. The withdrawal of cash distributions when refu-
gees concentrate on things other than learning Swedish is taken as proof 
of the caseworkers’ lack of understanding and even lack of appropriate 
professional knowledge. Dealing with their disappointments when they 
have not succeeded in taking up their studies, my interlocutors either re-
negotiate their aspirations, by becoming employed and thereby securing a 
financially ‘good life’, or by dreaming of migrating onwards, in the search 
for education and jobs. Ironically, the introductory programme, which aims 
to include refugees in Sweden, makes some give up hope of a satisfactory 
life there. Instead, they are softly impelled to fill spots in a racialised labour 
market, rather than educate themselves.
Moreover, the experiences of my interlocutors show that the institutional 
difficulties in taking the refugees’ more long-term educational goals seri-
ously are not only due to budget limits or shortage of staff, but are inter-
twined with the labelling of refugees. A refugee cannot be highly educated 
or hold ambitions to be so; it is a contradiction in terms. Within the insti-
tutional frames of the Swedish introductory programme, my informants’ 
ambitions to get a higher education and/or re-establish their former identi-
ties as professionals collide with their main reason for seeking refuge, which 
is to reach safety from political violence and persecution. Their experiences 
show that bureaucratic practices end up being a hindrance, rather than 
support.
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Notes
1 Although many Palestinians from the occupied territories are used to the hostile 
and extensive bureaucracy of the Israeli Civil Administration when, for instance, 
applying for travel permissions, family reunification or work permits, Israel does 
not intend to turn them into ‘good citizens’ or decide on their daily whereabouts. 
The Swedish introductory programme does. Israel, rather, uses its military forces 
to interfere in people’s daily routines through arbitrary decisions to block a road, 
close off a specific geographical area or refuse to let a Palestinian through a 
checkpoint despite having a valid permit (Calis, 2017).
2 They thus have previous refugee statuses with UNRWA since they belong to 
families that fled the first Israeli-Arab war in 1948. UNRWA’s ability and 
mandate to protect Palestinian refugees is, however, very limited. My interlocu-
tors travelled independently to Sweden to seek asylum.
3 A recent study, however, has pointed out that with diminishing beliefs in Pales-
tinian self-determination and in an end to Israeli occupation, many Palestinian 
youth understand education in a more instrumental manner and as a route to 
individual economic improvement (Pherali and Turner, 2018).
4 It can, however, also be argued that in practice, refugees have been more or less 
deliberately kept out of the labour market during various time periods, for 
instance by high demands on Swedish language proficiency and Swedish, rather 
than foreign, educational degrees (Schierup et al., 2006, p. 207).
5 http://arbeidslivinorden.org/artikler/insikt-og-analyse/nyheter-2015/
article.2015-05-27.1719982153.
6 Arbetsförmedlingens återrapportering 2012. Etablering av vissa nyanlända 
-samverkan och samordning, Dnr: AF-2011/414101, p. 44. Available at: https://
arbetsformedlingen.se/download/18.3e623d4f16735f3976e9be/%C3% 
85terrapport_8b_-_Etablering_av_vissa_nyanl%C3%A4nda_-_Samverkan_
och_samordning.pdf (Accessed 15 March 2020).
7 This is also clear from a special law, the so-called Gymnasielagen, which gave 
a second chance to young asylum-seekers, most from war-torn Afghanistan, in 
July 2018. Those ‘failed’ asylum-seekers with a deportation decision can stay in 
Sweden as long as they attend upper secondary school. After finishing school, 
they will have to leave unless they can find a job. The uncertain security situa-
tion in Afghanistan and any wishes for higher education are thus insignificant. 
(Khosravi, 2014 https://lesvosmosaik.org/stolen-time-shahram-khosravi/).
8 There are government-subsidised forms of employment for job-seekers consid-
ered ‘difficult to employ’ in Sweden. Normally, the employer will pay a smaller 
amount of the salary and social fees, while the SPES pays up to 80 per cent of 
the salary (Ennerberg 2017, p. 115).
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Aspiration, appreciation, and frustration: 
Syrian asylum seekers and bureaucracy  
in Germany
The university system here is very complicated and bureaucratic. In the 
German system, universities demand a 2.5 GPA. That is 80–85 per cent in 
the Syrian system. The student who is ranked number one in all of Syria got 
80 per cent. I graduated from university in Syria with a GPA of 70 per cent, 
which is very good for the system there. But here they do not understand the 
difference in the systems. They recognize my degree, but with bad grades. I 
am trying to resolve the issue. I finished taking German. Now I am looking 
for a university that accepts a GPA that is less than 2.5 in the German system. 
… We are not here for money. I am an educated person and I am trying to 
learn more. I have dignity here, but I am trying to increase it by finding my 
own job. I do not want assistance from the state. I am looking forward to 
such a day when I earn a living by myself. I now have to compete with people 
who are more qualified in terms of language and high degrees. I am seeking 
those things, too. I will get my Master’s and then I will show them what I 
can do. (Bilal, Tübingen, Germany)
On 21 August 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel invited Syrian 
refugees to Germany when her government suspended the de-facto policy 
(the Dublin system, see the Introduction of this volume) of sending asylum 
seekers back to their European country of entry. Against this backdrop, 
asylum applications exceeded one million in 2015–2016. The plurality of 
those attaining refugee or subsidiary protection status was Syrian.
In granting asylum, the German state was not only extending legal pro-
tection to individuals fleeing violence and persecution, but also social 
welfare provisions to meet their essential needs and support their integra-
tion into society and the labour market. The subsequent sweeping govern-
ment expenditures have fed debates preoccupied with distinguishing 
‘deserving’ war refugees worthy of care from ‘undeserving’ migrants exploit-
ing state largesse (Holzberg et al., 2018). German Interior Minister Thomas 
de Maizière spoke for many citizens in suspecting that generous benefits 
were a major ‘pull-factor’ attracting refugees in the first place (Bröcker and 
Kessler, 2017; Staudenmaier, 2017). Critics denounced his words, insisting 
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that Germany’s social transfers simply matched its high cost of living (Die 
Welt, 2017), and that welfare benefits still left many refugees below the 
poverty line (Bierbach, 2017).
These and other host society perspectives can be traced in press 
debates, public opinion surveys, and political party rhetoric. We know 
less, however, about the different ways that refugees and asylum seekers 
themselves are debating their encounters with the social welfare state. 
This chapter probes this spectrum of experiences and evaluations. Ana-
lysing my interviews and field research with Syrian asylum seekers in 
Germany since 2016, I find two powerful yet contradictory sentiments. 
On the one hand, many Syrians voice a keen appreciation for the social 
services and the ways that they aid their new lives in Europe. On the other 
hand, many articulate intense frustration with the bureaucratization of 
daily life.
At first glance, the identification of appreciation and frustration as prom-
inent strands in asylum seekers’ encounter with social welfare bureaucracies 
might seem to affirm the discourse of ‘refugee gratitude’. That is, it can be 
read as insinuating that refugees’ primary orientation toward states and 
societies should be one of thanks, and that a major problem in state–refugee 
relations lies in refugees’ failure to be grateful. Scholarly and popular 
writing has rightfully criticized such constructs, arguing that humanitarian 
protection is not a gift but an obligation (Nayeri, 2017). They suggest that 
viewing it otherwise reproduces demeaning hierarchies that subordinate 
refugees to dependency (Moulin, 2012), if not a tyrannical paternalism or 
eternal debt (D’Cruz, 2014).
Gratitude, however, is not the only lens with which to understand appre-
ciation and frustration with the welfare state. Offering a different perspec-
tive, I argue that asylum seekers are primarily motivated by desires to 
rebuild their lives and pursue their dreams for a better future. Attention to 
the intensity of such personal, professional, and educational aspirations can 
help us see that asylum seekers do not seek social welfare for its own sake, 
and that their struggles with state bureaucracy relate to concerns much 
larger than the mere hassle of paperwork and red tape. As Bilal’s testimony 
illustrates, many asylum seekers’ appreciation for social welfare stems 
chiefly from its power to facilitate realization of their hopes and ambitions. 
Their frustration, on the flip side, flows from the violence that it does to 
those ambitions (see also chapter 9). Exploration of these ways that aspira-
tion drives asylum seekers’ experiences of appreciation and frustration 
allows us to detach these very real sentiments from discourses implying that 
refugees are powerless, voiceless, and passive receivers of help. Instead, it 
allows us to interpret those sentiments with respect for refugees’ agency as 
political beings who critically evaluate state practices no less than do citi-
zens, and who similarly appraise them in the context of their own drive to 
be productive members of society.
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This chapter explores these arguments in five parts. The first establishes 
the context for this analysis by using published sources to provide an over-
view of Germany’s social welfare system and bureaucratic landscape, as it 
pertains to asylum seekers. The second section briefly presents my research 
methodology. The third section uses testimonials from a cross-section of 
Syrian asylum seekers to illustrate how personal aspirations for a better 
future shape sentiments of appreciation for German social welfare. The 
fourth section shows how the same aspirations produce and shape asylum 
seekers’ articulations of frustration with social welfare bureaucracies. The 
final section concludes with reflections on what analysis of the linkages 
between aspiration, appreciation, and frustration can teach us about both 
asylum seekers’ lived experiences and European social welfare bureaucracy 
in general.
Social welfare and bureaucracy: key domains for asylum seekers
Syrian asylum seekers’ interactions with the social welfare state begin 
almost immediately upon arrival in Germany. Upon submitting an asylum 
application, asylum seekers receive a temporary residency identity card 
while the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (BAMF) evaluates their 
applications. As few asylum seekers have income to cover their own 
expenses, federal states provide asylum seekers with ‘basic benefits for food, 
housing, heating, clothing, healthcare and personal hygiene, and household 
durables and consumables; benefits to cover personal daily requirements 
(cash and “pocket money”); benefits in case of sickness, pregnancy and 
birth; as well as further benefits which depend on the individual case under 
special circumstances’ (BAMF, 2018).
As they await a decision on their asylum applications, most asylum 
seekers’ principal encounter with the German social welfare landscape is 
their assignment to live in a reception centre for their first three months 
(Laubenthal, 2016). As long as asylum seekers live in reception facilities, 
basic benefits are typically provided as benefits-in-kind, such as meals and 
donated second-hand clothing (BAMF, 2018). Some states provide shelter-
dwellers with an additional cash allowance (Deutsche Welle, 2017; Treve-
lyan, 2018). The asylum application review process often takes longer than 
these three months. For example, Syrians waited an average of 7.1 months 
from arrival in Germany to receipt of their asylum decision in 2016, a wait-
time that rose to 10.7 months in 2017 (Deutsche Welle, 2018).
Once asylum seekers’ applications are reviewed, their relationships to 
the social welfare state evolve. Of 295,040 decisions on Syrian asylum 
applications in 2016, the state granted 56 per cent refugee status, which 
offered a three-year residence permit with rights to apply for family reuni-
fication. It granted 41 per cent of Syrian applicants subsidiary protection, 
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which entailed a one-year residence permit that was extendable for two 
years and carried no eligibility for family reunification during a transitional 
period (BAMF, 2017).
Once granted asylum or subsidiary protection, individuals receive social 
welfare and unemployment benefits according to the same general rubrics 
as German citizens. Meanwhile, they begin a relationship with another 
key component of the social welfare state: education. The law requires 
children of those seeking asylum to attend school after three months in the 
country. Since 2016, the government has also offered integration classes to 
asylum seekers ‘from countries with good prospects to remain’, even when 
they have yet to be granted asylum. Syria was included in this category 
(while many countries well represented among asylum seekers were not). 
Integration courses consist of 600 hours of German language instruction 
and 30 hours of orientation focused on Germany’s history, culture, and 
legal system. New legislation in 2016 went further in making integration 
courses not only more available, but also obligatory. Still, in some places 
language courses remained oversubscribed and undersupplied (Rietig,  
2016).
Language learning is crucial for both everyday life and for integration 
into the German work force. In 2016, to expedite asylum seekers’ engage-
ment in ‘meaningful work’, the federal government announced its plan to 
create 100,000 ‘One Euro Jobs’. These invited asylum seekers to do tasks 
such as laundry, cleaning, or food distribution in reception centres for a 
one-euro-per-hour supplement to their default welfare benefits (Deutsche 
Welle, 2016). The scheme was met with as much criticism as praise (Agence 
France-Presse, 2018) and, as of November 2016, only 4,392 asylum seekers 
were employed in such jobs (Deutsche Welle, 2016).
Until September 2013, asylum applicants had to wait one year for appli-
cations to be processed before being allowed access to the labour market. 
That time limit was later reduced to nine months and, in 2014, to three 
months (Information Network on Asylum and Migration, n.d.). The state 
allowed asylum seekers to apply for training courses after three months of 
residence and for funding for job training programmes after fifteen months 
(The Federal Chancellor, 2016). In accessing such resources, individuals 
who have been granted asylum, like unemployed citizens, access help from 
the Federal Employment Agency. The Agency provides services such as 
career counselling and assistance with job and training placement. Never-
theless, many asylum seekers find it very difficult to find employment. As 
of January 2018, 143,000 refugees were officially employed in Germany, 
while 482,000 refugees were registered at state agencies as searching for 
jobs (Klaus and Kriegbaum, 2018).
Language proficiency is a significant hurdle to employment, as basic 
German is necessary even for low-level positions (Breitenbach, 2016, see 
also chapter 9). Recognizing this problem, the federal government funded 
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an extra 100,000 seats in job-related language classes, which provide refu-
gees with German training beyond standard integration courses (Trines, 
2017). It also launched a four-year, EUR 100 million initiative to bolster 
refugees’ access to university education (Federal Ministry for Education and 
Research, 2015). This campaign included measures to improve recognition 
of students’ existing competencies, expand linguistic and technical pre-
paredness, and support integration into universities. This effort included 
increased advising; expanding opportunities for testing in foreign languages; 
funding of up to 10,000 new seats in preparatory colleges and institutions 
serving as pathways to German universities; improved online information 
about educational opportunities in multiple languages; and increased access 
to government student loans.
These and other measures illustrate the German government’s efforts to 
meet asylum seekers’ needs in the wake of the ‘refugee crisis’. How have 
Syrians experienced both the benefits that the social welfare state extends 
and the bureaucratic hang-ups that they often carry?
Methodology
The chapter is based on approximately seven months of fieldwork in 
Germany in the summers of 2016, 2017, and 2018, during which I con-
ducted ninety interviews with Syrian asylum seekers and refugees. This built 
upon a larger ongoing project in which I have interviewed more than 400 
Syrians in eight countries in the Middle East, Europe, and North America 
since 2012 (Pearlman, 2017a; Pearlman, 2017b). I identified interviewees 
using snowball sampling (Goodman, 2011), employing multiple entry 
points into different social networks in different towns to obtain as diverse 
a sample as possible. To this end, I made use of the robust, cross-continental 
linkages that I have established with displaced Syrians over the years. I also 
met Syrians through consultation with German colleagues, volunteer work 
at refugee shelters, participation in a range of civil society activities targeting 
newcomers, and attendance at Syrian-organised events.
My interviews, all but a few in Arabic, ranged from twenty-minute one-
on-one conversations, to group discussions involving several individuals 
over hours, to oral histories recorded over days. Interviews were open-
ended; I usually began with a general prompt that invited interviewees to 
speak about their lives. While I did not set out to learn specifically about 
their experiences with German social welfare and bureaucracy, I was struck 
by the extent to which such issues emerged spontaneously in our conversa-
tions. The information that they relayed in this context is valuable because 
open-ended interviews create spaces for people to raise concerns, feelings, 
and experiences that researchers might not think to elicit in questionnaires 
(Patterson and Monroe, 1998).
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Still, individuals’ post-hoc explanations of their actions can carry deliber-
ate or inadvertent misrepresentations, harden into social scripts, or assert 
lofty motivations rather than admit to base ones. I thus analyse narratives 
with an ethnographic sensibility, in the sense of seeking to glean the meaning 
of behaviour to the actors involved (Schatz, 2009, p. 5). I have developed 
the knowledge with which to do so through my general immersion in 
Syrian refugee communities during fieldwork. Multi-site, cross-temporal 
participant-observation has given me a bedrock of context in which to make 
sense of individuals’ self-reporting. Beyond this, I compare my interview data 
to a range of published sources, including journalistic reports and essays by 
Syrian writers. These published materials, cited in this chapter where appro-
priate, allow me to confirm that my interlocutors’ reflections resonate with 
those of an exponentially larger number of Syrian asylum seekers.
Aspiration and appreciation
Ahmed, an unmarried thirty-something from Homs with a vocational trade, 
recounted two years of life in a town in the former East Germany, where, 
on the one hand, he experienced the joy of new Syrian friendships made in 
exile and on the other, the indignities of racist slurs endured on public 
transport. These and other experiences, however, paled beside what he 
insisted was the dominant force guiding both his new life in Germany and 
that of his compatriot asylum seekers: the aspiration to rebuild, achieve, 
and live dignified lives:
We are driven to improve ourselves. Some are studying in university, and some 
have already finished language courses. You can see them in every step in life. 
This one is trying to get a place in a school. That one is a dentist, but is 
working as a physician’s assistant so he can learn medical vocabulary. Another 
one is trying to find an internship, and is working as a car mechanic. People 
are everywhere. They won’t just stay at home. They started again from zero, 
but didn’t give up. The first reason for all of this is that people love life. The 
second is people’s desire to build and improve themselves. I will be nothing 
if I just live here as a refugee. But if I get an education or finish learning the 
language, I’ll improve myself and be someone of value to society. I believe 
that’s people’s only motivation to keep going like this … We’re hoping for a 
better future. We’re all living on hope.
This aspiration structures a bedrock of appreciation for German social 
welfare services that I heard expressed repeatedly in my conversations with 
Syrian asylum seekers from different walks of life. For many, goals for 
personal advancement or growth, and the sense that the welfare state could 
facilitate realization of those goals, was what drove them to undertake great 
costs to try to get to Germany in the first place. This was a particularly 
common sentiment among Syrians who spent months or years living in one 
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of the countries on Syria’s borders before embarking on dangerous journeys 
to Europe. Mohammed, a young engineer from Damascus, described his 
life in Istanbul, where he worked long hours, was laughed at and exploited 
by others in the office, and still barely earned enough to get by. A young 
newlywed in the prime of life, Mohammed found life in Turkey to be a 
deadening cycle of work-sleep-work with no possibility of improving his 
lot. Information that reached him about Germany convinced him that the 
social welfare allowed greater chances to achieve his ambitions:
Salaries [in Turkey] are very low, but expenses are the same as in Germany. 
I earned 400 euros per month and paid 300 for rent. So my wife and I had 
100 euros left to live on. It was very difficult. My goal was to continue my 
education, but there was no way in Turkey. I tried to study at university and 
found that they needed 20,000 Turkish liras over two or three years, which 
is the equivalent to 6,000 euros per year. My salary was one hundred euros, 
what was left after the rent. How could I study? I tried to apply to language 
schools but they asked about 200 euros per month. I couldn’t do it. My work 
was from eight in the morning until six in the evening. There was no money, 
no time, no way to study … I heard that here [in Germany] education is 
almost free. They teach you the language, they put you in a house and so on 
… So I decided that either I live in humiliation in Turkey or I grab my future 
in Germany.
For Mohammed, the promise of social welfare was its delivery from a life 
of humiliation to one that offered a future. In his telling, free education is 
not an end in itself, but a means to the end of building a life that fulfilled 
his potential. The yearning for such opportunity was a main driver of his 
decision to risk his life on a dinghy across the Mediterranean in 2015.
I found similar expressions of appreciation for the social welfare state, 
and its role in facilitating life aspirations, among Syrian refugees after they 
had settled in Germany. Yusra, a mother from Aleppo, had stopped her 
formal education in primary school before gaining basic literacy. Having 
arrived in Germany after a perilous journey alone with three children, she 
was thankful for the range of provisions that the welfare state offered her 
family. What she appreciated most, however, was the educational opportu-
nities made available to refugees and the future that she hoped it would 
enable her children to attain:
The most wonderful thing here is the schools. They take really good care of 
kids. They teach them until they understand … Also, they help them with 
their homework. It’s so different from schools in Syria. In Syria, if you didn’t 
do your homework, you’d be beaten. And at the end of the year, the student 
passes, even if he was lazy and didn’t understand anything. Just to get rid of 
him. Here, they’ll teach the kid until he understands. They know that there’s 
something that can come out of him … I hope that my daughter will be an 
engineer or a doctor one day. I’m also going to school, and I started to learn 
the letters.
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Yusra was one of many who emphasized how the services they enjoyed in 
Germany surpassed those that they had known back home, regardless of 
rhetoric about socialism and a social safety net in Ba’ath party-ruled Syria 
(Perthes, 1995). Several of my interlocutors similarly compared German 
state practices to their experiences of the state in Syria, and grounded their 
appreciation for the former in their assessment of the shortcomings of the 
latter. ‘It’s very good to have a system and make sure that no one is above 
the law’, Fadi, a student from Swayda, said about his encounters with the 
German state. Others made similar nods to the principles of fairness, rule-
abiding, and equal treatment – the benefits of bureaucracy as described by 
Max Weber and values among those most prized by public administration 
in Germany (Zudeick, 2012). By contrast, many people with whom I spoke 
regarded corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, legalistic harassments, and 
general disrespect toward citizens as synonymous with Syrian government 
bureaucracy. Back home, in other words, many experienced negative dimen-
sions of bureaucracy as a vehicle for illegitimate use of state power. In 
Germany, they experienced some positive aspects of bureaucracy as a system 
regulating legitimate uses of state power. This safeguarded persons’ basic 
rights and security, but also removed arbitrariness and abuses that distorted 
meritocracy, and created a fairer playing field on which individuals could 
pursue their ambitions. As Mohammed the engineer put it, ‘Here there is 
hard work. People don’t cheat, they don’t trick people. They don’t say one 
thing and do another. I see that I can build something here.’
Others of my Syrian interlocutors assessed Germany’s social welfare state 
favourably, not only in comparison to Syria, but also relative to other 
countries in the Global North. Kareem escaped Syria for Jordan, where he 
continued his work as a doctor until increasingly restrictive conditions 
convinced him that he needed to take his family elsewhere. He received a 
visa to the US and spent ten days there exploring options for asylum. He 
discovered that the relative lack of social assistance for those who receive 
asylum, as for residents and citizens in general, would make it extremely 
difficult for him to survive the transition period requisite for him to become 
certified again as a physician, no less a surgeon. Kareem thus travelled 
onward to Germany, where he immediately requested protection as a dis-
placed Syrian. Assigned to a shelter, he studied general German and then 
medical German, worked as a guest auditor at a local hospital, and was 
eventually invited to work at a hospital on a one-month, unpaid trial. The 
social welfare benefits that he received as an asylum seeker enabled him 
and his family to get by during these many months with minimal or no 
wages. Pleased with his performance, the hospital offered him a full posi-
tion. Now a licensed doctor, he reflected on the social welfare state:
I am doing my duty in the best way I can in this country. Thank God I have 
been fortunate enough to do that. The taxes we pay are very high. I sometimes 
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pay 45 per cent of my paycheque in taxes. Plus, you have to pay an extra 20 
per cent in taxes on everything you buy. On the other hand, the social security 
here is excellent. For example, if I get injured, I will stay at home and get my 
full paycheque, and the government will help … In the US you won’t get that. 
Here, when receiving treatment, a janitor and a doctor lay down on cots next 
to each other. Life here is very comfortable and affordable … Those with high 
salaries pay more in taxes than from those with low salaries. There is a true 
sense of social equality, and an even stronger sense of social security. [This 
system] really deserves respect.
Kareem’s appreciation for social welfare was grounded in the ways that 
it helped him rebuild the life upturned by war in Syria and continue to 
grow his personal, professional, and familial dreams. Many others I spoke 
with echoed his eagerness to ‘give back’ to Germany, not least by being 
a taxpayer. Fadi, the student, fled Syria before finishing his degree, and 
was enrolled in German classes in hopes of resuming higher education: 
‘The most important thing that Germany gave me is a chance to live’, he 
explained. ‘I want to work here and pay taxes.’ Mustafa, a man from a 
working-class background who did not finish high school, expressed this 
sentiment dramatically: ‘Germany has done more for me than anyone else 
ever did. It gave me more than even my own mother and father could give 
me.’ He invoked an expression in Arabic along the lines of, ‘If someone 
looks at you with one eye, look back at them with two eyes’, meaning that, 
when someone helps, you should return the help several times over. That, 
he explained, was his attitude toward Germany.
I re-emphasize that these sentiments were not merely ‘gratitude’ as sug-
gested by the discourses that refugees are powerless receivers who should 
thank host states for their generosity. Rather, they give voice to agency, 
ambition, and a yearning to build productive futures. These Syrians looked 
forward to paying taxes, not simply to reimburse a debt, but because it 
signified dignity, independence, and participation as full members of society. 
In other words, their appreciation for social welfare was grounded in their 
aspiration to construct futures in which they were not dependent on social 
welfare.
Frustration and the bureaucratization of daily life
The flipside of appreciation for social welfare is frustration with the bureau-
cratic burdens that often accompany its provision. Just as many asylum 
seekers value welfare assistance due to its ability to facilitate realization of 
their goals, so can they sometimes feel that red tape and interminable 
waiting thwart those very hopes and dreams.
For the more than 325,000 asylum seekers arriving in Germany during 
the second half of 2015, the shock of bureaucracy came when ‘logistical 
nightmares’ required people to wait outside for days before they could 
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even submit their asylum applications. ‘It took me forty days even to enter 
the building’, Ghayth told me of his experience in Berlin. ‘I got a number, 
and then it took another thirty days for my number to show up on the 
screen.’
Asylum seekers’ frustrations with bureaucracy evolved with their interac-
tions with the multiple organs managing social welfare provisions in various 
realms of everyday need. For example, the social welfare state covered rent 
for independent housing. Nevertheless, tight housing markets could make 
it difficult to find affordable rentals. In addition, refugees’ apartment 
searches were encumbered by complex rental rules and the need to pull 
together a considerable amount of paperwork to submit a rental application 
(Anwalt.org, n.d.). If asylum seekers managed to obtain a rental agreement, 
they then had to obtain approval from the appropriate social services office, 
which might be any number of different agencies, depending on asylum 
seekers’ stage in the process. All of this could be so time-consuming that 
asylum seekers frequently lost the desired apartment in the interim (Bakir, 
2015). I met Sami when he was completing his first year living in an emer-
gency shelter that is an inflated structure dubbed ‘the balloon’. He put the 
experience of bureaucratic red tape in these terms:
If a miracle happens and you’re able to find a room in a shared apartment, 
then you go to the Immigration Office to submit the paperwork. They’ll tell 
you to come back in two weeks. And then if a second miracle happens and the 
landlord agrees to wait for you, then you go back to the Immigration Office, 
and they study your application for another month. And then if God really 
loves you, you’ll get approved. So the whole process takes one-and-a-half to 
two months. But the problem is that no apartment is going to wait that long 
for you. There is a long list of other people who also want that room.
For Sami, like the dozens of others who described their time in shelters as 
among their most demoralizing life experiences, the problem with bureau-
cracy was not that it required time and paperwork. Rather, frustration came 
from the intensity of his desire to re-establish a life of normalcy, stability, 
and dignity, and the sense that bureaucratic obstacles blocked the path 
towards the achievement of those goals. I heard similar reflections from 
Sarah, a trained librarian who was working as a volunteer at a library in 
Germany for nearly a year. The uncertain hope that her work might trans-
form into a paid position was the source of a considerable amount of worry. 
Her greatest source of pressure, however, was keeping up with the everyday 
paperwork demanded by the social welfare state:
We’ve been here for two years, and we’ve been running the whole time. The 
day starts and ends, and you’re always stressed, always running. The paper-
work, the courses … All the [refugees] here are very active. We’re not just 
sitting doing nothing. And still, you feel that the results don’t amount to 
much.
190 Refugees and the violence of welfare bureaucracies
Nour described similar frustration with the health care bureaucracy, while 
also mentioning linguistic issues that compounded the challenge. For years, 
her English fluency had enabled her to hold her own as a professional 
working with international agencies. In navigating the German welfare 
bureaucracy, however, the expectation of German proficiency added further 
difficulty to those of complicated authorizations and delays:
If you want to go to a doctor, you have to wait and wait. And make appoint-
ments. And wait again … And then there’s the issue of language. You have 
to prepare what to say when you talk on the phone. You can’t make mistakes. 
I freak out … I always thought of English as my ‘exit’ language that can 
connect me with anyone else, but that has become useless in Germany. They 
know that you’re not a tourist and they want you to learn German. Try to 
speak English in official governmental places. [They’ll respond], ‘Deutsch 
bitte’ [i.e. ‘German, please’].
Here again, the expectation of German language was not frustrating for 
its own sake as much as for its role in adding a touch of indignity to a 
situation in which the difficulties of meeting basic needs already seemed 
to hamper aspirations for building a new life. In my conversations with 
asylum seekers, I heard the most intense frustrations of this sort with regard 
to the bureaucratic obstacles to labour market access. Yahya, a journalist 
whose writing featured keen observation of the challenges of newcom-
ers in Germany, reflected on his compatriots’ aspirations and aspirations 
stymied:
There are two main things the refugee asks about once he enters Germany: 
‘Will I be able to find a job’ and ‘Will I be able to continue studying?’ … The 
refugees who come here don’t come just to eat and drink. They want to work 
and to build a life. But the situation here is hopeless. There are many job 
opportunities in Germany. The problem is that the labour market is filled with 
so many complexities … There are many people from Syria who have excel-
lent experience, but can’t find a job here because their certificates are not 
accepted, or they require something additional, or they need to attend training 
courses for years. So many people decide not to work in their careers any 
more … Instead you’ll find many of them working as security guards. You 
can’t blame someone like that. He needs to live. In Syria, he was an engineer, 
or a manger, or had his own business, or had a clinic, or worked in a hospital. 
But he needs to work now to be able to live. He’s fed up of living off the Job 
Centre [the official name of the German employment agency] … There’re so 
many people who have good experience, but no one will hire them without 
first going through more training. I know many people like these, and they 
are losing their ambition to work. They’re just hoping that their kids will 
grow up and go to work. Technically those people have no life. They’re just 
numbers. They’re doing nothing, except going to the supermarket or walking 
the streets or getting into arguments with their families. In Syria, their lives 
were whole. Here, life is empty.
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As Yahya suggests, state requirement of official certification of degrees, 
trainings, and other qualifications erect significant bureaucratic obstacles to 
refugees’ entry into the work force, and thus their ability to fulfil their 
aspirations for occupational fulfilment and economic independence. Par-
ticularly confounding in this regard is Germany’s apprenticeship system, 
whereby complex rules and standards require workers in dozens of areas 
to complete three-year vocational courses and pass exams in order to work 
legally. This system creates a layer of obstacles for refugees, many of whom 
had worked for years back home without formal instruction, often learning 
their craft from a young age in a family business. Lacking paperwork to 
verify their past experience or training, some face the choice of starting over 
with an apprenticeship alongside much younger novices, working in the 
‘black market’, or abandoning their trade completely. Fadi gave voice to a 
sense of bewilderment that he and other acquaintances had with these 
administrative constraints:
Here, everyone needs papers. Even carpenters, painters, and so on … I know 
many people who are very talented in the work they did in Syria, but don’t 
have any sort of certificate because they didn’t need it there … The system 
here is so different … Most people don’t even know where to start. Like if I 
have an idea … or you just want to try something, you’re not sure who are 
the right authorities to contact.
Frustration was thus less to do with the sheer magnitude of the bureaucracy 
than with its discouraging impact on asylum seekers’ ambitions. This frus-
tration co-existed with appreciation for the considerable funds that the 
German government was dedicating toward refugees’ education and job 
training. Feras, an aspiring IT specialist, described this duality of excitement 
for state-made opportunities and dismay with bureaucratic hang-ups:
I got an internship at a telecommunications company. I was there three 
months and I learned so much. They really liked me and they offered me a 
job. But I can’t work until I get my residency permit, and I’m still waiting for 
it. A sister company also offered me a job. They said I could do another 
internship from September until December. They’re willing to pay me, but the 
law allows you to have only one paid internship, and I already had one.
The sum of this red tape leaves many asylum seekers feeling that they 
devote the bulk of their first years in Germany to dealing with bureaucracy. 
This causes frustration first and foremost when they feel that they put on 
hold their larger ambitions in order to recover what they have lost and 
achieve new things. Starting a new life and learning the ropes of a new 
system is not simply difficult because it is different and time-consuming. 
Resonating with other chapters in this volume, it is difficult because the 
encounter does violence to the refugees’ dreams and ability to rebuild digni-
fied lives.
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Conclusion
Syrian newcomers’ experiences of appreciation and frustration with the 
social welfare bureaucracy form a critical part of their everyday lives, and 
no understanding of their settlement in Germany is complete without it. 
Using interviews to probe those experiences, I have traced them to asylum 
seekers’ overarching ambitions to reconstitute their lives and accomplish 
new goals. In doing so, I have grounded asylum seekers’ position vis-à-vis 
the welfare state in a framework not of gratitude, but of aspiration.
Scrutiny of the linkages between aspiration, appreciation, and frustration 
can help us investigate refugee integration as a lived process. European 
politicians and publics are engaged in intense debates regarding what inte-
gration should entail and who bears responsibility for its success or failure. 
Some of these debates are based on assumptions about cultural clashes 
rather than grounded listening. Prioritising the latter, I have turned the 
spotlight on refugee encounters with welfare bureaucracy because it emerged 
as a recurring topic in open-ended conversations with refugees about their 
lives. Work with such an orientation can shift the study of integration from 
the realm of the conceptual to the practical, and thereby allows us to trace 
the quotidian operations of public policy and state–society relations as they 
truly unfold in offices, classrooms, homes, and the lives of ordinary people.
Beyond this, study of asylum seekers’ encounters with social welfare 
states can shed light on the social welfare state itself. In interacting with a 
conspicuously different system, newcomers might observe, experience, feel, 
and articulate aspects of that system which might be buried, subdued, taken 
for granted, or simply unnoticed by locals too accustomed to those aspects 
to regard them as noteworthy. What strikes newcomers as triggering appre-
ciation or frustration, or countless other reactions, can thus bring to the fore 
norms, practices, and institutions that are otherwise obscured due to their 
sheer normality for native-born society. In this way, research on refugees’ 
interactions with social welfare states not only yields understandings about 
newcomers to Northern Europe but can teach us about Europe, as well.
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The trauma of waiting: understanding the 
violence of the benevolent welfare state  
in Norway
Bisrat, a refugee from Eritrea, was granted asylum in Norway after a rela-
tively short waiting period of ten months. However, it took another two 
years before he was settled in a municipality. Asked about how he experi-
enced his time in the reception centre after he was granted asylum, Bisrat 
answered as follows:
It completely changed my behaviour. It is difficult when you have to spend 
three years of your life waiting for something. It is a very expensive time. 
Nothing means anything. … I like joking, playing, sharing experiences. I had 
a book club in my home country. I liked to read books and watch movies, 
share experiences with my friends. Those times are gone. It affects you emo-
tionally, completely. You see people coming and going and you ask yourself 
‘What did I do to spend three years here?’ I got a chance to go to school, a 
chance to communicate with people. I got many chances when I was in the 
first reception centre, but the biggest question for me was this: The system 
says that once a person gets his papers, he is supposed to leave the reception 
centre, to be settled in a municipality, to start his life. My life was stalled in 
the reception centre, waiting for the next chapter to begin. My next chapter 
was stalled in the asylum centre.
He continues:
I did not expect things to be like this in Norway. Things were really difficult 
in my home country. I saw the worst things. I do not expect to be forgotten 
in a reception centre in a free country in Europe, especially not in Norway. I 
say that maybe they forgot me. I know the government declared that there 
was a lack of houses. Shelter and food are basic priorities in life. … But life 
means more than that. I hurt myself two or three times. I did not talk to 
anyone. Sometimes you stop breathing, stop thinking, your dream is crushed. 
Everything stops, for three years.
Norway’s welfare system has historically been conceived as inherently good 
and caring (Vike et al., 2016). An institutional apparatus is in place to host 
asylum seekers and integrate refugees as so-called, ‘new citizens’. After a 
short transit, asylum seekers are placed in ordinary reception centres. These 
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are characterised as ‘simple accommodations’ [nøktern botilbud], which 
should secure the inhabitants’ basic needs and security (UDI Rundskriv RS 
2008-031). Such centres are either centralised, that is refugees living in the 
same building as the camp administration – former hotels, schools or other 
institutions, or decentralised, in which case the refugees and asylum seekers 
are allocated ordinary flats or houses in vicinity to the camp administration. 
Such decentralised reception centres are usually preferred, as the refugees 
live an (almost) normal life integrated in the local community. Asylum 
seekers have the right to 250 hours of Norwegian classes and activities 
organised by the reception centre. After they are granted asylum, refugees 
are to be settled in a municipality within six months, and are enrolled in 
an intensive and comprehensive introductory programme, which lasts about 
two years. Settlement procedures within the Norwegian system are based 
on a collaboration between state institutions and municipalities (Djuve and 
Kavli, 2007), with municipalities having relative discretionary power to 
choose how many and what kind of refugees they want to resettle (Weiss 
et al., 2017). The governments’ expressed aim is to have a speedy process 
and to resettle the refugees as quickly as possible. Due to organisational 
and bureaucratic shortcomings of the system, however, refugees have to 
wait up to several years until a suitable municipality is found and they may 
be settled. In fact, refugees spend on average more than 600 days in recep-
tion centres from the day of their first admission to Norway until their 
settlement in municipalities (Weiss et al., 2017). Much of this waiting time 
is spent after refugees have been granted asylum, and refugees with a resi-
dence permit make up a third of the population in Norwegian reception 
centres (UDI, 2017).
From the perspective of the Norwegian ethnic majority, the link between 
welfare and violence might seem at odds. However, we do know that 
modern secular states, committed to preventing pain and suffering, abandon 
specific groups of citizens (Biehl, 2004; Povinelli, 2011) and generate per-
vasive forms of exclusion and violence (Asad, 2003; Mahmood, 2015). In 
this chapter, I explore the experiences of refugees who have been waiting 
in reception centres for years, investigate how this waiting is experienced, 
and question whether and how their experience in the reception centres 
affects their relationship to the Norwegian state. As the initial quote by 
Bisrat already indicates, I argue that refugees waiting for resettlement often 
experience the welfare state as imponderable, negligent and, at times, as 
utterly violent.
In referring to violence, I explore the ordinary, chronic and cruddy quasi-
events (Povinelli, 2011; Das, 2015), situations that are experienced as dif-
ficult or exhausting (Kublitz, 2015). I therefore tease out three factors which 
contribute to aggravating the experience of waiting as existential insecurity 
(Haas, 2017). I first explore the camp as a waiting zone in which time seems 
lost. I then explore how the absence of family members, the fear for their 
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safety and the longing for their arrival not only increase insecurity but also 
prolong the refugees’ sense of waiting. Finally, I link the two factors above 
to the refugees’ experience of the state. Refugees and immigrants who are 
subjected to the integration bureaucracy in the Scandinavian welfare states 
feel trapped in a vicious circle created by bureaucratic rules that they can 
neither understand nor escape from (Khosravi, 2009; Whyte, 2011). 
Whereas refugees may acknowledge attempts at empathy and care from 
street-level bureaucrats, the bureaucratic system often resembles a Kaf-
kaesque state bureaucracy rather than a benevolent welfare state.
The refugees I am writing about had received resident permits and, as 
such, had a secure future in Norway. However, this future was indefinitely 
far away, as the refugees were waiting to be settled, and their lives were 
put on hold. Many refugees describe this waiting period as extremely dif-
ficult and stressful, as we see in the quotes from Bisrat (see also chapter 10 
above). In the following pages, I describe refugees’ reports of severe stress, 
mental illness, depression and hopelessness. Such symptoms cannot only be 
traced back to their traumatic experiences in their country of origin or 
during flight. Waiting in the refugee camp, the inability to build a future 
and the frustration over wasted time are often experienced as equally trau-
matic as the trauma of war and refuge (Berg et al., 2005; Laban et al., 
2008). Being made to wait has been analysed as a demonstration of power 
(Bourdieu, 2000), a technology of governance, as power is effectuated 
through its exercise over other people’s time and in how they are made to 
wait (Auyero, 2012; Janeja and Bandak, 2018, p. 4). It is also a weapon to 
make existence intolerable for certain groups of people (Gaibazzi, 2012). 
Therefore, researchers have argued that the uncertainty inherent in waiting 
is not an accidental aspect of the immigration detention system, but intrinsic 
to its functioning (Whyte, 2011; Griffiths, 2013; Turnbull, 2016). Ironically, 
some would argue, the Norwegian government has acknowledged the long 
waiting period of refugees as very unfortunate and as a hindrance to inte-
gration (Stortingsmelding, 2015–2016). Reducing the time spent in recep-
tion centres after asylum has been granted is, therefore, one of its prioritised 
immigration practices. Until now, however, this priority has had very little 
success.
Methodology
This chapter is the result of a larger mixed-method project conducted in 
2015–2016. The project was funded by the Norwegian Directorate of 
Immigration to explore the short- and long-term structural effects of long 
stays in reception centres after asylum had been granted (Weiss et al., 2017, 
Weiss and Gren, forthcoming). Even though the ethnographic research 
partly coincided with the construction of the refugee crisis in 2015, the 
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latter had but little significance for this research. After all, the project 
focuses on refugees who had come to Norway prior to 2015 and who had 
already spent a considerable amount of time in Norwegian asylum centres.
This chapter is based on the qualitative part of the research, which was 
conducted by the author and Wendy Hamelink. We conducted ethnographic 
interviews with thirty-four refugees, half of whom had already been settled 
in municipalities whereas the other half were still waiting in reception 
centres. With the exception of six refugees who had managed to find a 
municipality on their own, the refugees had waited between two months 
and more than three years, with an average waiting period of sixteen 
months, after receiving their residence permit. We also interviewed thirty-
five street-level bureaucrats working with refugees in Norwegian asylum 
centres, municipalities and the Directorate of Immigration. Their experi-
ences and reflections have been explored elsewhere (Weiss and Gren, forth-
coming) and only serve as background information in this chapter. In order 
to control for the way structural frames impact waiting, we selected refugees 
from six municipalities in three different regions in Norway. We also 
recruited refugees from different types of reception centres (centralised, 
decentralised, and those which offered housing to people with special 
needs). Interestingly, however, the type of reception centre had little impact 
on the waiting experiences, a fact which confirmed the importance of 
waiting in and of itself. Initial contact with the refugees was established 
through the reception centres and municipalities in which they had been 
settled. In addition, we used personal networks and snowball techniques to 
reach more interviewees. All of our interlocutors had already obtained their 
residence permit.
For contextualisation, I also draw on the quantitative dataset of the 
above-mentioned research project. We analysed the re-settlement histories 
of 19,000 refugees who had come to a Norwegian refugee centre between 
2005 and 2010, and who were later resettled in a municipality (Weiss 
et al., 2017).
Waiting and unbecoming
People get ill from waiting. If they stay long at reception centres, they get 
more and more stressed. They sleep badly, think a lot and have little future. 
(Hassan, a Syrian living in a reception centre, who has waited for resettlement 
for almost a year)
Waiting is considered as an inherent ingredient of migratory practices 
(Elliot, 2016; Janeja and Bandak, 2018; Barber and Lem, 2018). As a 
process, migration often takes time – sometimes several years until the 
final destination is reached. Migrants wait for an opportunity to emigrate. 
They wait for transport, tickets and money. They wait at border crossings, 
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in camps, and at immigration offices. They wait for their asylum applica-
tion to be approved. In the meantime, they wait to hear back from their 
lawyers and to receive a date for their hearing. They wait for being given 
a municipality and being settled. After having waited that long, waiting 
continues if they have applied for family reunion. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, waiting and its detrimental effects have been explored in research on 
paperless migrants (Bendixsen and Eriksen, 2018), in detention centres 
(Turnbull, 2016), asylum seekers (Rotter, 2016) and among those who 
stayed behind (Kwon, 2015; Elliot, 2016). In these studies, waiting is often 
described as painful, exhausting and associated with a lack of respect and 
dignity (Schwartz, 1974). Haas (2017) argues that waiting in the asylum 
system may be described as an ‘extreme situation’, in which uncertainty and 
investment are simultaneously maximised. People are forced to live with 
a dual uncertainty of time, in which change is both absent and imminent 
(Griffith, 2014 in Haas, 2017, p. 82). This total uncertainty, described by 
Haas, points to Bourdieu (2000), who made the direct link between time 
and power: ‘Waiting is one of the privileged ways of experiencing the effect 
of power, and the link between time and power’ (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 228). 
Where the one who is made to wait is forced into submission, the power-
ful is the one ‘who does not wait but who makes others wait’. Therefore, 
‘absolute power is the power to make oneself unpredictable and deny other 
people any reasonable anticipation, to place them in total uncertainty by 
offering no scope to their capacity to predict’ (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 228).
Prolonged insecurity, as waiting in the asylum system entails, may 
severely impact mental health, and researchers and migrants alike refer 
to this prolonged insecurity as psychological torture (Turnbull, 2016, p. 
69). We also know that long stays in reception centres after being granted 
asylum may have serious consequences for the refugees’ psychosocial health 
(Laban et al., 2004; Berg, 2012; Weiss, 2013; Weiss et al., 2017). Asylum 
seekers and refugees are already more vulnerable to certain psycho-somatic 
and physical illnesses (Marshall et al., 2005; Jakobsen et al., 2007; Bughra 
and Gupta, 2011) due to traumatic experiences in their home country and 
refuge, the loss of resources and social networks, and so on. Research on 
asylum seekers has shown that such experiences intensify through insecu-
rity, passivity and lack of meaningful future perspectives (Berg et al., 2005; 
Laban et al., 2008; Sveaas et al., 2012). Also, among the refugees who 
had been granted asylum but who were still waiting for resettlement in 
municipalities, feelings of insecurity, passivity and the lack of a meaningful 
future prevailed. The majority of our interlocutors reported experiences of 
depression, sleeplessness and other psychosomatic inflictions.
Being forced to wait affects experiences of temporality (Barber and Lem, 
2018), as the abundance of time, and the indefinite time left to wait, does 
something to people. Time is expensive, as Bisrat expressed in the introduc-
tion, ‘time is lost’ (Simonsen, 2018), or negated (Rotter, 2016) as people 
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live in the ‘nothing’ (Kublitz, 2015), while they watch those outside, in the 
‘normal’ world, getting on with their lives. The notion of life in nothing is 
explored in Kublitz’s (2015) article on the experiences of catastrophe by 
Palestinian refugees in Danish housing projects. Her interlocutors insist that 
the present catastrophe is worse than the past and recollect an abundance 
of life in spite of conflict, war and danger in Palestine and in Lebanese 
refugee camps. Their current life in Denmark, however, ‘was marked by 
decline and disillusion’. Kublitz draws our attention to the ordinary, chronic 
and cruddy in her interlocutors’ lives, and to the quasi-events, a concept 
coined by Povinelli (2011). ‘If events are things that we can say happened 
such that they have certain objective being, then quasi-events never quite 
achieve the status of having occurred or taken place. They neither happen 
nor not happen’ (Povinelli 2011, p. 13). Povinelli furthermore theorises the 
effect of these quasi-events. She speaks of the violence of enervation, ‘the 
weakening of the will rather than the killing of life’ and that ‘hopes and 
despair are conjured through the endurance of the exhaustion of numerous 
small quasi-events’ (Povinelli 2011, p. 13). As will become clear throughout 
this chapter, it is the violence of enervation, coupled with the imponderabil-
ity of the bureaucracy, which constitutes much of the experienced violence 
and negligence described below.
The reception centre as a waiting zone
The reception centre becomes like an open prison. Sometimes a prison could 
even be better, since you can get a proper education and a proper everything. 
In the reception centre, I cannot express it in English, it is a bad life. (Nasih, 
refugee from Eritrea who waited for three years to be settled)
Norwegian reception centres are voluntary accommodation offers [frivillig 
botilbud] (Weiss et al., 2017). This indicates that – at least on paper – refu-
gees and asylum seekers are not obliged to stay there during and after their 
asylum application has been processed. Asylum seekers and refugees are free 
to find their own accommodation, as long as that they inform the police and 
immigration authorities about their whereabouts and can provide for them-
selves. Asylum seekers and refugees have the right to allowances while in 
the immigration system. These allowances, however, are tightly linked to the 
stay in reception centres, and people lose the right to financial support upon 
leaving the reception centre. As Gordon, a refugee from Kenya who had 
chosen to leave the reception centre and to manage on his own, explains:
When I left [the reception centre] and came to Oslo everything stopped. 
Because in Norway, unlike in Sweden, when you leave the camp you are on 
your own. … Once you leave the camp, then that is the end of it. No allow-
ances from immigration so you really have to either get a job, or get somebody 
to help you. It was that simple.
The trauma of waiting 201
While Gordon had a social network in Norway that supported him and 
helped him to find accommodation and work, many refugees have neither 
resources nor networks. In spite of the voluntary nature of reception centres, 
most refugees therefore feel bound to stay there. They find themselves in a 
paradoxical situation well formulated by Turner (2015): ‘First, they cannot 
settle where they are because they are supposedly “on the move’” and 
‘second, they cannot remain “on the move” as they possibly are not going 
anywhere, either now or in the near future’. Refugees thus end up in a ‘time 
pocket, where time grinds to a halt inside the camp while normal time 
continues outside the camp’. Refugees often referred to their stay in recep-
tion centres as a period of powerlessness and constraint. Dependency on 
the reception centre for housing and financial support made it difficult for 
the refugees to take decisions over their own lives, to move or settle where 
they wished. Of course, refugees were allowed to move in and out of the 
centre – especially during daytime. However, there were strict rules as to 
when and how long a resident could leave the reception centre overnight 
(see also chapter 12).
You can leave the camp. You may go, but you have to report that you are 
going. You could not go away for more than I think a week, and you could 
not go frequently. There was a limit, because we were attending orientation 
classes and these kinds of things, so you could not miss them. (Gordon, 
Kenyan refugee, now settled)
Refugees had to apply for permission to leave the reception centre for longer 
periods, even after their asylum application had been processed and they 
had been granted residency. Although such permission was granted in most 
cases, the fact that refugees had to apply before leaving the centre aggra-
vated their feelings of isolation and incapacitation. Fethawi, a refugee from 
Syria in his twenties who had arrived in Norway after the outbreak of the 
Syrian Civil War, compared the reception centre and its control regime to 
life in prison:
Reception centres are like a prison. People control me [even] when I go out. 
If I want to go away for some days, the staff get angry with me and inquire 
where I have been. They threaten to sign me out [thus also threatening him 
with a cut in allowance]. (Fethawi, Syrian artist, still living in a reception 
centre and who has been waiting for a municipality for one year)
References to prisons were made frequently. Fethawi referred to what he 
called a control regime. Others mentioned the remoteness of the centres 
and the lack of transportation or money to get around (see also chapter 12 
below). However, associations to places of confinement came often simply 
from the fact that the reception centres were waiting zones, where time 
was lost. This temporal dimension, of course, refers to the fact that recep-
tion centres by definition are meant to be temporary, while in practice this 
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temporariness may become – if not permanent – then still indefinite. This 
became quite clear in the quote from Nasih, mentioned above: ‘The recep-
tion centre becomes like an open prison’. Nasih had received his residence 
permit after only a few months, but waited for three years to be settled in 
a municipality. Waiting in the reception centre was so difficult that he even 
would have preferred to stay in prison. At least in prison, time would not 
have been entirely lost. He could have found useful activities and maybe 
even continued his education. In the reception centre he only waited, waited 
for a municipality and for life to go on. For him, in experiencing his waiting 
time as indefinite, time was lost. As Bourdieu (2000) has reminded us, it 
is in the way time is spent that power relations become visible. While the 
powerful are able to fill time well, time is ‘killed’ for those who are made 
to wait. Of course, the confinement to a space, where time passes or maybe 
is killed, further accentuates the power imbalance. Several researchers have 
therefore pointed to the ‘time work’ (Rotter, 2016) that refugees engage in 
– an active but exhaustive attempt to find ‘distractions’ (Brux et al., 2018), 
which might make time pass.
Authorities and front-line bureaucrats knew of the importance of mean-
ingful activities, and of the detrimental effect of long-time passivity. There-
fore, refugees who lived in reception centres were encouraged to stay active 
and to partake in organised or unorganised activities outside. People went 
fishing, visited a church, or participated in the activities organised by the 
centre. Per decree, reception centres were required to provide their inhabit-
ants with meaningful activities (UDI Rundskriv RS 2008-027). There were, 
however, no specific guidelines as to which activities and how many should 
be organised. The lack of specifications and the relative discretion of the 
centres’ administrators as to the allocation of resources has led to a quite 
unequal offer in the different reception centres (Weiss, 2013; Lillevik et al., 
2017; Weiss et al., 2017). Furthermore, what is considered meaningful for 
some makes no sense for others. As Hassan, a Syrian refugee points out: 
‘We have lectures about FGM [Female Genital Mutilation], but there is no 
FGM in Syria. So this is totally meaningless for me.’ In general, therefore, 
it was mostly up to the refugees to fill their day with more or less meaning-
ful activities.
I do things to let the time pass by. I go fishing and do sports, do whatever I 
can find, so that the time passes by. The time passes by but it is of no benefit, 
because I do not do anything useful. I do not do anything to build up my life. 
Those who are already in municipalities, they are learning the language. They 
can start with university or do a job. But, whatever you do here is without 
any benefit. (Harun, Syrian refugee still living in reception centre)
In spite of the considerable energy refugees invested to make time pass and 
to be active, they still found themselves living in ‘nothing’. Waiting for life 
to start in an indeterminate future, enduring life in the waiting zones and 
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maintaining life under conditions of the ‘nothing’ required an enormous 
effort.
The absence and the living in nothing
It is not so easy to wait for a year – especially if you do not know whether 
it is a year or more. People who wait for a long time, they think of their 
family. I am tired of waiting – both physically and mentally. I am very afraid 
for my family. The longer my family reunion case takes, the longer my family 
will be exposed to war and violence. (Ali, a Syrian refugee, having waited 9 
months in reception centre)
The notion of living in ‘nothing’ has, as I outlined earlier, been coined by 
Kublitz (2015). The author demonstrated how this ‘nothing’ was ‘charac-
terised by absences: of homeland, family members, close friends, jobs, and 
good health’ (Kublitz, 2015, p. 230). The absence of security, of a future, 
and not least the absence of family members, was of course also very central 
in the lives of many refugees.
Adiba, a woman in her late twenties and mother of two children, had 
fled Sudan and arrived in Norway in 2011. ‘The whole family left because 
of problems and misery in my country. We left, and from that day onwards 
it had only been problems.’ The family came to Norway via Malta, and 
whereas Adiba and her two children were granted asylum in Norway, her 
husband was sent back to Malta under the Dublin agreement. (It seemed 
that her husband’s fingerprints had been taken in Malta, whereas Adiba’s 
and the children’s had not.) The family was thus forcefully split. Her 
husband returned several times illegally to Norway in order to visit the 
family. Sometimes he stayed for weeks, sometimes for months. The last time 
he had visited, he had been forcefully deported from their home and sent 
back to Malta.
Adiba has now employed a lawyer who is looking into her case, and she 
is hopeful that once they are finally settled in a municipality she will be able 
to bring her husband on the basis of family reunion. However, there were 
a number of possible issues with that plan. Firstly, Adiba was unsure 
whether and how her husband’s repeated illegal entry into Norway and his 
forceful deportation would influence an application for family reunion. 
Secondly, she did not know when she would be settled. At the time of our 
interview, Adiba had already waited two years for a municipality, and 
nothing pointed to a quick change in her situation. Abida did not consider 
a positive outcome for family reunion likely until she was settled in a 
municipality. When asked about her health, Adiba shrugged: ‘I try to keep 
myself occupied, but there is not much to do’. She had wanted to start with 
her obligatory introduction programme and was looking forward to Nor-
wegian courses and job training. The municipality in which her reception 
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centre was based, however, had little resources and offered the programme 
only to refugees who had settled there. As Adiba was not one of those, she 
had to wait. In the meantime, she had to stay in good health, she said, 
because of her children. ‘But I feel extremely sad and tired.’ As much as 
waiting for a municipality, it was the waiting for her husband to come and 
her family to be complete again that exhausted Adiba.
Families who migrate together only make up 8 per cent of the refugee 
population in Norway; 27 per cent of the refugee population in our quan-
titative dataset had children who did not live with them, and 19 per cent 
had fled with children, but without their spouse (Weiss et al., 2017). Reunit-
ing with their loved ones was therefore a major concern of many of the 
refugees we interviewed. While around 80 per cent of all applications for 
family unification had been approved in 2015 to 2017, getting their families 
safely to Norway was still highly challenging. The waiting time until their 
application was processed was between one-and-a-half to two years. In the 
meantime, the refugees had to cope with continued fear for their family 
members, who either still lived in the conflict zones or in refugee camps, 
and the need to provide for their loved ones without necessarily being able 
to do so. The insecurity over whether and when they would be united 
seemed to overshadow all other concerns. Thus, the struggle to obtain 
family reunion seemed to have a detrimental effect on refugees’ social and 
mental wellbeing.
When I met Mounir, a Syrian refugee, I met a man who was nearly out 
of his mind. His entire demeanour showed signs of extreme stress and 
anxiety. Mounir had arrived in 2014 and had been granted asylum very 
quickly – two months after his arrival. However, the system did not work 
as efficiently when it came to his family. Mounir had applied for family 
reunion with his wife and four children, who were living in destitute condi-
tions in Turkey. He had been informed that the procession of his application 
would take at least eighteen months – if there were no problems along the 
way. However, there was a problem in Mounir’s family. His daughter had 
a chronic illness, which required intensive – and thus expensive – care. 
Mounir feared that the Norwegian state was interested only in healthy refu-
gees, those who were easy to integrate. After all, quota refugees were, and 
still are, handpicked to fulfil the high standards set by the Norwegian 
government (Enes, 2017). Mounir reckoned that his daughter would fall 
outside of that category. Her condition was chronic, and she would need 
expensive care for the rest of her life. He therefore saw his chances for 
reunion with his family and resettlement in a municipality as meagre: ‘I am 
sitting here and waiting. I am afraid that the municipalities do not want us, 
since my child is handicapped.’ He had heard that municipalities refused to 
accept refugees who were considered an obvious financial burden, a rumour 
that was partially confirmed in our research (Weiss et al., 2017). Mounir 
was thus left in limbo, and in indeterminate anxiety and uncertainty, 
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knowing that he had the right to family reunion but also knowing that this 
right would not be effectuated in any immediate future.
Bureaucracy and unpredictable futures
I have now been waiting for five months and again nothing. I went to Oslo, 
but they said, we have a long list. But many friends of mine, who came after 
me, they got the municipality before me. That is what I do not understand. 
I do not understand what the problem is. (Harun, Kurdish refugee who 
has been waiting five months for resettlement after being accepted by a 
municipality)
While I agree with Whyte (2011) and others that the uncertainty inherent 
in the waiting for asylum is intrinsic to the immigration system, it is beyond 
my ethnographic material to state the same for the insecurity linked to 
waiting for resettlement. As I have mentioned, the Norwegian government 
did see the long stay in reception centres as highly problematic and has 
effectuated several measures to improve the situation – without any success, 
however. My point here is that there is at least an expressed will to care 
for these refugees in limbo, and to improve their living conditions.
Indeed, most street-level bureaucrats we talked to – be it the employees 
in reception centres or people working in the municipalities – said that they 
cared about the refugees and that they were deeply concerned for their 
wellbeing.
I try to spread confidence in a very insecure everyday life. I try to smile at 
everyone, to look the residents into their eyes every day. I want to give them 
the feeling that I care, and to see whether they are stressed or whether they 
have managed to sleep. I try to detect those whose feelings of stress and 
frustration have become unbearable. Life in reception centres exhausts people. 
A reception centre is meant for a maximum stay of three to six months only, 
not longer. (Nurse in reception centre, Northern Norway)
Street-level bureaucrats were especially concerned for those refugees who 
had mental or physical illnesses or who had developed psychosocial health 
problems:
Those with mental health issues or psychosomatic problems, they are the 
disadvantaged, and are treated unfairly. They are suffering even worse [than 
other refugees] under the long waiting period, I would say. They have more 
difficulties in handling the situation … How can they understand that someone 
has said yes – and granted them asylum – whereas they do not get this other 
yes from the municipality [which would enable them to settle]? This maybe 
sounds strange, but some of these refugees with special needs, they sit and 
wait for years after having received a residence permit. (Manager of a recep-
tion centre with a special unit for refugees and asylum seekers with special 
needs)
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This street-level bureaucrat had gone to great lengths in order to find 
municipalities for his residents. At one point, he had put a notice in one of 
the main newspapers, advertising on behalf of a refugee with severe mental 
health issues. The notice had been picked up by the national press and been 
widely discussed. This effort produced results: after having spent more than 
five years waiting for a municipality, the refugee was finally able to resettle 
and to get proper treatment. ‘But you cannot advertise for all of the resi-
dents, can you?’ he added.
Many of the refugees I talked to acknowledged the attempts at empathy 
and care by the street-level bureaucrats. However, these bureaucrats could 
only alleviate their everyday struggles, not reduce their insecurity. Whether 
and when a refugee was given a municipality to resettle was often beyond 
the knowledge of the employees in reception centres. In spite of attempts 
of empathy and care, the benevolent welfare state was often experienced as 
utterly violent.
Conclusion
In several of his works, Kafka explores the hopelessness, or rather the 
continuous crushed hopes, ‘as the protagonists are led from one false hope 
to another’ (Huber and Munro, 2014). Redemption is promised, but never 
tangible, never in sight. In the case of some of the refugees whose stories 
were told in this chapter, redemption was finally achieved. At some point, 
the refugees were assigned a municipality and allowed to start with the 
introduction programme, to learn Norwegian and to find a job. More than 
80 per cent of all applications for family reunion are granted. This means 
that at some point in the future, the vast majority of refugees ought to be 
able to reunite with their loved ones and to start their lives outside the 
camp, to return to normalcy.
Indeed, some of the refugees we talked to had managed to find a job or 
continue their education. Fethawi found a job in the local supermarket, 
Gordon is today well established with a family and job, and also Harun 
has finally been settled in a municipality and resumed his studies. The last 
time we met, he had married and was full of optimism for the future. 
Unfortunately, not all of the refugees we interviewed had managed to go 
on with their lives as they had planned. Several are still waiting for family 
reunion. Among those settled, a third have not managed to find a full-time 
job; they are more or less dependent on social welfare and their hopes and 
plans for their future remain remote. They continue to live in the ‘nothing’ 
and to experience the Norwegian welfare system as a Kafkaesque bureau-
cracy, which remains imponderable (see chapter 9 above). Their hopes were 
projected on the next generation, for whom hopefully the Norwegian 
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welfare state will be experienced as inherently caring, instead of ignorant, 
negligent and even violent.
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Bureaucratised banality: asylum and 
immobility in Britain, Denmark and Sweden
Bordering is not new to Northern and Western Europe. Although the 
erosion of physical and invisible boundaries is often celebrated – from the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain, to the implementation of the 
Schengen Agreement in 1985 – a resurgence of bureaucratic bordering is 
manifest (see also the Introduction in this volume). Gaining entry to Euro-
pean countries has become ever more restrictive, particularly since the 
1980s. Meanwhile, as Ana Aliverti (2012; 2013; 2015) has shown in depth, 
there has been a long term shift to administrative bordering through social 
policy, whilst Juliet Stumpf (2006; 2015) has concretely conceptualised the 
conflations between criminal law and immigration (or ‘crimmigration’) in 
ways which entangle border transgressors in criminal justice systems in the 
Global North.
This chapter briefly explores the impacts of increased external borders 
before developing an empirical analysis of the increase in internalised bor-
dering. Focusing on Britain,2 Denmark and Sweden as Northern cases, I 
outline ways in which people are kept out of these countries, and how this 
increased in the aftermath the European refugee crisis, which I term a 
refugee reception crisis.3 I will then turn my attention to the micro-level, 
everyday forms of bordering which impact on the wellbeing of people 
seeking asylum. These specifically relate to the deliberate erosion of auton-
omy through spatial isolation, destitution, detention, informal confinement, 
and social control. Those are experiences of bureaucratic violence (see the 
Introduction in this book).
The arguments drawn out here stem from multiple projects over a ten-
year period. Primary empirical data included in this chapter are based on 
interviews across three periods: reflections from a decade of activist partici-
pation and ethnography with women seeking asylum in the North West of 
England; interviews with psychologists and psychotraumatologists from a 
research project focusing on state and organisational responses to survivors 
of sexual torture in Denmark;4 and a two-year project on women’s experi-
ences of seeking asylum in Britain, Sweden and Denmark, funded by the 
Victoria Canning1
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Economic and Social Research Council.5 The last mentioned project incor-
porated seventy-four in-depth semi-structured interviews with psycholo-
gists, detention custody officers, support workers, border agents, refugee 
rights activists and other such social actors working with people seeking 
asylum. The material has been further enriched with six oral histories with 
women seeking asylum. The project also included visits to two immigration 
detention centres in Sweden, one in Denmark, a Danish deportation centre 
(udrejsecenter or udvisningscentre6) and ethnographic reflections from one 
month of visits to a Danish Red Cross asylum centre.
After the borders
‘There has been a narrowing of all the gaps through which people can 
obtain permission to stay legally in the state or permission to enter the state 
legally.’ This statement, made by an immigration lawyer I interviewed in 
the UK, is certainly reflective of the responses taken by Northern European 
countries in the aftermath of the European refugee reception crisis of 2015. 
In 2015, Sweden received considerably more people seeking asylum than 
the UK and Denmark did (Clante Bendixen, 2018). Whilst Sweden’s neigh-
bouring countries worked to ferment hostile environments for the increas-
ing numbers of people arriving to seek asylum, the Swedish government 
had a more welcoming attitude (Barker, 2018, pp. 1).
As the year progressed, however, so too did a politicised anti-immigrant 
sentiment in Sweden. The most obvious physical manifestation of border-
anxiety came with the closure of the Öresund Bridge which, from 24 
November 2015, was policed with travellers required to produce valid IDs 
and/or relevant visas. Although aspects of immigration control – such as 
detention, dispersal and deportation – were long embedded in all three 
countries, Denmark and Sweden, in particular, have seen substantive legisla-
tive shifts since 2015, aspects of which are discussed as this chapter pro-
gresses. On the whole, however, Sweden’s reputation as being open for 
migration shifted almost overnight (see chapters 2 and 7).
At the time of writing, Sweden has maintained its use of the Temporary 
Law of 2016, which limits stay to thirteen months before a requirement to 
reapply for asylum; and residence permits in Denmark have been reduced 
since 2015 from five-to-seven years, to one-to-two years. As such, although 
external border controls were not new, as the title of this section indicates, 
people I spoke with often referred to a point ‘after the borders’ or ‘since 
the borders’, in particular in Denmark and Sweden.
At the same time as Denmark and Sweden were hardening their internal 
and external borders, Britain, entrenched with a neoliberal island mentality, 
had long worked to build an externalising scaffold, which facilitated a 
buffering zone far from its own borders, lest such a crisis might unfold 
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(Carr, 2012; Andersson, 2014). Whilst the UK has maintained a five-year 
stay for those granted refugee status, the number of refusals has gradually 
increased, and the number of grounds on which to appeal a refusal have 
been reduced from seventeen to four (Immigration Act, 2014). Unlike 
Denmark and Sweden, Britain has always refused participation in the 
Schengen Agreement and has long outsourced visa restrictions, even to its 
own former colonies (Webber, 2012). Considering that Sweden, for example, 
is geographically further North than the UK, it should go without saying 
that the disproportionately low number of applications is not due simply 
to physical distance. It is instead the result of a long-term strategy to reduce 
the mobility capacity for people outside of the EU7 to reach British shores 
(Webber, 2016).
It was thus through these strategies that the UK was able to retain a 
kind of exclusivity in its response to the movements of migrants north. Two 
outcomes of these strategies are as follows: Britain received comparatively 
low numbers of asylum applications in 2015 and 2016, and facilitated 
instead a bottle neck build-up of people stranded at camps in Calais in 
France who were not able to make the final border crossing toward Britain. 
Controversially, this has included unaccompanied minors who otherwise 
had the right to be with their families already in the UK. In the aftermath 
of the European refugee reception crisis, the exacerbation of physical and 
bureaucratic boundaries to prevent and deter the mobilisation of people 
into (predominantly richer, Northern) countries became more concrete 
than ever.
The increasing internalisation of immigration controls
Compounding the problems that people experience in gaining entry to 
Britain, Denmark and Sweden is the increased use of internalised borders 
(Crawley and Sigona, 2016; Barker, 2018). For some time, clear and delib-
erate decisions have been made to make living in each country a lot more 
difficult for migrants generally and people seeking asylum specifically. In 
the UK, this has become widely known as the ‘Hostile Environment’, a term 
used by then Home Secretary (2010–2016), and later Prime Minister 
(2016–2019), Theresa May, to characterise an environment being devel-
oped for those living in Britain who, it was considered, should not be there 
(Kirkup and Winnett, 2012).
‘Enhanced motivation techniques’ have been employed in Denmark 
since 1997 – a way of encouraging coercive self-deportations by encourag-
ing reductions in autonomy and welfare allowances (Suárez-Krabbe et al., 
2018). However, a much harsher policy – more similar to the UK’s – was 
later promoted by the former Danish Minister for Immigration, Integration 
and Housing, Inger Støjberg, who promised to make life ‘intolerable’ for 
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people on ‘tolerated stay’ (see chapter 4). As the coordinator of a national 
support service for refugees in Denmark bluntly summarised it in the context 
of deportation centres: ‘They are designed to make life as intolerable as 
possible, to persuade people to go back.’ Also, people who have been 
accepted as refugees are affected, as a director at a Danish support facility 
for survivors of torture told me: ‘The new policies that have come into place 
for refugees that have achieved asylum are really tough, they’ve never been 
tougher than they are right now and we’re seeing levels of poverty that we 
have never experienced before. I mean this is really devastating.’
The policies to which he refers were known as Halvtreds Stramninger, or 
The Fifty Restrictions (as of April 2019, increased to 114 restrictions). The 
most internationally controversial of these was the introduction of The Jew-
ellery Law (see chapters 2 and 4 above), which reminded many Europeans 
of the Anti-Semitic politics of Nazi Germany. However, as this chapter goes 
on to evidence, it is the infliction of banality and isolation, including but 
not limited to deportation centres, which is most grinding in the everyday.
In Sweden, the general feeling amongst practitioners was that the state 
had created two borders. As one support worker for unaccompanied minors 
argued: ‘There are two border controls, and they took one away now and 
instead they said they would focus on controls inside the borders. So instead 
of checking IDs at the border, they said there are no safe zones right now’. 
The idea that there are ‘no safe zones’ is a direct reference to the increased 
efforts which have been gradually placed by states and state affiliated actors 
to infiltrate areas that are otherwise seen as safe from securitised controls. 
From interviews and conversations in the field, this has included the tar-
geting of religious buildings, organisations working with unaccompanied 
minors and undocumented migrants, and attempts by police to enter a 
popular informal language class.
The exacerbation of these controls was sharply experienced by Nour,8 a 
woman seeking asylum who had lived in Sweden for thirteen years and with 
whom I undertook the beginnings of an oral history within one of the two 
Swedish detention centres I visited. Nour is a survivor of multiple forms of 
male violence, and had originally sought asylum to avoid being returned to 
her husband, who she stated is a significant figure in Hezbollah. Having 
had her asylum application refused twice, she had been able to live in rela-
tive obscurity as a refused asylum applicant, living with Swedish friends 
who were able to provide her with legitimate and legal work. As internalised 
borders tightened, however, Nour was refused asylum once more – this time 
within two weeks of her application in 2017. She recalled:
The third time was really awful, because I have heard that it would take 
around two to three years before you got a response, either positive or nega-
tive, but this time they dropped all the other cases and were just focussing on 
me and they handed me over to the police immediately and I got a negative 
result in only two weeks.
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The period within which she was refused fell at the same time that Sweden 
was responding to unprecedented numbers of asylum applicants and – as 
a staff member at the Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) informed me 
– had hired new staff to organise the backlog. Having not known immigra-
tion detention centres even existed, Nour was subsequently arrested and 
moved to the centre where we met. She was confused and disorientated,9 
remembering, ‘the first four days I didn’t eat at all [Crying]. But now I’m 
starting to adapt to the environment’. Nour also argued that her refusal for 
asylum was in a way bureaucratic, in that the Migration Agency did not 
believe Lebanon to be unsafe for women due to inaccurate in-country 
information, and that ‘they listened but they didn’t believe me and I don’t 
understand who gave them the information that I was safe in my home 
country because I really wasn’t’. She was subsequently deported to Lebanon 
before the latter sections of her oral history could be developed.
Eradicating autonomy, eroding dignity
Whilst events such as deportation or detention are of serious significance 
and incredibly traumatic experiences in the lives of individuals affected, it 
is in the everyday that the impacts of grinding bureaucracies are often felt 
in the longer term. This is enacted through the deliberate reduction or 
removal of autonomy, and is a key facet of micro-level controls (see Canning, 
2019b). Across all three countries, asylum-seeking people’s access to every-
day activities are reduced – access to further and higher education is limited; 
nutritious food is often unaffordable, culturally specific foods often unob-
tainable; and travel unfeasibly expensive. These create what I have discussed 
elsewhere as autonomy harms and relational harms (Canning, 2017, pp. 
75–85), whereby people are (deliberately) infantilised and degraded through 
processes of forced dependence, social isolation and waiting (see also chap-
ters 9 and 11).
These bureaucratic borders are no less barbed in the everyday, but are 
differentially enforced. In all three countries, they are compounded by 
spatial isolation. In Britain, this can be seen in the practice of dispersal, 
whereby people are placed in towns and cities without any say on where, 
but which are often far from amenities and networks which could have 
promoted inclusion. Furthermore, many of these are situated in some of 
the poorest areas of the UK, since, ‘All of the top 10 areas for highest 
concentration of asylum seekers are in the north of England, Scotland and 
Wales and just one of the top 31 is in the south of England’ (Wheatstone,  
2016).
Asma’s case is an example of bureaucratic temporality. She has been 
‘stuck’ in the British asylum system for more than a decade with no right 
to work and – given that she has a young child with learning disabilities 
– is unlikely to be deported. Instead, she feels she is made to ‘waste the best 
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years of [her] life’. For Asma, a survivor of domestic violence living in the 
North West of England and whom I regularly visited, the distance from the 
city centre was compounded by two further impacts on autonomy. The first 
was her fear of the Home Office, the government body responsible for 
handling asylum claims and with which she had to report every week. As 
well as this appointment impacting on other duties and childcare, she 
reflected that: ‘I feel very scared when I go to the Home Office because they 
can detain with children as well. Oh yeah, I feel very, very scared’. The 
second related to the long-term experience of racist abuse and threats to 
report her from her housing officer, employed by a private company which 
was contracted by the Home Office. She stated that, ‘Even my manager is 
very bad, racist, all the time the comment that he gives me, he said, “Why 
have you people come to this country? You have to go back! Home Office 
will come and soon this house will be empty”.’ This was one example in a 
long line of many. At the time of writing, the housing officer in question 
has been suspended from his duties pending multiple investigations from 
various complainants.
In Denmark and Sweden, spatial isolation is a central facet of housing, 
since many people seeking asylum live in (often remote) asylum centres (see 
Asylum Information Database, 2017). Although technically open, and so 
not the same as the detention centres which will be discussed later, these 
centres are typically located on the periphery of towns or cities, if not alto-
gether isolated in Sweden’s rural north, or as Zachary Whyte documents, 
on small Danish islands (Whyte, 2011).
Denmark is a unique example in that, on application, people first live in 
Centre Sandholm, a reception (or processing) centre in former military bar-
racks approximately one-and-a-half hours from Copenhagen by bus and 
train – which are largely unaffordable for migrants.10 As Mahira, a survivor 
of domestic abuse and false imprisonment, reflected, ‘you don’t have money 
and you cannot go out if you don’t have money so how do you pay for the 
bus, for the train? So you cannot go out, you can walk … but you cannot 
go out. You can get a ticket, a bus ticket, a bus pass, only if you have an 
appointment with your doctor’. Alongside the spatial isolation, Mahira felt 
that the process itself was degrading, reflecting on hours of standing in lines 
for food and post (see Boochani, 2018 for discussions on ‘queuing as 
torture’), due to which she preferred to eat only twice a day. Moreover, her 
reflections on Sandholm embedded experiences of public ‘embarrassment’ 
and indeed an Othering of the non-Danish migrant body:
You have to wait there for the post and if you want to know something or 
you want to say something you have to wait in the gate. It took such a long 
time for me. And if they gave you the post and you collect the post it is in 
Danish. You are an asylum seeker from another country, you cannot read 
Danish, but you get the letter in Danish. So you need to ask, ‘Can you read 
this letter for me?’ And they read the letter in English and other people hear 
you. I was really embarrassed.
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Controversially, and as with the Ellebæk ‘Alien’s Centre’ – a closed deten-
tion centre – and Sjælsmark deportation centre, Sandholm is situated next 
to an active military camp. As a psychologist working nearby in Sandholm 
told me in 2014: ‘Sometimes you have military rehearsals around Sand-
holm. So they stand practising how to throw a grenade like 100 metres 
away, and all the people in Sandholm are just like, back in the war. People 
with PTSD … it’s completely absurd.’
People generally spend at least three to four weeks at Sandholm11 before 
they are transferred to an asylcenter. At the height of the so-called refugee 
crisis in 2015, Denmark opened multiple new centres. Many of these closed 
as the number of applications for asylum dropped, with only around nine 
centres in operation (not including departure or deportation centres) most 
of which are situated in rural, isolated areas in Jutland (Jylland).
Prior to its closure, I spent one month undertaking visits with women 
in an asylum centre in the rural southwest of Zealand (Sydvestsjælland). 
The centre was two hours away from Copenhagen by train, with limited 
resources in the town where it was situated. In any case, the lack of 
funds people had meant that few residents were able to exercise autonomy 
over meals, although collaborative cooking was a key way to maintain 
friendships, healthy eating and collegiality. Whilst some organisations in 
Copenhagen were able to offer travel reimbursements to people attend-
ing meetings, any women who had children were not able to benefit from 
this since they were expected to ensure their children were collected from 
nursery or school during the days – it was not possible to get to or from 
Copenhagen in the short time available. As Antonia, a survivor of sexual 
trafficking, reflected, ‘I go to church when I have money for a ticket. Last 
week, I didn’t have money. It’s only when I go to church, when they pay us, 
every two, three weeks, so I will get money’. The political and bureaucratic 
decision to house people in spatial peripheries thus impacts on religious and 
cultural practices and social lives.
In essence, isolation at centres is both spatial and, for some, an exercise 
in self-confinement. During visits I spent many hours in women’s rooms 
watching Danish or Nigerian television, kneading chapatti dough or talking. 
Any suggestions of other activities or exercise were met with exasperation, 
with the exception of one walk and some hours of cycling with one woman. 
There were numerous reasons for this. For Jazmine, a transwoman who 
had been persecuted in her country of origin, her experience of transphobia 
had, at the time, left her feeling vulnerable and thus choosing to stay alone 
in the asylum centre:
I was a lone trans in my room. They gave me a room alone and every day I 
sit in my room, there was no TV, no internet, nothing. I only see the trees 
and houses. A very difficult life I see… I have also right to work, eat, to live 
as I want, as a woman, but the Red Cross did not help me that time, that’s 
why due to the Red Cross, I [attempted] suicide [shows me scars on wrists].
Bureaucratised banality 217
For Antonia, there was a strong feeling of living in a prison, and that the 
people she was surrounded with were unsettling. Antonia had travelled by 
foot and car from Nigeria to Morocco, survived thirst by drinking her own 
urine in the desert, and endured significant levels of fear on a boat crossing 
to Spain at night. She was a survivor of sexual trafficking, first in Italy, then 
Denmark and Sweden, and had been living in camps for more than two 
years when we first met. She felt that, ‘asylum makes people crazy, when 
you’re sick in asylum, it’s not what you expect when you are in asylum, 
sister. [In] asylum [centres] you will not know your whereabouts, where 
you are going to. But they just got you like prisoners in the camp’.
As we can see here, Antonia’s life was reduced to feelings of confinement 
and isolation on the peripheries of Danish society. It was banal. ‘You eat, 
you sleep, did you come to Europe to eat and sleep?’ she had asked. The 
centre claimed to support vulnerable women – survivors of sexual violence, 
trafficking and domestic abuse – and yet there was no sustained psychologi-
cal support for people living there. Antonia spent much of her time in her 
small room, with only one bed between herself and her son, curtains closed 
and a Nigerian Christian television channel on repeating church services 
throughout the day. Her son, who was almost two, was unable to speak, 
much like many of the other children I met there. At the time she was 
thankful for not being in one of the (even more) isolated centres, since, 
‘right now they are taking some people to Jutland. They are moving them 
from here to Jutland. But anyway, it’s not my business. It’s too far away’. 
Sadly, when I last visited Avstrup departure centre in 2018 I unexpectedly 
met a friend of Antonia’s who informed me that she and her son had been 
moved to a centre in Jutland.
Internal detention as a tool for externalisation
Thus far I have focused on the informal aspects of spatial isolation that 
facilitate banality: poverty, asylum housing and dispersal, and self-
confinement in asylum centres. To reiterate earlier points, many aspects of 
internalised bordering were already being developed or implemented prior 
to 2015, but these were exacerbated and – as we will see in this section – 
exponentially increased since 2015. One aspect of this has been penal 
expansionism in the form of the immigration detention estate in all three 
countries, and the implementation of departure centres in Denmark.
Immigration detention is one further tactic of control which has been 
used differentially across Denmark, Sweden and the UK. Denmark has 
only two formal detention centres – literally referred to as Aliens Centres. 
In Sweden there are currently five centres, with (as informants working 
in two centres told me) views to expand over the next three years. The 
UK is an anomaly here. At present, there are seven immigration detention 
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centres – termed Immigration Removal Centres, also linguistically sanitised 
as IRCs.
Two key disparities sit between them: the capacity for detention, and the 
length of time people can be confined. At present, approximately 3,500 
people can be detained at any given time in the UK (Silverman, 2017), whilst 
in Denmark this is around 358 (Global Detention Project, 2016) and in 
Sweden around 700.12 Both Denmark and Sweden have a time limit for 
detention, respectively six months (with an option for an extension of 
twelve months) and twelve months (possibly longer in exceptional circum-
stances). There is no time limit for detaining people in British IRCs.
Although inherently harmful and violent, the objectives of immigration 
detention are clearer in Denmark and Sweden than in the UK. In Denmark, 
this is to contain people who are either deemed at risk of absconding or 
‘going underground’ (interview with centre governor) before they are 
deported, whilst in Sweden it is specifically meant as a final holding area 
prior to deportation, with exceptional circumstances where detainees are 
successful in appealing their refusal to stay in Sweden. One detention 
custody officer in a Swedish centre I visited synopsised: ‘we’re here to make 
sure that they’re available for deportation’ (see also Khosravi, 2009). As 
Mary Bosworth (2014) has shown in depth, the objectives of detention are 
much less clear in the UK, and this is hard felt as punishment by people 
who are confined. Apart from the prison-like regime and architecture, 
which itself is often under scrutiny (Bosworth and Turnbull, 2015; Shaw, 
2016; Women for Refugee Women, 2016), some people are left languishing 
even whilst appeals are ongoing or when their rights to refugee status are 
under review (Hasselberg, 2016).
The risk and threat of detention is a central driver of control in the UK. 
In 2017 alone, the UK detained 27,300 people in IRCs (Silverman and 
Griffiths, 2018). As argued elsewhere (Canning et al., 2017), the potential 
for detention becomes a key factor of anxiety for people seeking asylum, 
since they can be arbitrarily detained, often when attending weekly or 
monthly signings at the Home Office (a strategy to bureaucratically control 
the whereabouts and temporal autonomy of people seeking asylum). More-
over, the reasons for detaining people are incredibly broad, and work to 
further control the actions of people who are thus coerced into acting as 
docile bodies, compliant and apolitical since ‘women and men awaiting 
decisions to stay in Britain can be detained indefinitely when the “decision 
has been reached” on the basis of one or more of 13 reasons, with the 
thirteenth being “your unacceptable character, conduct or associations”’ 
(Canning, 2014, p. 11).
Similar to Cohen’s (1985) visions of social controls, law breaking is 
extended to state interpretations of non-criminalised actions or associa-
tions. It is, in effect, easy to be detained in the UK without necessarily being 
able to avoid it.
Bureaucratised banality 219
Denmark’s departure centres: the extraordinary case of  
false freedom
The more powerful and concerted political will is directed at keeping asylum 
seekers at a distance, socially disconnected, so as to facilitate their possible 
deportation. (Whyte, 2011, pp. 21)
At surface level then, one might be drawn to conclude that – compared to 
the UK – Denmark and Sweden are relatively ‘soft’ on detention (Barker, 
2013; Pratt and Eriksson, 2013; Ugelvik, 2013). I have contested this and 
addressed the harms of detention in Sweden elsewhere (Canning, 2019c). 
However, for the purposes of emphasising the pains of bureaucratic vio-
lence, it is worth focusing on the harms of deportation centres in Denmark.
In response to the rising number of asylum applications, and perhaps as 
a pre-emptive measure against applications yet to come, the Danish state 
established Udrejsecenter Sjælsmark in 2015, the country’s first deportation 
centre. Near to the centre for arrivals (Sandholm) and Ellebæk Aliens 
Centre, it is built in former military barracks approximately 25 kilometres 
north of Copenhagen, and takes around one hour and forty-five minutes to 
reach by public transport from the city centre.
Unlike Ellebæk detention centre, Sjælsmark is an open camp and although 
there is a curfew, residents are technically ‘free’ to come and go as they 
wish. With around 140 people living there at the time of writing, it is 
sprawling but not overcrowded. People have the option of eating three times 
a day at stipulated hours, and can travel to other cities. However, many are 
fundamentally limited by the lack of money to do so, and the potential 
reliance on food from the canteen if they cannot afford to eat elsewhere.
As figures 3 and 4 show, the militaristic architecture of the centre is quite 
clearly prisonlike – although people can leave, they must first pass through 
a guarded gate. Likewise, fences surround the communal areas, which was 
a point of discussion with a member of staff I interviewed:
D12: I think it’s hard for families to live there, when it looks like that, and 
there’s so many lawns there that you could sit on when it’s sunny but 
you can’t because there’s fences everywhere …
VC: Why do you think the fences are there?
D12: I dunno. I think it’s to make it … I dunno. To make it look like a prison?
This was reiterated by five other members of staff whom I interviewed. 
Indeed, there is no purpose for these wire fences other than to create a sense 
of confinement. They do not actually physically confine, but instead reduce 
autonomy and enforce banality: where children could play on the grass or 
meet in communal areas, the sense of imprisonment will stay pervasive, 
restricting where and how one moves through the centre. Banality is thus 
inflicted through the removal of options to live how one might wish to, or 
take part in activities ranging from basic rights, such as eating, to having 
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options for leisure. The aim of such a bureaucratised violence is therefore 
to induce a sense of nothingness, so that returning to any other circum-
stances in ones’ country of origin (or indeed a third party country) becomes 
preferable to banally watching time slip away.
Faiza was moved to the asylum centre in the southwest of Zealand in 
early 2017. She had endured a marriage with a man who controlled her 
3 Accommodation at Udrejsecenter Sjælsmark
4 Image of walkway at Udrejsecenter Sjælsmark
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until a point when, after having been brought to Denmark to marry and 
after the birth of two children, she could not endure the relationship any 
further. On the occasions I visited her at Sjælsmark, frustrations were clear, 
not only with the failures of her legal representative to open her case and 
thus move her from Sjælsmark (which did eventually happen), but the 
restrictions on food times and school times meant she was not able to leave 
the camp when she otherwise would go to get food she was culturally 
accustomed to. This was compounded by the withdrawal of funds: the 
‘pocket money’ which is given to people seeking asylum is removed once 
they enter the departure centre unless they agree to ‘comply’ with orders 
for removal and deportation. As Faiza argued: ‘I’m … fighting with life 
because they stopped my money. They don’t continue my pocket money, 
even though I cooperate with the police, because there’s immigration law, 
if we cooperate with the police then they give you money.’
The impacts of this extension of bureaucratic controls were personal and, 
for Faiza, highly gendered. She reflected that it was, ‘so bad because I have 
no more social life, I have nothing to do, I have nothing … anything [that’s] 
my own choice, I can’t do. So it’s the worst. I get tired a lot from my life, 
mainly physically I’m tired a lot, but just as a woman sometimes I feel I’ve 
died’. Moreover, as a survivor of domestic violence, Faiza felt that, ‘my 
husband and Danish immigration are the same for me. They are playing 
the same role, they’re both playing the same role for me. So I’m very tired’.
What has been made integral to Danish deportation centres is the delib-
erate strategy to induce banality. Although Red Cross staff I spoke with 
were working hard to implement activities for people living there, the politi-
cally driven objective was the opposite, as one staff member pointed out, 
since ‘our [then] minister has stated that they should be as unpleasant as 
possible for people to actually want to leave the country’. Thus Sjælsmark 
has become the embodiment of motivation enhancement measures set out 
in the Aliens Act 1997 (see Suárez-Krabbe et al., 2018), which aim to 
encourage people to leave ‘voluntarily’.
The message is clear: residents are technically free, but all means to 
survive independently are reduced and ultimately eradicated as a way to 
speed up removal. As a staff member working there told me, ‘It’s deliber-
ately not trying to make people stay, so there weren’t concerts every Friday 
night so you have something to look forward to’, whilst another synopsised, 
‘We’re discussing whether you should be allowed to do anything because 
it’s supposed to be motivating, for motivating people to depart’. Like closed 
detention centres, the intended outcome is the same: the removal of 
unwanted migrant bodies, spatially isolated so that out of sight becomes 
out of mind for the majority society. Existential confinement, banality and 
the reduction of autonomy replace formal confinement as a means to exter-
nalisation. It is thus only the strategies of the three countries I discuss which 
inherently differ.
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Conclusion
There have been clear efforts to reduce and deter people from seeking 
asylum in Northern Europe. Whilst calls have indeed been made for states 
such as Britain, Denmark and Sweden to ‘do their fair share’, in accom-
modating refugees (Morgan Johansson, cited in Orange, 2015), they have 
arguably not done so. Instead, fewer people are able to reach safety in 
Northern shores, and the lives of people seeking asylum in Northern Europe 
have been progressively made worse through bureaucratic controls and the 
infliction of harmful practices.
It is this point that has been the central focus of this chapter: the means 
by which people are deterred, degraded, detained, and, for some, deported. 
In the case of the UK, long-term bureaucratic efforts to offshore and out-
source border control responsibilities were ultimately successful in their bid: 
the UK was broadly unaffected by the increase in people seeking asylum as 
2015 and 2016 progressed. As I have argued, externalisation works to 
refuse entrance before people even leave their country of origin through 
visa regulation. For those who have made it further North, the final reach 
to Britain has been blockaded by the increased financing of physical border 
expansionism.
As 2015 progressed, so too did Danish and Swedish efforts to reduce 
entry by securitising the borders between Denmark and Sweden as well as 
between Denmark and Germany through border controls and increased 
deportations. These have been supplemented by strategies to deter – some 
tactics are new, some are bolstered versions of policies already in exis-
tence. From the empirical data reflected on throughout this chapter, it 
is clear that the realities of poverty, uncertainty and lack of autonomy 
render people dependent on state agendas even to the micro-level – where 
they go, how they travel, who they spend time with, how long they spend 
it, where it is spent. Asylum centres in Denmark and Sweden may differ 
from dispersal in the UK, but spatial isolation remains a central facet of 
internalised controls – further embodied in the use of formal immigration 
detention.
To that end, it is worth drawing a conclusion from a national coordina-
tor for a refugee women’s support organisation in the UK. Although focus-
ing on Britain, it is clear that the points she raises are increasingly applicable 
to Danish and Swedish state counterparts:
the Home Office doesn’t want to grant asylum to very many people and 
whether it has explicit … numerical targets on that or not, the ethos of the 
asylum system, if you think about, all of the things that happen in it – from 
dispersing people, or giving them tiny amounts of money, to not letting them 
work, to detaining people – it just seems really clear that in all of these kinds 
of stages of the asylum process you’ve got a system that doesn’t want those 
people to be here.
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The outcome is uncertainty, threat of detention and ultimately deportation. 
It is the deliberate infliction of bureaucratic violence on and within North-
ern borders.
Notes
1 Grant information: This research is funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council, grant number ES/NO16718/1.
2 The term ‘Britain’ is used when referring to empirical research, which did not 
include Northern Ireland. Where relevant statistics or legislation are referred 
to, it is the UK.
3 This accounts for the fact that the increase in refugees arriving in Europe was 
predictable and predicted. It is instead more appropriate linguistically to 
address the crisis in responding adequately to refugees, which has exacerbated 
border harms and indeed border related deaths. Many thanks to Karam Yahya 
and Alaa Kassab for insightful conversations on framing this.
4 Undertaken in 2014. See Canning, 2016 for fuller context.
5 Entitled Gendered Experiences of Social Harm in Asylum: Exploring State 
Responses to Persecuted Women in Britain, Denmark and Sweden, grant 
number ES/NO16718/1.
6 The first translates as ‘departure centre’, but this is contested by Lindberg et al. 
who – along with people living there – refer to it as the second, translating as 
a ‘deportation centre’. See Suárez-Krabbe et al (2018).
7 This case has now expanded in the aftermath of Brexit to further include EU 
migrants, including economic migrants and European students.
8 This is a pseudonym, as are all the other names in this chapter.
9 Considering Nour’s upset state of mind, I repeatedly asked if she was sure she 
wanted to take part in any of the oral history, to which she vehemently asked 
to participate as she felt women’s rights were not represented in the Swedish 
asylum system.
10 When I last visited Sandholm in 2018 a bicycle system had been introduced to 
facilitate free travel to the train station. Whilst a positive initiative, this does 
not solve the problem of inaccessible travel for a) people who cannot afford 
train travel and b) people with dependent children – a disproportionately gen-
dered issue (see Canning, 2019a; 2019b).
11 Interviews I undertook with staff members working there raised concerns that 
some were staying for periods of months.
12 These numbers are based on interview information with governors working in 
Sweden. Statistics from the Global Detention Project suggest much fewer, with 
255 spaces, but this is inconsistent with a) the numbers in the centres I visited, 
which across two already reach this, and b) the information given by staff.
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